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RISE AND DEMISE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE

By JOHN H. HERZ

STUDENTS and practitioners of international politics are at present in a strange predicament. Complex though their problems have been in the past, there was then at least some certainty about the "givens," the basic structure and the basic phenomena of international relations. Today one is neither here nor there. On the one hand, for instance, one is assured—or at least tempted to accept assurance—that for all practical purposes a nuclear stalemate rules out major war as a major means of policy today and in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, one has an uncanny sense of the practicability of the unabated arms race, and a doubt whether reliance can be placed solely on the deterrent purpose of all this preparation. We are no longer sure about the functions of war and peace, nor do we know how to define the national interest and what its defense requires under present conditions. As a matter of fact, the meaning and function of the basic protective unit, the "sovereign" nation-state itself, have become doubtful. On what, then, can policy and planning be built?

In the author's opinion, many of these uncertainties have their more profound cause in certain fundamental changes which have taken place in the structure of international relations and, specifically, in the nature of the units among which these relations occur. This transformation in the "statehood" of nations will be the subject of this article.

I. Basic Features of the Modern State System

Traditionally, the classical system of international relations, or the modern state system, has been considered "anarchic," because it was based on unequally distributed power and was deficient in higher—that is, supra-national—authority. Its units, the independent, sovereign nation-states, were forever threatened by stronger power and survived precariously through the balance-of-power system. Customarily, then, the modern state system has been contrasted with the medieval system, on the one hand, where units of international relations were under higher law and higher authority, and with those more recent international trends, on the other, which seemed to point toward a greater, "collec-

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tive" security of nations and a "rule of law" that would protect them from the indiscriminate use of force characteristic of the age of power politics.

From the vantage point of the atomic age, we can probe deeper into the basic characteristics of the classical system. What is it that ultimately accounted for the peculiar unity, compactness, coherence of the modern nation-state, setting it off from other nation-states as a separate, independent, and sovereign power? It would seem that this underlying factor is to be found neither in the sphere of law nor in that of politics, but rather in that substratum of statehood where the state unit confronts us, as it were, in its physical, corporeal capacity: as an expanse of territory encircled for its identification and its defense by a "hard shell" of fortifications. In this lies what will here be referred to as the "impermeability," or "impenetrability," or simply the "territoriality," of the modern state. The fact that it was surrounded by a hard shell rendered it to some extent secure from foreign penetration, and thus made it an ultimate unit of protection for those within its boundaries. Throughout history, that unit which affords protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit; people, in the long run, will recognize that authority, any authority, which possesses the power of protection.

Some similarity perhaps prevails between an international structure consisting of impenetrable units with an ensuing measurability of power and comparability of power relations, and the system of classical physics with its measurable forces and the (then) impenetrable atom as its basic unit. And as that system has given way to relativity and to what nuclear science has uncovered, the impenetrability of the political atom, the nation-state, is giving way to a permeability which tends to obliterate the very meaning of unit and unity, power and power relations, sovereignty and independence. The possibility of "hydrogenization" merely represents the culmination of a development which has rendered the traditional defense structure of nations obsolete through the power to by-pass the shell protecting a two-dimensional territory and thus to destroy—vertically, as it were—even the most powerful ones. Paradoxically, utmost strength now coincides in the same unit with utmost vulnerability, absolute power with utter impotence.

This development must inevitably affect traditional power concepts. Considering power units as politically independent and legally sovereign made sense when power, measurable, graded, calculable, served as a standard of comparison between units which, in the sense indicated

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above, could be described as impermeable. Under those conditions, then, power indicated the strategic aspect, independence the political aspect, sovereignty the legal aspect of this selfsame impermeability. With the passing of the age of territoriality, the usefulness of these concepts must now be questioned.

Thus the Great Divide does not separate "international anarchy," or "balance of power," or "power politics," from incipient international interdependence, or from "collective security"; all these remain within the realm of the territorial structure of states and can therefore be considered as trends or stages *within* the classical system of "hard shell" power units. Rather, the Divide occurs where the basis of territorial power and defensibility vanishes. It is here and now. But in order to understand the present, we must study more closely the origin and nature of the classical system itself.

II. The Rise of the Territorial State

The rise of the modern territorial state meant that, within countries, "feudal anarchy" of jurisdictions yielded to the ordered centralism of the absolute monarchy, which ruled over a pacified area with the aid of a bureaucracy, a professional army, and the power to levy taxes, while in foreign relations, in place of the medieval hierarchy of power and authority, there prevailed insecurity, a disorder only slightly attenuated by a power balance that was forever being threatened, disturbed, and then restored. Such has been the customary interpretation.

It is possible to view developments in a somewhat different light. Instead of contrasting the security of groups and individuals within the sovereign territorial state with conditions of insecurity outside, the establishment of territorial independence can be interpreted as an at least partially successful attempt to render the territorial group secure in its outward relations as well. Especially when contrasted with the age of anarchy and insecurity which immediately preceded it, the age of territoriality appears as one of relative order and safety.

Indeed, the transition from medieval hierarchism to modern compartmentalized sovereignties was neither easy, nor straight, nor short. Modern sovereignty arose out of the triangular struggle among emperors and popes, popes and kings, and kings and emperors. When the lawyers of Philip the Fair propounded the dual maxim according to which the king was to be "emperor in his realm" (*rex est imperator in regno suo*) and was no longer to "recognize any superior" (*superiorem non recognoscens*), it was the beginning of a development in the course of which,

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in McIlwain's words, "Independence *de facto* was ultimately translated into a sovereignty *de jure*."[1] But centuries of disturbance and real anarchy ensued during which the problems of rulership and security remained unsettled. The relative protection which the sway of moral standards and the absence of highly destructive weapons had afforded groups and individuals in the earlier Middle Ages gave way to total insecurity when gunpowder was invented and common standards broke down. Out of the internal and external turmoil during the age of religious and civil wars, a "neutralist" central power eventually managed to establish itself in and for each of the different territories like so many *rochers de bronze*.

The idea that a territorial coexistence of states, based on the power of the territorial princes, might afford a better guarantee of peace than the Holy Roman Empire was already widespread at the height of the Middle Ages when the emperor proved incapable of enforcing the peace.[2] But territoriality could hardly prevail so long as the knight in his castle (that medieval unit of impermeability) was relatively immune from attack, as was the medieval city within its walls. Only with a developing money economy were overlords able to free themselves from dependence on vassals and lay the foundations of their own power by establishing a professional army. Infantry and artillery now proved superior to old-style cavalry, firearms prevailed over the old weapons.

As in all cases of radically new developments in military technology, the "gunpowder revolution" caused a real revolution in the superstructure of economic, social, and political relationships because of its impact on the units of protection and security. A feeling of insecurity swept all Europe.[3] Though a Machiavelli might establish new rules as to how to gain and maintain power, there still followed more than a century of unregulated, ideological "total" wars inside and among

[1] Charles H. McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West*, New York, 1932, p. 268.

[2] F. A. von der Heydte, *Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates*, Regensburg, 1952, pp. 103ff., 277, 293ff.

[3] Ariosto expressed the feeling of despair which invaded the "old powers" of chivalry when gunpowder destroyed the foundations of their system, in terms reminding one of present-day despair in the face of the destructive forces loosed upon our own world:

> "Oh! curs'd device! base implement of death!
> Framed in the black Tartarean realms beneath!
> By Beelzebub's malicious art design'd
> To ruin all the race of human kind."

Quoted from *Orlando Furioso* by Felix Gilbert, in Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, N.J., 1943, p. 4.

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countries until the new units of power were clearly established. Before old or new sovereigns could claim to be recognized as rulers of large areas, it had to be determined how far, on the basis of their new military power, they were able to extend their control geographically.[4]

The large-area state came finally to occupy the place that the castle or fortified town had previously held as a unit of impenetrability. But the new unit could not be considered consolidated until all independent fortifications within it had disappeared and, in their place, fortresses lining the circumference of the country had been built by the new central power and manned by its armed forces.[5] If we contrast our present system of bases and similar outposts surrounding entire world regions with what are today small-scale nation-states, perhaps we can visualize what the hard shell of frontier fortifications consolidating the then large-scale territorial states meant by way of extending power units in the age of absolutism. They became, in the words of Frederick the Great, "mighty nails which hold a ruler's provinces together." There now was peace and protection within. War became a regularized military procedure; only the breaking of the shell permitted interference with what had now become the internal affairs of another country.

In this way was established the basic structure of the territorial state which was to last throughout the classical period of the modern state system. Upon this foundation a new system and new concepts of international relations could arise. And as early as the second half of the seventeenth century a perspicacious observer succeeded in tying up the new concepts with the underlying structure of territorial statehood.

III. The Nature of Territoriality

It was hardly a coincidence that this connection was established shortly after the end of the Thirty Years' War, when formal sanction had been given to territorial sovereignty in the Westphalian Peace. For here was the turning point, the Great Divide between what were still partially medieval situations reflecting a certain permeability of the rising nation-state (when, for instance, outside powers could still ally themselves with *frondes* within a country against that country's sovereign) and the modern era of closed units no longer brooking such interference.[6]

[4] On this, see Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, Boston, 1955, pp. 59ff., 121ff., 205ff.

[5] See Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsraison in der neueren Geschichte*, Munich and Berlin, 1925, pp. 241ff.

[6] The emergence of "non-intervention" as a legal concept illustrates this transition.

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The clarification of the nature of territoriality to which we referred above is found in a little and little-known essay by Leibniz, written for an entirely pragmatic purpose—namely, to prove the right of legation of the territorial ruler (the Duke of Hanover) in whose service the philosopher then was.[7] Leibniz' problem derived directly from the situation created by the Peace of Westphalia. This settlement, for all practical purposes, had conferred sovereign independence upon those princes who formally were still included in the Empire; yet it had not abolished the long-established, essentially feudal structure of the Empire itself, with its allegiances and jurisdictions, its duties of membership, and even its clumsy and scarcely workable framework of government. Thus some of the factually sovereign territorial rulers in Europe were somehow still under a higher authority. Were they now "sovereign" or not? What accounted for sovereignty?

Leibniz' contemporaries failed to see the problem in this light. The muddled state of affairs was made to order for those jurists and others who argued fine points perennially with the aid of sterile or obsolete concepts. Leibniz, instead, proceeded to study "what actually happens in the world today," and as a result could boast of being "the first to have found the valid definition of sovereignty."[8]

As he saw it, the first condition for sovereignty was a minimum size of territory. Minuscule principalities, at that time still abundant, could not claim to be on a par with those that recognized each other as equally sovereign in respect to peace and war, alliances, and the general affairs of Europe, because, not possessing sufficient territory, they could at best, with their garrisons, only maintain *internal* order.[9] But there remained the chief problem: how to define the status of those rulers who, because of their membership in the Empire, were subjects of the emperor. Could one be "sovereign" and "subject" at the same time? If not, what was the status of these "subject" rulers as compared with that of their

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A complete change in the meaning of the term occurred in the brief period between the time of Grotius and that of Pufendorf. Grotius, writing during the last phase of the pre-modern era of religious and "international civil" wars and still thinking in terms of "just" and "unjust" wars, considered a ruler entitled to intervene in the affairs of another sovereign if it was necessary to defend oppressed subjects of the latter; Pufendorf, barely fifty years later, rejected such interference in the "domestic affairs" of another sovereign as a violation of the sovereign's exclusive jurisdiction over his territory and all it contained. See Walter Schiffer, *The Legal Community of Mankind*, New York, 1954, pp. 34f., 56.

[7] "Entretiens de Philarète et d'Eugène sur le droit d'Ambassade"; quoted here from *Werke*, 1st series, III, Hanover, 1864, pp. 331ff.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 340, 342.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 349.

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"sovereign" European brethren? If so, what did their subjection to the emperor amount to? These questions were further complicated by the fact that at every European court, and in the Empire as well, there were certain high dignitaries, often called "princes," "dukes," etc., who customarily held the rank of "sovereign." It was through this maze of relationships that Leibniz arrived at his definitions.

He elaborated his concept of sovereignty by distinguishing it from "majesty." Majesty, the authority which the emperor has *qua* emperor over the Empire's members, consists of a number of jurisdictions that confer the right to demand obedience and involve duties of fealty, but it is not sovereignty. Why not? Simply because, with all its supreme authority, majesty does not involve an "actual and present power to constrain" subjects on their own territories. Their territory, in other words, is impermeable. The subject, on the other hand, if he is a territorial ruler, is sovereign because he has the power to constrain *his* subjects, while not being so constrainable by superior power. The decisive criterion thus is actual control of one's "estates" by one's military power, which excludes any other power within and without. Contrariwise, the absence of such forces of his own on his subjects' territories accounts for the absence of "sovereignty" in the emperor's "majesty." He can enforce his authority or rights only by applying his own or other sovereigns' forces from the outside, "by means of war." But in doing so, his condition is no different from that of any other sovereign vis-à-vis *his* fellow-rulers, for war is a contest which can be inaugurated not only by majesties but by any sovereign ruler. And force of arms may constrain a sovereign outside the Empire quite as well as one inside; in fact, war constitutes the only way in which even sovereigns can be constrained.[10] By perceiving that the emperor's power to enforce his authority was actually reduced to means of war, Leibniz was in a position to demonstrate that any and all rulers of impermeable territory, whatever their status in regard to imperial authority, were equal in their sovereign status.

This capacity also distinguished them from those dignitaries who were sovereigns in name only. Leibniz, by way of example, referred to the non-sovereign status of certain papal "princes," contrasting it with that of sovereign princes: "Should His Holiness desire to make . . . [the papal princes] obey, he has merely to send out his 'sbirros' [bailiffs],

[10] "La souveraineté est un pouvoir légitime et ordinaire de contraindre les sujets à obéir, sans qu'on puisse être contraint soy même si ce n'est par une guerre" (*ibid.*, p. 352).

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but in order to constrain . . . [the sovereign princes] he would need an army and cannon."[11] Similarly, if the Empire wants to constrain a sovereign member, "what would begin as court procedure in an imperial Tribunal, in execution would amount to a war."[12] In the new age of territoriality, those superior in law no longer could use the machinery of government (courts, etc.) to enforce claims against territorial rulers.[13] In more recent times, this has come to be the relationship between sovereign nation-states as members of international organizations (like the League of Nations or the United Nations) and the organizations as such.

IV. The Territorial State in International Relations

From territoriality resulted the concepts and institutions which characterized the interrelations of sovereign units, the modern state system. Modern international law, for instance, could now develop. Like the international system that produced it, international law has often been considered inherently contradictory because of its claim to bind sovereign units. But whether or not we deny to it for this reason the name and character of genuine law, it is important to see it in its connection with the territorial nature of the state system that it served. Only then can it be understood as a system of rules not contrary to, but implementing, the sovereign independence of states. Only to the extent that it reflected their territoriality and took into account their sovereignty could international law develop in modern times. For its general rules and principles deal primarily with the delimitation of the jurisdiction of countries. It thus implements the *de facto* condition of territorial impenetrability by more closely defining unit, area, and conditions of impenetrability. Such a law must reflect, rather than regulate. As one author has rightly remarked, "International law really amounts to laying down the principle of national sovereignty and deducing the consequences."[14] It is not for this reason superfluous, for sov-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 354. [12] *Ibid.*, p. 358.

[13] Leibniz' emphasis on constraint as a primary prerequisite of sovereignty might strike later observers as over-materialistic. But one should remember that the *rocher de bronze* of sovereignty was only then being established, not only against outside interference but also against still recalcitrant feudal powers within the territorial ruler's realm, and even in the latter case frequently by force of arms and armed forces which to the defeated may well have appeared as something very much like occupation forces. As a matter of fact, "garrisoning" is a key word in Leibniz' arguments: "As long as one has the right to be master in one's own house, and no superior has the right to maintain garrisons there and deprive one of the exercise of one's right of peace, war, and alliances, one has that independence which sovereignty presupposes (*liberté requise à la Souveraineté*)" (*ibid.*, p. 356).

[14] François Laurent, as quoted by Schiffer, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

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ereign units must know in some detail where their jurisdictions end and those of other units begin; without such standards, nations would be involved in constant strife over the implementation of their independence.

But it was not only this mutual legal accommodation which rendered possible a relatively peaceful coexistence of nations. War itself, the very phenomenon which reflected, not the strength, but the limitations of impermeability, was of such a nature as to maintain at least the principle of territoriality. War was limited not only in conduct but also in objectives. It was not a process of physical or political annihilation but a contest of power and will in which the interests, but not the existence, of the contestants were at stake. Now that we approach the era of absolute exposure, without walls or moats, where penetration will mean not mere damage or change but utter annihilation of life and way of life, it may dawn on us that what has vanished with the age of sovereignty and "power politics" was not entirely adverse in nature and effects.

Among other "conservative" features of the classical system, we notice one only in passing: the balance of power. It is only recently that emphasis has shifted from a somewhat one-sided concern with the negative aspects of the balance—its uncertainty, its giving rise to unending conflicts and frequent wars, etc.—to its protective effect of preventing the expansionist capacity of power from destroying other power altogether.[15] But at the time of its perfection in statecraft and diplomacy, there were even theories (not lived up to in practice, of course) about the *legal* obligations of nations to form barriers against hegemony power in the common interest.[16]

More fundamental to the conservative structure of the old system was its character as a community. Forming a comparatively pacified whole, Europe was set off sharply against the world outside, a world beyond those lines which, by common agreement, separated a community based on territoriality and common heritage from anarchy, where the law of nature reigned and no standards of civilization applied. Only recently have the existence and role of so-called "amity lines" been rediscovered, lines which were drawn in the treaties of the early modern period and which separated European territories, where the rules of war and peace

[15] See my *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Chicago, 1951, pp. 206-21.

[16] J. von Elbe, "Die Wiederherstellung der Gleichgewichtsordnung in Europa durch den Wiener Kongress," *Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, IV (1934), pp. 226ff.

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were to prevail, from overseas territories and areas.[17] There was to be "no peace beyond the line"; that is, European powers, although possibly at peace in Europe, continued to be *homo homini lupus* abroad. This practice made it easier for the European family of nations to observe self-denying standards at home by providing them with an outlet in the vast realm discovered outside Europe. While the practice of drawing amity lines subsequently disappeared, one chief function of overseas expansion remained: a European balance of power could be maintained or adjusted because it was relatively easy to divert European conflicts into overseas directions and adjust them there. Thus the openness of the world contributed to the consolidation of the territorial system. The end of the "world frontier" and the resulting closedness of an interdependent world inevitably affected this system's effectiveness.

Another characteristic of the old system's protective nature may be seen in the almost complete absence of instances in which countries were wiped out in the course of wars or as a consequence of other power-political events. This, of course, refers to the territorial units at home only, not to the peoples and state units beyond the pale abroad; and to the complete destruction of a state's independent existence, not to mere loss of territory or similar changes, which obviously abounded in the age of power politics.

Evidence of this is to be found not only in a legal and political ideology that denied the permissibility of conquest at home while recognizing it as a title for the acquisition of territorial jurisdiction abroad.[18] For such a doctrine had its non-ideological foundation in the actual difference between European and non-European politics so far as their territoriality was concerned. European states were impermeable in the sense here outlined, while most of those overseas were easily penetrable by Europeans. In accordance with these circumstances, international politics in Europe knew only rare and exceptional instances of actual annihilation through conquest or similar forceful means.

Prior to the twentieth century, there were indeed the Napoleonic conquests, but I submit that this is a case where the exception confirms the rule. The Napoleonic system, as a hegemonial one, was devised to de-

[17] See Carl Schmitt, *Der Nomos der Erde*, Cologne, 1950, pp. 60ff.; also W. Schoenborn, "Über Entdeckung als Rechtstitel völkerrechtlichen Gebietserwerbs," in D. S. Constantinopoulos and H. Wehberg, eds., *Gegenwartsprobleme des internationalen Rechts und der Rechtsphilosophie*, Hamburg, 1953, pp. 239ff.

[18] On this, see M. M. McMahon, *Conquest and Modern International Law*, Washington, D.C., 1940; M. F. Lindlay, *The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law*, London, 1926; and Robert Langer, *Seizure of Territory*, Princeton, N.J., 1947.

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stroy the established system of territoriality and balanced power as such. Consequently, Napoleon and his policies appeared "demonic" to contemporaries,[19] as well as to a nineteenth century which experienced the restoration of the earlier system. During that century occurred Bismarck's annexations of some German units into Prussia in pursuance of German unification. As in Napoleon's case, they appeared abnormal to many of his contemporaries, although the issue of national unification tended to mitigate this impression.[20] Besides these, there was indeed the partition of Poland, and considering the lamentable and lasting impression and the universal bad conscience it produced even among the ruling nations in a century used to quite a bit of international skulduggery, again one may well claim an exceptional character for that event.[21]

What, in particular, accounts for this remarkable stability? Territoriality—the establishment of defensible units, internally pacified and hard-shell rimmed—may be called its foundation. On this foundation, two phenomena permitted the system to become more stable than might otherwise have been the case: the prevalence of the legitimacy principle and, subsequently, nationalism. Legitimacy implied that the dynasties ruling the territorial states of old Europe mutually recognized each other as rightful sovereigns. Depriving one sovereign of his rights by force could not but appear to destroy the very principle on which the rights of all of them rested.

With the rise of nationalism, we witness the personalization of the units as self-determining, national groups. Nationalism now made it appear as abhorrent to deprive a sovereign nation of its independence as to despoil a legitimate ruler had appeared before. States, of course, had first to become "nation-states," considering themselves as representing specific nationality groups, which explains why in the two regions of Europe where larger numbers of old units stood in the way of national unification their demise encountered little objection. In most instances, however, the rise of nationalism led to the emergence of *new* states, which split away from multinational or colonial empires. This

[19] As witness the impression made on contemporaries by the destruction of the first ancient European unit to fall victim to these policies—Venice.

[20] See Erich Eyck, *Bismarck*, II, Zurich, 1943, pp. 305ff.

[21] Except for these cases, we find only marginal instances of complete obliteration. The annexation of the Free City of Krakow by Russia eliminated a synthetic creation of the Vienna settlement. British conquest of the Boer Republics, if considered as an instance of annihilation of European polities in view of the European origin of the inhabitants, happened at the very rim of the world, as it were, remote from the continent where the practice of non-annihilation prevailed.

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meant the extension of the European principle of "non-obliteration" all over the world. It is perhaps significant that even in our century, and even after the turmoil of attempted world conquest and resulting world wars, a point has been made of restoring the most minute and inconsiderable of sovereignties, down to Luxembourg and Albania.[22]

This hypertrophy of nation-states presented new problems—above all, that of an improved system of protection. For by now it had become clear that the protective function of the old system was only a relative blessing after all. Continued existence of states as such was perhaps more or less guaranteed. But power and influence, status, frontiers, economic interests—in short, everything that constituted the life and interests of nations beyond bare existence—were always at the mercy of what power politics wrought. Furthermore, much of the relative stability and political equilibrium of the territorial states had been due to the extension of Western control over the world. When what could be penetrated had been subjugated, assimilated, or established as fellow "sovereign" states, the old units were thrown back upon themselves. Hence the demand for a new system which would offer more security to old and new nations: collective security.

I propose to view collective security not as the extreme opposite of power politics, but as an attempt to maintain, and render more secure, the impermeability of what were still territorial states. To an age which took territoriality for granted, replacing power politics with collective security would indeed appear to be a radical departure. From the vantage point of the nuclear age, however, a plan to protect individual sovereignties by collective guarantees for continuing sovereignty appears questionable not because of its innovating, but because of its conservative, nature. Its conservatism lies in its basic objective: the protection of the hard-shell territorial structure of its members, or, as the core article of the Covenant of the League of Nations put it, its guarantee of their "territorial integrity and political independence" against external aggression. The beginning of air war and the increasing economic interdependence of nations had indicated by the end of World War I that the old-style military barriers might be by-passed. If territorial units were to be preserved in the future, it would be accomplished less by reliance on individual defense potentials than by marshaling collective power in order to preserve individual powers.

[22] Cf. also the remarkable stability of state units in the Western Hemisphere *qua* independent units; unstable as some of them are domestically, their sovereign identity as units appears almost sacrosanct.

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But since the idea of organizing a genuine supranational force—an international police force—was rejected, the League had to cling to classical arrangements insofar as the procedures of protection were concerned. The guarantee to the individual states was to be the formation of the "Grand Coalition" of all against the isolated aggressor, which presupposed the maintenance of a certain level of armed strength by the member states. A member without that minimum of military strength would be a liability rather than an asset to the organization—in Geneva parlance, a "consumer" and not a "producer" of security.[23] Thus classical concepts (the sovereignty and independence of nation-states) as well as classical institutions (in particular, hard-shell defensibility) were to be maintained under the new system.

Whether there ever was a chance for the system to be effective in practice is beside the point here. It is sufficient to realize how closely it was tied to the underlying structure as well as to the prevailing concepts and policies of the territorial age.

V. The Decline of the Territorial State

Beginning with the nineteenth century, certain trends became visible which tended to endanger the functioning of the classical system. Directly or indirectly, all of them had a bearing upon that feature of the territorial state which was the strongest guarantee of its independent coexistence with other states of like nature: its hard shell—that is, its defensibility in case of war.

Naturally, many of these trends concerned war itself and the way in which it was conducted. But they were not related to the shift from the limited, duel-type contests of the eighteenth century to the more or less unlimited wars that developed in the nineteenth century with conscription, "nations in arms," and increasing destructiveness of weapons. By themselves, these developments were not inconsistent with the classical function of war. Enhancing a nation's defensive capacity, instituting universal military service, putting the economy on a war footing, and similar measures tended to bolster the territorial state rather than to endanger it.

Total war in a quite different sense is tied up with developments in

[23] In League practice, therefore, membership applications of countries without this minimum were rejected (for instance, that of Liechtenstein; cf. Walther Schücking and Hans Wehberg, *Die Satzung des Völkerbundes*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1924, pp. 252ff.). The decline of genuine collective security in our time is apparent from the fact that, in contrast to this practice, the United Nations pays hardly any attention to the question of defensibility, particularly in connection with membership applications.

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warfare which enable the belligerents to overleap or by-pass the traditional hard-shell defense of states. When this happens, the traditional relationship between war, on the one hand, and territorial power and sovereignty, on the other, is altered decisively. Arranged in order of increasing effectiveness, these new factors may be listed under the following headings: (a) possibility of economic blockade; (b) ideological-political penetration; (c) air warfare; and (d) atomic warfare.

(a) *Economic warfare.* It should be said from the outset that so far economic blockade has never enabled one belligerent to force another into surrender through starvation alone. Although in World War I Germany and her allies were seriously endangered when the Western allies cut them off from overseas supplies, a very real effort was still required to defeat them on the military fronts. The same thing applies to World War II. Blockade was an important contributing factor, however. Its importance for the present analysis lies in its unconventional nature, permitting belligerents to by-pass the hard shell of the enemy. Its effect is due to the changed economic status of industrialized nations.

Prior to the industrial age, the territorial state was largely self-contained economically. Although one of the customary means of conducting limited war was starving fortresses into surrender, this applied merely to these individual portions of the hard shell, and not to entire nations. Attempts to starve a belligerent nation in order to avoid having to breach the shell proved rather ineffective, as witness the Continental Blockade and its counterpart in the Napoleonic era. The Industrial Revolution made countries like Britain and Germany increasingly dependent on imports. In war, this meant that they could survive only by controlling areas larger than their own territory. In peacetime, economic dependency became one of the causes of a phenomenon which itself contributed to the transformation of the old state system: imperialism. Anticipating war, with its new danger of blockade, countries strove to become more self-sufficient through enlargement of their areas of control. To the extent that the industrialized nations lost self-sufficiency, they were driven into expansion in a (futile) effort to regain it. Today, if at all, only control of entire continents enables major nations to survive economically in major wars. This implies that hard-shell military defense must be a matter of defending more than a single nation; it must extend around half the world.

(b) *Psychological warfare*, the attempt to undermine the morale of an enemy population, or to subvert its loyalty, shares with economic

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warfare a by-passing effect on old-style territorial defensibility. It was formerly practiced, and practicable, only under quite exceptional circumstances. Short periods of genuine world revolutionary propaganda, such as the early stages of the French Revolution,[24] scarcely affected a general practice under which dynasties, and later governments, fought each other with little ideological involvement on the part of larger masses or classes. Only in rare cases—for instance, where national groups enclosed in and hostile to multinational empires could be appealed to—was there an opening wedge for "fifth column" strategies.

With the emergence of political belief-systems, however, nations became more susceptible to undermining from within. Although wars have not yet been won solely by subversion of loyalties, the threat involved has affected the inner coherence of the territorial state ever since the rise to power of a regime that claims to represent, not the cause of a particular nation, but that of mankind, or at least of its suppressed and exploited portions. Bolshevism from 1917 on has provided the second instance in modern history of world revolutionary propaganda. Communist penetration tactics subsequently were imitated by the Nazi and Fascist regimes and, eventually, by the democracies. In this way, new lines of division, cutting horizontally through state units instead of leaving them separated vertically from each other at their frontiers, have now become possible.

(c) *Air warfare* and (d) *nuclear warfare*. Of all the new developments, air warfare, up to the atomic age, has been the one that affected the territoriality of nations most radically. With its coming, the bottom dropped out—or, rather, the roof blew off—the relative security of the territorial state. True, even this new kind of warfare, up to and including the Second World War, did not by itself account for the defeat of a belligerent, as some of the more enthusiastic prophets of the air age had predicted it would. Undoubtedly, however, it had a massive contributory effect. And this effect was due to strategic action in the *hinterland* rather than to tactical use at the front. It came at least close to defeating one side by direct action against the "soft" interior of the country, by-passing outer defenses and thus foreshadowing the end of the frontier—that is, the demise of the traditional impermeability of even the militarily most powerful states. Warfare now changed "from a fight to a process of devastation."[25]

[24] See my article, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, II, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157ff.; in particular, pp. 165ff.

[25] B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare*, New Haven, Conn., 1947, p. 36. Suspicion of what would be in the offing, once man gained the capacity to fly, was

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That air warfare was considered as something entirely unconventional is seen from the initial reaction to it. Revolutionary transition from an old to a new system has always affected moral standards. In the classical age of the modern state system, the "new morality" of shooting at human beings from a distance had finally come to be accepted, but the standards of the age clearly distinguished "lawful combatants" at the front or in fortifications from the civilian remainder of the population. When air war came, reactions thus differed significantly in the cases of air fighting at the front and of air war carried behind the front. City bombing was felt to constitute "illegitimate" warfare, and populations were inclined to treat airmen engaging in it as "war criminals."[26] This feeling continued into World War II, with its large-scale area bombing. Such sentiments reflected the general feeling of helplessness in the face of a war which threatened to render obsolete the concept of territorial power, together with its ancient implication of protection.

The process has now been completed with the advent of nuclear weapons. For it is more than doubtful that the processes of scientific invention and technological discovery, which not only have created and perfected the fission and fusion weapons themselves but have brought in their wake guided missiles with nuclear warheads, jet aircraft with intercontinental range and supersonic speed, and the prospect of nuclear-powered planes or rockets with unlimited range and with automatic guidance to specific targets anywhere in the world, can in any meaningful way be likened to previous new inventions, however revolutionary. These processes add up to an uncanny absoluteness of effect which previous innovations could not achieve. The latter might render power units of a certain type (for instance, castles or cities)

abroad as early as the eighteenth century. Thus Samuel Johnson remarked: "If men were all virtuous, I should with great alacrity teach them all to fly. But what would be the security of the good, if the bad could at pleasure invade them from the sky? Against an army sailing through the clouds, neither walls, nor mountains, nor seas, could afford security" (quoted in J. U. Nef, *War and Human Progress*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, p. 198). And Benjamin Franklin, witnessing the first balloon ascension at Paris in 1783, foresaw invasion from the air and wrote: "Convincing Sovereigns of folly of wars may perhaps be one effect of it, since it will be impracticable for the most potent of them to guard his dominions. . . . Where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense, as that ten thousand men descending from the clouds, might not in many places do an infinite deal of mischief before a force could be brought together to repel them?" (from a letter to Jan Ingelhouss, reproduced in *Life Magazine*, January 9, 1956).

[26] See Julius Stone, *Legal Controls of International Conflicts*, New York, 1954, pp. 611ff.

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obsolete and enlarge the realm of defensible power units from city-state to territorial state or even large-area empire. They might involve destruction, in war, of entire populations. But there still remained the seemingly inexhaustible reservoir of the rest of mankind. Today, when not even two halves of the globe remain impermeable, it can no longer be a question of enlarging an area of protection and of substituting one unit of security for another. Since we are inhabitants of a planet of limited (and, as it now seems, insufficient) size, we have reached the limit within which the effect of the means of destruction has become absolute. Whatever remained of the impermeability of states seems to have gone for good.

What has been lost can be seen from two statements by thinkers separated by thousands of years and half the world; both reflect the condition of territorial security. Mencius, in ancient China, when asked for guidance in matters of defense and foreign policy by the ruler of a small state, is said to have counseled: "Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your people." This remained the classical posture up to our age, when a Western sage, Bertrand Russell, in the interwar period could still define power as something radiating from one center and growing less with distance from that center until it finds an equilibrium with that of similar geographically anchored units. Now that power can destroy power from center to center, everything is different.

VI. Outlook and Conclusion

It is beyond the compass of this article to ask what the change in the statehood of nations implies for present and future world relations; whether, indeed, international relations in the traditional sense of the term, dependent as they have been on a number of basic data (existence of the nation-state, measurable power, etc.) and interpreted as they were with the aid of certain concepts (sovereignty, independence, etc.), can survive at all; and, if not, what might take their place.[27] Suffice it to remark that this question is vastly complex. We cannot even be sure that one and only one set of conclusions derives from what has happened or is in the process of happening. For, in J. Robert Oppenheimer's words, one of the characteristics of the present is "the prevalence of newness, the changing scale and scope of change itself.

[27] Some of the pertinent questions are discussed in a more comprehensive manuscript, "Reflections on International Politics in the Atomic Age," from whose initial chapters the preceding pages were adapted.

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. . ."[28] In the field of military policy, this means that since World War II half a dozen military innovations "have followed each other so rapidly that efforts at adaptation are hardly begun before they must be scrapped."[29] The scientific revolution has been "so fast-moving as to make almost impossible the task of military men whose responsibility it is to anticipate the future. Military planning cannot make the facts of this future stay long enough to analyze them."[30]

If this applies to military planning, it must apply equally to foreign policy planning, and, indeed, the newness of the new is perhaps the most significant and the most exasperating aspect of present world relations. Hardly has a bipolar world replaced the multipower world of classical territoriality than there loom new and unpredictable multipower constellations on the international horizon. However, the possible rise of new powers does not seem to affect bipolarity in the sense of a mere return to traditional multipower relations; since rising powers are likely to be nuclear powers, their effect must be an entirely novel one. What international relations would (or will) look like, once nuclear power is possessed by a larger number of power units, is not only extremely unpleasant to contemplate but almost impossible to anticipate, using any familiar concepts. Or, to use another example: We have hardly drawn the military and political conclusions from the new weapons developments, which at one point seemed to indicate the necessity of basing defense on the formation and maintenance of pacts like NATO and the establishment of a network of bases on allied territory from which to launch nuclear weapons "in case" (or whose existence was to deter the opponent from doing so on his part), and already further scientific and technological developments seem to render entire defense blocs, with all their new "hard shells" of bases and similar installations, obsolete.

To complicate matters even more, the change-over is not even uniform and unilinear. On the contrary, in concepts as well as in policies, we witness the juxtaposition of old and new (or several new) factors, a coexistence in theory and practice of conventional and new concepts, of traditional and new policies. Part of a nation's (or a bloc's) defense policy, then, may proceed on pre-atomic assumptions, while another part is based on the assumption of a preponderantly nuclear contest.

[28] *The Open Mind*, New York, 1955, p. 141.

[29] Roger Hilsman, "Strategic Doctrines for Nuclear War," in William W. Kaufmann, ed., *Military Policy and National Security*, Princeton, N.J., 1956, p. 42.

[30] Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Politics: US Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age*, New York, 1954, p. 256.

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And a compounding trouble is that the future depends on what the present anticipates, on what powers now think and how they intend to act on the basis of their present thinking; and on the fact that each of the actors on the scene must take into consideration the assumptions of the others.[31]

There then evolves the necessity of multilevel concepts and of multilevel policies in the new era. In this we have, perhaps, the chief cause of the confusion and bewilderment of countries and publics. A good deal in recent foreign policies, with their violent swings from one extreme to another, from appeasement or apathy to truculence and threats of war, and also much in internal policies, with their suspicions and hysterias, may be reflections of world-political uncertainties. Confusion, despair, or easy optimism have been rampant; desire to give in, keep out, or get it over with underlies advocacy of appeasement, neutralism, or preventive war; mutually exclusive attitudes follow each other in rapid succession.

One radical conclusion to be drawn from the new condition of permeability would seem to be that nothing short of global rule can ultimately satisfy the security interest of any one power, and particularly any superpower. For only through elimination of the single competitor who really counts can one feel safe from the threat of annihilation. And since elimination without war is hardly imaginable, destruction of the other power by preventive war would therefore seem to be the logical objective of each superpower. But—and here the security

[31] The expectations connected with the situation of nuclear deterrence may serve as an illustration. Each side, so we may assume, wants to act "rationally"—that is, avoid resort to a war which it knows would be suicidal; in this, in fact, is grounded the widespread present belief in the obsoleteness of major—i.e., nuclear—war. However, not knowing for sure that the other side can be trusted to behave rationally, each feels that the possibility of irrational behavior by the opponent must be included in its own calculations. For instance, assuming that rationally the United States would not permit itself to be provoked into nuclear action, can it rely on Soviet abstention from nuclear attack for similarly rational reasons? Or can the Soviets, who may actually believe that the "imperialist" powers are ready to inflict the worst on them, rely on Western rationality? And if, knowing that the other side may be swayed by considerations like these, one side takes these amended calculations as yardsticks for its own, what rational considerations remain? Policies then become so dependent on considerations of what you believe the other side believes, etc., ad infinitum, that no sane calculations are any longer feasible. One is caught here in the vicious circle inherent in the problem of the effects of assumptions (in behaviorist parlance, the problem of "anticipated reactions"), of what David Easton has called the possibility of an "infinite regress of effects" (*The Political System*, New York, 1953, p. 27). It may be doubted that even the theory of games as applied to international relations can cope with this one. And suppose that, sometime in the future, more than two major units "play"? In the face of this prospect, as Herbert Butterfield says, "The mind winces and turns to look elsewhere" (*History and Human Relations*, New York, 1952, p. 23).

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dilemma encounters the other great dilemma of our time—such an aim is no longer practical. Since thermonuclear war would in all likelihood involve one's own destruction together with the opponent's, the means through which the end would have to be attained defeats the end itself. Pursuance of the "logical" security objective would result in mutual annihilation rather than in one unit's global control of a pacified world.

If this is so, the short-term objective must surely be mutual accommodation, a drawing of demarcation lines, geographical and otherwise, between East and West which would at least serve as a stopgap policy, a holding operation pending the creation of an atmosphere in which, perhaps in consequence of a prolonged period of "cold peace," tensions may abate and the impact of the ideologies presently dividing the world diminish. May we then expect, or hope, that radically new attitudes, in accordance with a radically transformed structure of nationhood and international relations, may ultimately gain the upper hand over the inherited ones based on familiar concepts of old-style national security, power, and power competition? Until recently, advocacy of policies based on internationalism instead of power politics, on substituting the observance of universal interests for the prevalence of national interests, was considered utopian, and correctly so. National interests were still tied up with nation-states as units of power and with their security as impermeable units; internationalist ideals, while possibly recognized as ethically valid, ran counter to what nations were able to afford if they wanted to survive and prosper. But the dichotomy between "national self-interest" and "internationalist ideals" no longer fits a situation in which sovereignty and ever so absolute power cannot protect nations from annihilation.

What used to be a dichotomy of interests and ideals now emerges as a dichotomy between two sets of interests. For the former ideal has become a compelling interest itself. In former times, the lives of people, their goods and possessions, their hopes and their happiness, were tied up with the affairs of the country in which they lived, and interests thus centered around nation and national issues. Now that destruction threatens everybody, in every one of his most intimate, personal interests, national interests are bound to recede behind—or at least compete with—the common interest of all mankind in sheer survival. And if we add to this the universal interest in the common solution of other great world problems, such as those posed by the population-resources dilemma (exhaustion of vital resources coupled with the "population explosion" throughout the world), or, indeed, that of "peacetime"

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planetary pollution through radio-active fallout, it is perhaps not entirely utopian to expect the ultimate spread of an attitude of "universalism" through which a rational approach to world problems would at last become possible.

It may be fitting to conclude this article by quoting two men, one a contemporary scientist whose words on nuclear problems may well apply to other problems of world relations, the second a philosopher whose statement on the revolutionary impact of attitude changes seems as valid today as when it was first made: "It is a practical thing to recognize as a common responsibility, wholly incapable of unilateral solution, the complete common peril that atomic weapons constitute for the world, to recognize that only by a community of responsibility is there any hope of meeting the peril. It would seem to me visionary in the extreme, and not practical, to hope that methods which have so sadly failed in the past to avert war will succeed in the face of this far greater peril. It would in my opinion be most dangerous to regard, in these shattering times, a radical solution less practical than a conventional one" (J. Robert Oppenheimer).[32] And: "Thought achieves more in the world than practice; for, once the realm of imagination has been revolutionized, reality cannot resist" (Hegel).

[32] "Atomic Weapons," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XC (January 29, 1946), pp. 9f.

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FROM BALANCE TO DETERRENCE*

A Theoretical Analysis

By ARTHUR LEE BURNS

NEW weapons, and the new strategies and tactics which they make possible, alter the conduct of wars.† But they may also induce changes in the conduct—warlike or peaceful—of international affairs. This happens for either or both of two quite different kinds of reason. First and least importantly, a new weapon may tilt the balance in favor of those nations pre-eminent in the skill to use or the resources to produce it. Second and more profoundly, it may cause the major contending Powers to adopt new or radically extended strategies, calling in their turn for a complete reassessment of national interests, and of the value of resources, alliances, and conventional armaments.

What follows is an attempt to clear the ground for such a reassessment, which the armory of nuclear weapons and the prospective new means of delivering them so obviously suggest. But what exactly are these things that need to be reassessed? How, if at all, are they related to each other? Why should military innovations affect them?

In answer, this article tries first to show that international relations form a system, and that a general theory of that system may be possible. I then outline some elements of a general theory, in which the relationships of *alliance* and *pressure* are taken to constitute the distinctive features of the self-balancing international system. Since alliances and increases of pressures are here defined as changes in the allocations of military force, it is not hard to show, next, why and how military innovations affect them—notably, to the extent of making unworkable the classic balance of power. Some guesses at the likely effects of the new weapons conclude the study.

I

Suppose a world of three Powers roughly of a size, each earmarking

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against each the half of its unreserved forces. Now imagine that, without so much as mentioning the existence of Red, the Blue and the Yellow Powers reciprocally reserve or demobilize all or some substantial part of the forces that each has been deploying against the other. Does it follow that *ipso facto* Red's defense has been made less secure? If we find ourselves thinking so, we must admit, as it seems to me, that the three Powers form a system, and that a general theory concerning this kind of system may be possible.

What kind of system and what kind of theory are implied? The nearest analogy, perhaps, can be found in the economics of imperfect competition. Suppose a system of three firms, each producing the same goods, but Red competing with Blue in a market from which Yellow is excluded, while Blue and Yellow compete likewise without Red. If, then, without mentioning Red, Blue and Yellow agree upon prices for the market they share, Red's stocks should fall when this becomes known. In that highly artificial example, a firm's capital has analogies with a nation's resources or potential; competition, with the exercise of pressure through earmarking of forces; and the price-fixing agreement which does not include all producers, with alliance.[1]

The theory of games has taught us how to characterize systems of this kind, and the type of general theory that concerns them. This new branch of mathematics cannot by itself explain or resolve international conflicts. But it does enable us to interpret them, in its terminology, as belonging to that class of infinite essential n-person non-zero-sum games in which the payoff consists for the most part of staying indefinitely in the game. That characterization helps by suggesting both the outlines of a general theory of international relations, and also the narrowness of the limits set to its possibilities of sophisticated development. Some years ago, Mr. M. A. Ash sought to lay the foundations of a formalized general theory,[2] but he has published so far only an attempt at the aspect which parallels the analysis of subjective preference in economics. I shall be concentrating upon the objective aspect and, more especially, on the *effects* of that web of security-maximizing de-

[1] The analogous economic case would work as stated; but to complete its resemblance to our imaginary three-Power world, we should add explicitly the condition that Red competes with Yellow for a market from which Blue is excluded.

[2] See M. A. Ash, "An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics," *World Politics*, III, No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 218-37. My analysis is not intended to depend upon any of that article's conclusions. But in 1948 I was shown another of Mr. Ash's MSS., which still remains unpublished; and from that and in conversations with him I learned the approach and much of the terminology used in the first part of this study.

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cisions for which in his article Mr. Ash was concerned to find a rationale. My point of departure is the existence of a system of Powers, i.e., of sovereign states deploying military force.

I assume such systems to be the peculiar subject matter of the study of international relations, and of its general theory. That theory will share some concepts with a constellation of other studies: it will share "the state" with internal politics, "resources" with economics, "deploying and reserving of forces" with military science, and so on. Those three disciplines are as a matter of fact ingredient in the study of international relations, which has to take account of much more than its *peculiar* subject matter. (Some, indeed, maintain that another family of social sciences—viz., anthropology, sociology, and psychology—is connected with international relations as intimately as are economics, politics, and military studies—three "sciences of rational decision." Usage is against that view. Though we still consider ourselves as working at international relations when we find it necessary to explain a Foreign Secretary's decision in terms of political pressure by vested interests or backbenchers, we call it something else when, say, psychopathic tendencies in the individual or in the social structure have to be brought into the picture.) International affairs are a meeting place for economic, political, and military studies.

But they are not merely that; nor are they the partial subject matter of a more general science. There is, I have suggested, a constellation of studies, all concerned with various aspects of policy, or rational decision, and of conflict of purpose; all interpretable as attempts to work out the implications of various strategies' being adopted by participants in one or another of the several spheres of rational decision; but none capable of generating any of the others through elaboration of its own terminology. The concept of *alliance* in international relations, to come to the point, *cannot be reduced to or deduced from* any congeries of economic or internal-political or military terms, nor of those of any other more general science—if such there be. Economics, as we have seen, provides analogies with alliance; so, perhaps, may the study of party politics. But analogies are not entailments. I have somewhat to labor this point, since later I shall be underscoring the strongly determinative role of military technology in current international affairs.

Not all kinds of international relations go to comprise the type of system peculiar to international affairs. Economic relations, for instance, are part of a different system. But facts about them will be relevant to the study of international relations only insofar as they afford condi-

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tions of or motives for change in the peculiar relationships between Powers—relationships of alliance, and of pressure or opposition. These latter are the relations which constitute the international system, and we may sum up their system-building propensities in the following principle:

(1) *The closer the alliance between any two or more Powers, the greater the increase of opposition or "pressure" (other things being equal) between any one of the two and any third Power or group of Powers.* The reader will have anticipated that by "alliance" I do not primarily mean the reaching of understandings or the signing of treaties, but something concrete and occurrent: the reciprocal reduction of armaments, or the exchange of actual guarantees against reciprocal increase of armaments, earmarked for use against each other by two or more Powers. (Similarly, by "increase of pressure" I mean in the first place the earmarking of a larger proportion of actual forces for possible use against each other, by two or more Powers.) The technicality of my usage can be brought out by contrasting it with the more ordinary dispositional sense of "alliance," which stands to mine rather as "credit" stands to "funds." In my sense, two Powers reducing their reciprocal allocations of force, responsively though tacitly, would be allied in fact, if not in form; while two Powers reciprocally increasing the proportion of their forces allocated against each other, even had they signed a treaty, would be opponents, allied in form only. But except for cases of mere bluff, deception, and verbalism, the ordinary sense and mine denote for practical purposes much the same thing.

In the actual world, certain Powers are neither allied nor opposed, but indifferent. As geographic separation has enforced mutual indifference hitherto, so the extending ranges of aircraft and rocket may well prohibit it for the future. Throughout this analysis, which is directed more or less toward possible future situations, I shall be abstracting all tendencies to indifference. But for completeness' sake, we may imagine a Power's international posture vis-à-vis any other given Power or bloc of Powers as moving within a triangle formed by lines connecting the points: (i) of *total indifference*, at which—no matter in what proportions either's reciprocal allocations against any third Power should have altered—the Power in question neither allocates nor could have call to allocate forces against the other, since *ex hypothesi* they have no common "frontier"; (ii) of *total opposition*, at which the power's whole force is allocated against the other; and (iii) of *total alliance*, at which it does not in fact allocate any force

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against the other, though able to do so were there call. If a right angle is envisaged at point (iii), then the proportion of the Power's total force allocated against the other can be thought of as plotted on the appropriate internal parallel to line (iii)-to-(ii); and the degree to which it could gain warlike access to the other, on the appropriate internal parallel to line (i)-to-(iii).

What are the grounds for Principle 1? Let us return to the imaginary world of three Powers, in which Blue and Yellow, but not Red, have reciprocally reduced the proportions of armament allocated against each other. Why is Red *ipso facto* in a less secure position?

The allying Powers, Blue and Yellow, must either reserve or demobilize the forces they have withdrawn from against each other. Their reserving such forces would cause an immediate decline in Red's *short-run* security—a decline the more serious the greater the ratio of the value of forces they thus reserve to the likeliest value of Red forces expected to survive battle against one or more ally's deployed forces. For, on this alternative, Red has to contemplate the possibility that, even were she to defeat in battle the forces presently deployed against her by Blue or Yellow or both, she would have to go on and encounter their reserved forces.

Suppose, on the other hand, either that Blue or Yellow or both have not reserved but demobilized the withdrawn forces; or that military forces can be maintained more cheaply as reserves than as allocated forces; or a combination of both these conditions. Then Red's *long-run* security will have declined to the extent that she is rationally compelled to anticipate an increase, relative to her own expected level of resources, in the future levels of resources of Blue and Yellow. This ratio of increase, in turn, will depend upon (i) the discounted cost of maintaining, either as reserves or as allocated forces, the forces actually demobilized (or reserved) by Blue and Yellow; (ii) the proportions of that discounted sum which Blue and Yellow respectively might be expected to invest in resource-producing enterprises (including the raising of the population); (iii) the marginal productivity of capital in Blue and in Yellow Land; (iv) the expected cost of future forces; (v) their military efficacy; and (vi) the expected relationships of alliance and pressure between Red and the others, and between Blue and Yellow, except insofar as those relations may be determinable by the ratio of increase in question.

Though "long-run against short-run security" suggests a purely temporal distinction, I have actually defined the difference, as will

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have been seen, in terms of whether or not *resources* are taken into consideration. The economic concept of "resources" thus appears in our general theory under the heading, "considerations of long-run security," and is to be understood as the economic ingredient in the military concept of *potential*. "Potential" means "anything which can be drawn upon to generate armaments, or military force." So defined, it includes unmarketable assets such as geographic location, and imponderables such as morale. The latter are sometimes intuitively evaluated in military terms (e.g., "Blue's mountain range gives her an initial advantage against Red equivalent to ten divisions"; "Yellow's morale will collapse with only five successive nights' bombing"), and military terms are rather more objectively translatable into money in peacetime or by a labor-and-materials measure in war. Even so, we should not assume without qualification that a unit increment of resources equals a unit increment of potential, since in theory the non-economic factors may tell against the value of resources, and vice versa. In practice, however, this seems usually discountable. I shall therefore discount it, and state the second principle:

(2) *Other things being equal, considerations of long-run security determine an optimum degree of short-run security.* Bluntly, a Power that quite neglects its short-run security will have no long run; but every increase beyond sufficiency in short-run security is a tax upon long-run security.

As I understand it, Mr. Ash's article (see above) is an explication of the considerations which indicate the *optimum* point or range mentioned in Principle 2—at least as far as concerns the reciprocal earmarking of forces between any *two* Powers in a more-than-two-Power world. I shall not attempt to reduplicate his analysis, but shall go on to extract from the second principle a rationale of alliance-swapping and war-making.

As stated, Principle 2 may suggest (though it does not imply) that there will always be some margin of safety, however narrow, *between* the minimum level of allocated forces required to guarantee short-run security on any given frontier, *and* the minimum level of potential at which the allocating of force begins to trench upon long-run security. In fact, since the maintenance of any force whatsoever costs money, we may assume that all Powers have an interest in cutting back their forces-in-being to the minimum quantity compatible with short-run security, unless a larger amount is required for internal policing or for the maintenance of full employment. For each Power, three states of affairs

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exhaust the possibilities: she cannot allocate enough forces to maintain even short-run security on a given frontier; or she can place the required minimum of forces there only at serious expense—involving the prospect of decline—to her long-run security; or she can maintain short-run security there without unbearably risking her long-term position. The second, of course, is the active and dynamic alternative. Faced with it, any Power must transform it into the third—upon pain otherwise of seeing it change, as time passes, into the first. Such a transformation can be effected in either or both of two directions: either by bringing about a reduction in the minimum of allocated force required for short-run security on all frontiers; or by raising the level of long-run security that one has prospects of maintaining.

Since we are now assuming an unpolarized world of at least three Powers, a Power faced with the dynamic alternative must be receiving pressure from at least one other frontier besides the frontier in question. She will not be able therefore *directly* to reduce the short-run minimum on the frontier in question by any other means than that of destroying her neighbor's forces on the opposite side of it. So in this type of situation, raising one's level of long-run security is normally the alternative to making war or suffering decline.

Now we saw, in discussing the conditions of long-run security, that they are in the main an affair of relative resources, or potential. The comparison of potentials, in turn, we saw to depend upon both military and economic factors. A Power may therefore improve its resources relative to those of other Powers by (i) raising its national income, rate of investments, productivity of capital, effective population, and so on, in comparison with those of other Powers; or by (ii) inventing armaments more effective than any the others may be expected to possess. (At present, the Western and the Soviet blocs are contending with each other in both kinds of endeavor—the West perhaps more by the second, the Soviet bloc more by the first.) But under "long-run security, Condition (vi)," there were also mentioned "relationships of alliance and pressure." And whereas long-run changes in economic or military resources must be brought into the international system from other fields—economic, political, or technological—changes of alliance and pressure are changes in the relationships constitutive of the system itself. So instead of considering them a mere third means of improving one's relative resources, I shall treat their implications as a third principle:

(3) *To the extent that forces consequently released are not immedi-*

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ately required for the maintenance of short-run security, alliance with a second Power or group of Powers is equivalent to raising one's potential in comparison with that of a third Power and of any other non-ally; and an increase of pressure between any of one's non-allies is equivalent to the raising of one's own (and one's allies') potential in comparison with theirs. It will be apparent that the mention here of "short-run security" somewhat qualifies my previous assertions that ". . . raising one's level of long-run security is normally the alternative to making war or suffering decline," and that changes of alliance and pressure are to be construed wholly as long-run phenomena. Obviously, a release of forces sufficient only to meet a short-run deficit cannot raise potential, and there is no reason to suppose that all of one's alliances, or all increases of pressure amongst one's non-allies, will necessarily afford some surplus beyond short-run needs. But the main practical point is quite unaffected—that changes in alliance and pressure are among the few alternatives to risk of war. Sometimes they have been unavailing, e.g., the swappings of alliances which preceded both World War I and World War II. (Similarly, the amalgamation of two declining firms will not always obviate price war and consequent bankruptcy throughout the industry.) Nevertheless, "diplomatic revolutions" have occasionally prevented wars, and the case for the traditional balance of power rests largely upon their alleged propensity to do so.

We shall next consider another and rather desperate kind of military-diplomatic maneuver, by which—at the risk of war *and* defeat—a threatened Power may force alliance upon others and thereby transform its situation. In our imaginary three-Power world, Red has no other possible ally threatened like herself by the alliance of Blue and Yellow. She might therefore seek to meet the threat *either* by joining the alliance on equal terms (which, supposing the others consented, would thus become world disarmament), or by compelling Blue and Yellow to break the alliance and reallocate forces against each other. But what can she use as a lever to make the others either admit her to the alliance or break it up? If she reduces her allocations *equally* against each, she offers them the alternative of partitioning instead of admitting her. They would then be left in an inherently less-equilibrating world of two equal Powers, but they might be willing to risk that (and here we approach a major limitation to the development of a general theory of international relations).

On the other hand, the threatened Power may chance employing the lever of dilemma: she may alter her allocations *unequally* against each.

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This involves her in risking war and conquest, since she would have to be affording the Power against whom she had allocated the lesser amount *some* motive for attacking her. However, she could offset that motive by threatening the Power in question with the prospect, should it attack, of her surrender without fighting to the third Power against whom she had allocated the greater amount of armaments.

One might describe this kind of maneuver as "posing the dilemma of victor's inheritance." It would be as if the threatened Power were warning each of the others, "Ask yourself 'And what then?' before you try attacking me." In present practice, many of our neutral Powers are securing themselves by something like that kind of understanding. But in our artificial three-Power world, the threatened participant would be using the lever of dilemma to make less predictable—more uncertain—the prospects of the Power she was allocating the greater force against. Supposing the latter to be Yellow, and Red to be the threatened Power, then their alliance—i.e., their reciprocal reduction of allocated force—would relieve Yellow's new uncertainty by making the situation on that frontier less momentous. Certainty and uncertainty in general depend upon the momentousness, the predictability, and the number of others' decisions which any given Power has to guess at. Yellow, for instance, at this latest stage of the story, has to ask itself, "Will Blue attack Red?—and, if so, will Red carry out her declared intention of surrendering to me?"

Considerations of certainty and uncertainty bring us to a new stage of development of the general theory. So far we have been imagining ourselves as each in turn of the several Powers *within* a given system, and the question has not yet been raised whether this three-Power system as a whole works better than others. What happens if we acknowledge our recent presupposition—that certainty as well as security may be an objective of foreign policy?

Let us conceive of some Great Power faced with the opportunity of achieving world dominion. World dominion would eliminate uncertainty as I have defined it. The problem is: how far would the Great Power be prepared to risk its security in order to gain this complete certainty? Can there be a rational measure for discounting one objective against the other? If we can find one, the general theory of international relations may be extendible above its lower level, the theory of the behavior of Powers toward each other, into a second level, the theory of systems. If not, the subject will remain indeterminate, except

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where we can neglect altogether the influence of the objective of certainty.

As far as I can see, the Great Power would have rational[3] warrant for an attempt at world dominion only if it could be sure that failure in the attempt would not diminish its current prospects of security. This implies that security is the overriding motive in international affairs, and that all other Powers, therefore, would have motives for resisting dominion at *almost* any cost. (The unpayable price would be physical destruction without hope of revival. For this reason, rational warrants for attempting world dominion would be granted only by (i) the pioneering of a discovery in military technology which could guarantee ability to deny the means of retaliation to any possible coalition of opponents, and (ii) the realization that world dominion had become one's sole means to security. Our age should expect continuing attempts at the first; may we also hope that Great Powers will follow the policy of never facing each other with the second?) The foundational principle for the theory of systems should therefore read somewhat as follows:

(4) *Any Power will seek to maximize certainty if, but only if, it expects the attempt to engender no undiscountable risk (or, none graver than it currently faces) of decline in its long-run prospects of security.* This would imply (see pp. 499-500) that no Power already unable to maintain short-run without trenching upon long-run security would go out of its way to reduce uncertainty, unless it had estimated that no possible outcome of that attempt could exacerbate its existing predicament. Any Power, on the other hand, that happened to be enjoying a margin of safety between the cost of its short-run security and the level of its resources used in support of long-run security might be willing to risk reducing that margin, though not below zero, were there a good prospect of increasing its certainty by that expense.

We may now be able to approach the question, "How do systems of international relations compare with respect to propensities for self-stabilization, given the prevalence of a certain type of weapon?" The

[3] "Rational" here has nothing to do with "moral." The owner of a firm would have rational warrant, in this sense, for attempting monopoly if he could be sure he would be risking no permanent reduction in the value of his capital. As elsewhere in this article, the element of prediction in Principle 4 below is conditional upon the assumption of rationality—the assumption, broadly, that each Power's program of aims and estimates will involve neither lacunae nor contradictions. That this is false in most cases need not wholly destroy the theory's usefulness as a canon.

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qualification about types of weapon must be made; for, as will be argued in later sections of this study, some kinds of armory—such as that coming into prevalence at the moment—tend to preclude the systems of alliance and pressure so far considered. They do this, broadly, by transforming major war into mutual mass-destruction, and thereby they rule out that threat of it against which, as bank-deposit, all the paper of historic diplomacy has been issued.

In contrast with "the balance of power," we shall call the type of system that now seems to be emerging a "state of deterrence" or "balance of terror"—the latter perhaps an ungrateful title, since for so long as the appropriate armory prevails, this system may eliminate major war. It will nevertheless fail to do something sometimes done by the old balance of power: independent change of comparative resources (potentials) cannot be readily taken up in it through the old-fashioned method of switching alliances. Since no Power equipped with the requisite means of retaliation will be able to exercise the traditional kind of pressure against any Power similarly equipped, alliance between such Powers or blocs will tend to lose its point, and each will become the potential but unlikely enemy of all. Meanwhile, however, the search will go on for yet other weapons that might enable reviving the classical military policy: to seek out an enemy's forces and destroy them. If several Powers find such weapons at about the same time, the balance of power will again emerge. If it were not for that remote possibility, the question of a self-stabilizing international system would have become purely theoretical. Nevertheless, I shall pursue it a little further, as likely to throw indirect light upon the intrinsic causes of decay in the balance of power.

Assuming, then, the prevalence of weapons which do not establish a universal state of deterrence: which system of international relations is most likely to be stable, and therefore most to be favored by its constituent Powers or blocs? (Since we shall be thinking of a world-wide system, the "bloc" is likely, from this point in the analysis onward, to be the dominant type of unit. I understand by it a concentration of smaller Powers around some Great Power or alliance of Great Powers—in fact, a large-scale combination of alliance and sphere-of-influence, tighter than an entente, because made up of less commensurable Powers. Tolerably peaceful adjustments can be made between blocs by the "trading" of client Powers, e.g., Yugoslavia.[4] Ordinary usage, further-

[4] "Trading" suggests a far more passive role for Yugoslavia than in fact she adopted. I had in mind the possibility of a lesser Power's shaking loose from one bloc and being then incorporated by another, some *quid pro quo* ensuring the tacit consent of both.

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more, applies the word "bloc" to Power-groupings of roughly comparable size.) Into how many blocs, if one were to play at being Providence, should a world still capable of major war be divided for maximum stability?

Not simply into two, even though that would minimize one of the three conditions making for uncertainty, viz., the number of decisions requiring to be guessed at before a change of policy. Granted there would be only one opponent to worry about, the two other conditions that militate against certainty would be exercising unexampled effect—with decisions at their most momentous, because of the blocs' great size; and at their least predictable, for want of a balancer. We should expect, then, that a world wholly shared out between two blocs would fall quite soon to the stronger, were military technology to permit of war. One could hardly count upon repeated self-denying ordinances from the continually more prosperous of the contestants.

A three-bloc world, as our earlier example showed, has a built-in stabilizer lacking in polarized situations. But we observed a source of danger in the fact that a third Power threatened by two others would have little recourse—diplomatically speaking—but to take a risk, though not an uncalculated one, of war and defeat. On the other hand, existence of a comparable fourth Power or bloc would give the third another alternative—adequate counter-alliance. The difficulty with that, as far as concerns the stability of the whole system, would consist of course in its turning a four-bloc into a polarized world: a change that mere exercise of pressure could not forfend, though wise collective prevision might. In general, blocs forming a concert readily divisible into two fairly equal alliances will always be strongly tempted to divide it in that way.

For that reason, the most stable arrangement would seem to be a world of five or some greater odd number of Powers, independent and of approximately equal strength.[5] Putting together Principles 1, 2,

[5] This requirement of equal strength is needed to make sense of the previous requirement concerning odd number. Since together they yield a comparatively simple model of the international system, I shall continue to use them throughout the earlier part of the analysis. But the practical point indicated by this theoretical gambit consists in that temptation to polarize itself which afflicts any world whose constituent Powers could fall readily into a pair of equal alliances. That is a thing that *might* happen to worlds of odd-numbered as well as of even-numbered Powers, provided that not all the Powers were of a size. In fact, the most asymmetrical of distributions may approach polarization through division into a larger but looser and a smaller but tighter alliance—see Principles 1 and 3. Generally, asymmetry affords greater possibilities of self-equilibration than does symmetry, only through the opportunities—not offered in symmetrical worlds—for exercise of pressure to break up the polarization.

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and 3, along with the lines of reasoning that justify them, we may construct a further principle in the theory of systems:

(5) *The less readily a concert or system of Powers or blocs can divide into equal parts, and the larger the number of independent Powers or blocs comprising it, the less momentous and the more precisely calculable will be any change of pressure initiated by any one of them.* On the other hand, it will be remembered that in estimating the various systems' tendencies to produce uncertainty, we have been taking into account also the number of decisions calling for anticipation by the maker of any decision. This number will increase with the number of relationships generated by the system, and that number in turn is an arithmetical function of the number of constituent Powers or blocs. Let r connote the total number of relationships within the system, and p the number of independent Powers or blocs comprising it: then r = the sum of the first $p-1$ integers. Thus two blocs comprising a system generate only one relationship; three generate three; four, six; five, ten; seven, twenty-one, and so on. The uncertainty produced by multiplication of decisions requiring to be anticipated mounts, therefore, on a steep parabolic curve, which may be imagined to cut a descending complementary curve—representing the uncertainty produced by the momentousness and the incalculability of decisions—at a point given by some odd number of comparable Powers or blocs. In this way, from the above arithmetic and the fifth principle, there follows another:

(6) *Of international systems where technology permits the rational waging of war, uncertainty will be minimized in the one comprising blocs or Powers of equal strength, and of an odd number such that uncertainty induced by the number of others' responsive decisions requiring to be anticipated by any Power which contemplates reallocation of its forces equals uncertainty induced by the momentousness and incalculability of such pressure-changing decisions in that system.* Thus, theoretically, there will be an optimum point at which the number of (equal-sized) blocs in the system yields the greatest possible degree of certainty. Stability and certainty are not identical—all the indicators, in fact, might point unequivocally to "war"—but uncertainty strongly tempts or provokes rulers to unstabilizing acts. So far, then, we may assume that where war remains a last resort, the most stable system will be constituted by something between a very few and many Powers or blocs, not readily divisible into two equal sides.

For what it is worth, history confirms this part of the theory. Rome,

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once she had defeated the Carthaginians, was able to conquer piecemeal the many lesser states of the Mediterranean system, overthrowing thereby several interconnected balances of power. Similar if less abrupt changes from multiple-Power systems to single empires unified the more or less isolated worlds of China and India. The mechanism is apparent: each of the many comparable states must be small, and so an easy prey to the fast-growing Power. In our world, on the other hand, the prewar quadripartite system of blocs and Powers (the Axis, the Western Allies, the American hemisphere, and the USSR), complicated by the existence of many small Balkanized Powers, has collapsed through total war into the polarized system of today. That change was due, no doubt, as much to folly and short sight as it was to the structure of the system. Yet the story would have run differently also, had eastern Central Europe and the Balkans formed one strong bloc.

Besides uncertainty, what are the other factors working against stability of system? For, as Mr. Martin Wight has put it: "Great Powers tend to decrease in number and increase in size. . . . We have seen that the Balance of Power is inherently unstable, because Powers are not static societies, but are constantly growing or declining in relation to each other. The Balance of Power is essentially competitive. It leads to rivalry of power, which leads to war, as a consequence of which one side is temporarily eliminated and the other has a temporary monopoly of power."[6] The causes of instability suggested by Mr. Wight fall under two heads: those intrinsic, and those extrinsic, to the system of international relations. The former include such processes as he mentions in the final sentence I have quoted from him. The latter include, obviously, most kinds of economic and demographic growth, and changes in military technology; less clearly, "extrinsic causes" include such merely economic or merely internal-political temptations as have notoriously enjoined war or aggression in the past. We shall deal first with the intrinsic factors.

It is not inevitable that war should issue in reduction of the number of constituent Powers, but reversion to the *status quo ante* requires wisdom and long sight in the victors, as well as favorable prospects. To absorb or partition the conquered is rarely difficult; to restore him without depriving oneself of the fruits of victory is rarely easy—and both presuppose victory; but to make, by peace treaty, two substantial Powers out of one conquered Power is impossible. Again, it is not

[6] Martin Wight, *Power Politics*, Looking Forward pamphlet, No. 8, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, pp. 24, 54.

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inevitable that rivalry of power should always lead to war; and some numbers of blocs or Powers may promote the chances of war much less than others. Nevertheless, we must remember how the possibility of war-making is a condition necessary for the persistence of any balance of power. Therefore:

(7) *Any system embodying the balance of power has some intrinsic tendency to diminish the number of its constituent Powers or blocs, and no intrinsic tendency to increase that number.* If, nevertheless, we turn to the game of playing Providence to a world in which the possibility of general war between blocs is deemed about to reassert itself, under the technologically created conditions that attack can be launched around the globe by any large Power, what kind of division would yield us the least unstable system—granted now the implications of Principles 4 to 7? I would suggest that they indicate dividing such a world into five roughly equal blocs, each including a family of exchangeable client nations. Any larger odd number overmultiplies relationships, and invites an attempt at world conquest, while, as we have seen, a three-Power world withholds the facility of counter-alliance.

The *extrinsic* causes of international instability reveal, by contrast, no single overriding tendency—it would be surprising if they did. Of long-run changes extrinsically caused, the most formidable, at first sight, are the variations in potential constituted by relative economic growth and decline. Among the types of growth likely to impinge upon the international relations of our era, the steepest—and for each economy the earliest—we call "industrial revolutions." Late in the nineteenth century, the German, American, and Japanese industrial revolutions nominated those countries to the dwindling club of Great Powers. Communism first expelled and then, by promoting industrial revolution, renominated Russia for the same club. It appears at present to be repeating that maneuver for China's benefit. Whether industrial revolutions, should they occur, may be expected to promote India or Indonesia or South America or Africa into significant competition with the present leaders is a question to be answered only after estimating each region's population and resources—especially, nowadays, for production of food—and after deciding whether cheap atomic power and other great innovations will not push the leaders even further ahead. The whole thing is an affair of *comparative* accelerations.

We ought not to forget, however, that the causes of economic growth itself are not all intrinsic to the realm of economics. The Power-begetting industrial revolutions mentioned above were all preceded, and all

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seem to have been in part brought on, by great political or military unifications. Moreover, the latter by themselves can sometimes lift the nations they produce up the stairway of power—e.g., Italy from the nineteenth to the early twentieth century; though from the same illustration it could be inferred that without concomitant economic growth, international levitation is a temporary state. Political revolutions have thus both immediate short-run and more calculable long-run effects. The possibility of the former alone should tend to produce uncertainty.

But of all causes of instability, the partly intrinsic, partly extrinsic species, "innovation in military technology," is on second thought the most upsetting, at least for our age. In other ages, its general effect was to make dominant the Power first employing it, as the fast chariot did the Aryans, the legion Rome, the longbow England, and so on. Yet none of these temporary changes of predominance induced any change in the general condition of international relationship: they tipped the existing balance of power, and thereby kept the principle of it at work. Our nuclear weapons, in contrast, have added virtually nothing to the actual dominions of the United States of America; but the hydrogen bomb in particular has qualitatively changed international affairs as such. For a time at least, it has abolished the balance of power.

II

The paradox created by our new weapons may be brought out in the following imaginary problem. The Blue continent was preparing nuclear war against the Red continent. Blue's eight hundred intercontinental bombers, each loaded with a hydrogen bomb, were equally divided between Air Marshal Strategico, whose task was to annihilate all of Red's cities, and Air Marshal Tactico, whose task was to annihilate all of Red's intercontinental bombers (or all of his hydrogen bombs, or both). Which air marshal was the more likely to succeed? How many loaded bombers would each have had to give to the other in order to guarantee the other's success? How likely would Blue have been to launch its attack, had its best intelligence revealed that Red possessed an identical defense establishment, but for a hundred fewer intercontinental bombers?

Two American scientists, C. W. Sherwin and Warren Amster, have recently published proposals for a general policy of defense,[7] based on

[7] "Securing Peace Through Military Technology," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XII, No. 5 (May 1956), pp. 159-64; and "Design for Deterrence," *ibid.*, pp. 164-65.

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reasonings of the kind that make us answer: "Very unlikely indeed!" to the last of those three questions. They call their policy "a strategy of *measured* retaliation," and find in it a sovereign preventive against all-out war—or, at the worst, a means of stopping such war in its early stages. For our present enquiry, however, the details of this strategy are interesting mainly because of the orders of physical, economic, and military magnitude that Amster and Sherwin explicitly base their proposals on. Any nuclear Power, they maintain, can force adoption of this strategy upon any other, simply by adopting it herself through announcement of her intention (a) not to use nuclear weapons strategically, e.g., against cities, unless first attacked with them in her own cities; (b) if so attacked, to retaliate with the *same number* of bombs against the attacker's cities; and (c) if bomb-carriers or equivalent means of delivery are attacked and destroyed, to respond by sending just the number of bomb-carriers destroyed against the attacker's *cities*. An important feature of the strategy is that ". . . each side needs an optimum and not a maximum force. Larger or smaller forces actually *reduce security*."[8]

The conditions making this strategy now feasible arise from an unprecedented contrast between the efficacy of attack against productive resources (styled, "the economy": cities, industrial installations, even farmland) and the efficacy of attack against means of nuclear attack. Formally, the point is that hydrogen bombs make "value of destructible economy divided by cost of attack" much greater than unity, and *very* much greater than "value of destructible means-of-attack divided by cost of attack," which is much less than unity. The disparity is already great, even with piloted bombers as the means of delivery. When the guided missiles and rockets at present on the horizon are brought into service, it will increase much further. This is because "Compared to cities, they are *small* (100-200 ft. across), *light* (a few hundred tons for the largest), *mobile* (they can fly, or ride on ships, for example); furthermore, they can be widely *dispersed* over the continents or on or under the seas, and can be *protected* from blast by special buildings or underground shelters. Finally, they can be manned by a very small fraction of the population, who can be given maximum blast and radiation protection and, if necessary, can operate independently from the rest of society for considerable periods."[9]

[8] Sherwin, *loc.cit.*, p. 161.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

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Above all, they are *not* weapons of precision, nor do the scientists think they are likely to become so in the near future. This is a quite fundamental consideration. As long as the chances of hitting a site of departure remain as low as they will soon become, retaliation will be cheap and easy, and total destruction of an enemy's forces impossible. But if ever these chances increase greatly, then the Amster-Sherwin threat of retaliation could be capped by a threat of even more severe measures. Now—or at least in the near future—either party could wipe out the other's economy and have some means of attack unused. The question of bluff can arise again only when and if still newer orders of much greater accuracy permit some nuclear Power plausibly to tell another, "After my attack upon your means of attack, you will have left enough to destroy no more than a part of my economy, whereas I shall have enough to destroy all of yours." Later, we shall explore this theoretical possibility a little further. At this stage, even the layman can recognize its remoteness.[10]

Could a chink in the armor of measured retaliation be found by the coming guided missiles? Doubtless they will soon make bombers obsolete, though all the present indications are that some planes would still get through. And if, instead of the once-normal 90 per cent, only 5 or 10 per cent got through with their hydrogen bombs . . . what then? Indeed, attack has much more chance of outrunning defense even further, by virtue of the interregional and intercontinental ballistic missile, for development of which the United States is currently spending five billion dollars.

Rumored current development of "cleaner" H-bombs (i.e., fusion-

[10] Publications during 1957's first few months may appear to have given the lie to the above assertions of last year. We now know that artificial satellites may be able to transmit information about quite small areas located anywhere, and that unjammable homing devices have been perfected for planes and guided missiles (cf. the next paragraph of text). Further, it seems possible that even ballistic missiles might be equipped to home in during the later stages of their flight. At the same time, however, there are foreshadowed anti-missile systems capable of dealing with some significant proportion of ballistic missiles. Assuming that these factors of opposite tendency are likely to phase in together, we may be sure that the probability of any single ballistic missile's eliminating even one other remains fairly small, while that of its destroying vastly many times its own worth of economy is still rather larger. Such a contrast, of course, maintains the deterrent situation. But the prospect of these innovations, many of them employing expensive electronic equipment, impinges upon the findings of this study in another way: by multiplying the money-and-skill costs of optimum deterrent forces, it raises the entrance fee for the deterrent Powers' club well beyond most nations' resources. Such a possibility has been allowed for in Principles 9 to 12 (see below). Principles 13 to 15, on the other hand, must now tend to represent a merely formal limit to the deterrent situation, since they can begin to apply only when there are scores of deterrent Powers.

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weapons with much less radioactive fall-out but still great blast) suggests another line of objection. If it should become *technically* possible to blanket with tens of thousands of bombs an entire enemy landscape, might not a very secretive, very wealthy Power manage to rush up the vast predominance in bomb-carriers required to eliminate its Amsterite victim's "optimum" forces? Let us simplify that question a little by putting it in terms of launching-platforms and projectiles. The aggressor's problem can then be seen to be one of destroying all of his victim's launching-platforms (or, to be precise, all but as many as the number of missiles he is prepared to have launched against his cities), and of doing so by a single volley. How many projectiles must he send in that volley?—or, to put it from another aspect, how many simultaneously usable launching platforms must he have?

Let M—the aggressor's minimum—stand for the smallest number of platforms or sites that he would need; let V stand for his highest estimate of the number presently possessed by his intended victim; let $P(h)$ stand for the assessed chances of a projectile hitting and knocking out a launching-site, $P(c)$ for the chances of one hitting a city, and t for the (very small and more or less constant) risk that the aggressor would be prepared to tolerate of nuclear explosions upon his own economy.[11]

[11] Dr. W. A. O'N. Waugh, of Canberra University College, has shown me that the above argument and the formula immediately following leave out of account the extent to which random effects may cause deviations from my "expected numbers" of hits in reprisal. My formula suggests, e.g., that if $P(h)$ equals "one in a hundred," just a hundred projectiles could be relied on to knock out a launching site, and that V times a hundred would knock out V sites—clearly, an overconfident assumption! I have thus *understated* consistently both the case for Amster's type of strategy, and the deterrent situation's prospects of enduring. This means that the tendencies (discussed on p. 514, and formalized in Principles 13 to 15, p. 525) toward reintroduction of alliances into the deterrent situation, toward its polarization, and finally toward its reversion to a balance of power are much weaker and longer-run than I had supposed. I shall try to adjust the picture by footnotes.

Dr. Waugh writes in correction: "It is possible to derive the probabilities for the number of bombs to be anticipated in reprisal after a volley has been fired at an opponent's sites, and these give rather more information than an argument based purely on 'expected numbers,' which would yield an approximate expression only in certain circumstances—for example, if there were as many sites as missiles, and each missile were aimed at a different site. We can correct your formula as follows. A particular missile can only be aimed at one of the sites. Suppose that m missiles are aimed at each site, so that mV missiles are let off at once. Interpret $P(h)$ as the probability that a particular missile hits its target. Suppose that after this onslaught each surviving site fires off a missile in reprisal, each aimed at a different city (to avoid the waste of duplication) and each having probability $P(c)$ to hit its target. Then the number of reprisal hits on cities will be a 'binomial variable' with mean

$$V[1-P(h)]^m P(c)$$

Other schemes such as firing successive shots until a site was eliminated would yield different results but might not fit the description of a 'volley.' "

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Then—

$$M = \frac{V}{P(h)} - \frac{t}{P(c)P(h)}$$

Compared with V, $\frac{t}{P(c)}$ would be quite tiny, since the damage caused to cities by H-bombs would be so great, and the task of hitting a city with a rocket so easy. $P(h)$, of course, is the important magnitude. It must be small, since (see above, pp. 510-11) the launching-sites would be small, dispersed, protected, and hidden, and the projectiles not weapons of precision. Suppose it were .01, t were 3, and $P(c)$ were .6. Then if V is 500, M will have to approach 50,000. This would yield a "distance" between victim's optimum and aggressor's minimum of 49,000 sites to be constructed. And should the potential victim consider that amount of construction to be well within his foe's productive capacity, he could increase it to something quite unbridgeable through raising his own optimum, V, by proportionately much less. Were he to quadruple V, for example, he would be making the "distance" something near 197,500 sites.[12]

Under prospective conditions of accuracy, therefore, policies resembling "measured retaliation" do permit discounting the possibility of sudden rearmament by any single would-be aggressor. The same holds, though in lesser degree, for worlds comprising aggressive coalitions and their victims. Given an eleven-bloc world including a victim with 500 launching-sites and $P(h) = .01$, the ten aggressive allies would need each of them a "distance" beyond their victim of 4,000 sites; while if the victim himself could match that by increasing his own force by the same number, each aggressor would come to need not much less than 45,000 sites altogether.[13]

[12] Both "distances," as here estimated, understate the aggressor's difficulties (see the previous footnote). Dr. Waugh comments: "In this numerical example, t is the expected number of hits in reprisal. If the aggressor fires 50,000 missiles, aiming 100 at each of the victim's sites, our corrected formula makes this expected number approximately 116. Use of the 'normal approximation' indicates that the number of reprisal hits will exceed 88 with probability greater than 99.7%. To reduce the expected number of reprisal hits to 3, it would be necessary to aim about 455 missiles at each site, i.e. to fire about 230,000 in the initial volley."

[13] Let n connote the number of Powers, and let us neglect the consideration, very favorable to Amster, that one chance in ten of a hydrogen bomb on one's cities would not deter much less than the certainty of the same thing. Then for each Power in a coalition of aggressors,

$$M = \frac{V}{P(h)(n-1)} - \frac{t}{P(h)P(c)}$$

ADDENDUM. This formula also leaves out of account deviations from random effects

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We saw that in the current change from power-balancing to deterrence two conditions were at work: the greatly enhanced effect of anti-economy weapons, and their greatly diminished effect against each other. Now suppose technical advances were to modify the latter, so that with the expectation of increased accuracy, the average optimum of nuclear forces had to be raised also—and the more numerous the world's deterrent Powers, the faster. At a highly improbable extreme, there might be eighty or so deterrent Powers, and the chances of hitting a launching-site might be in the tens, not in the hundreds. That, of course, would push expenditure upon defense nearer and nearer ruination, at least for the poorer countries. It would also reimpose a premium upon the formation of blocs—truly defensive blocs, since their dimensions, though deterring to an aggressor, would not enable attack by any one such bloc. (The low-accuracy situation as envisaged by Amster need afford no particular encouragement to bloc formation.) But even a remarkable accuracy of weapons against launching-sites need neither wholly preclude a strategy of measured retaliation nor on that account reinstate the classic balance of power. For measured retaliation depends not simply upon accuracy against sites but upon the disparity between that and thermonuclear destructiveness against cities.

Now, if we suppose that the tendency is for military research to make missiles more accurate, and that nothing short of a world government could halt tendencies to military innovation, then, according to the general approach of this study, we should infer a countervailing tendency, once missiles have begun to grow much more accurate, toward the realliance of independent deterrent Powers into larger and larger deterrent blocs. Under such conditions, the motives for this realliance would be added to by its propensity for keeping down the deterrent-defense budgets, and for making the most of organizations for research. Thus bolstered by conventional alliance, the semi-deterrent state could be maintained until the chances of hitting a site with an intercontinental rocket became something like unity.

This, of course, is all in the realm of abstraction. In practice, we may expect a much earlier petering-out of the tendency of wholly independent Powers to multiply under the deterrent state. Though, for a while, Powers of medium size might well be able to "stand off" the

(see footnote 11). Yet its general point—the larger the number of deterrent powers, the shorter the "distance" required by aggressors—remains valid. So does the *comparison* between the figures in the paragraph this note refers to and those in the paragraph before that, since the extent of underestimation is the same in both.

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whole world by acquiring H-bombs and the means of delivering them, yet the great and increasing disparity between the potentials of the giant Powers, the United States and Soviet Russia, and the potentials of most other nations should enable the giants to make the cost of deterrent defense too much for minor Powers. What may be more important, the economies of scale in research enjoyed by those two giants are a constantly appreciating asset, which only Britain and perhaps a Western European bloc centered on Western Germany could hope at present to match. We shall return to this question below. Meanwhile, it may be concluded that in terms of abstract theory such strategies as measured retaliation can survive criticism, though this is not to say that from now on and forever they will dominate the international scene.

If so far our argument for the emergence of a deterrent state has been sound, there should be little reason to expect a third world war involving what the press describes as "intercontinental artillery duels." Since the victim of a surprise attack upon his "artillery" would certainly have enough of it surviving to annihilate the aggressor's economy, neither side could profit by the traditional strategy of seeking out and destroying its enemy's forces. The next paragraph is therefore a theoretical digression.

Insofar as, for both sides, the traditional strategy were to remain feasible or to become so again, Lanchester's Square Law[14] would apply and would operate for the whole war rather than, as in past conflicts, for each separate engagement or front[15]—in other words, there would be a single front. The Square Law in one of its formulations states that the number of victorious firing-units (e.g., riflemen, warships, fighter planes, rocket-launching sites) surviving in the most probable of all the outcomes of any engagement approximates to the square root of the difference between the squares of the numbers of units firing from each side. It serves to predict increasing advantages for mere numerical predominance, or "concentration," and also for getting in the first volley—i.e., for "surprise." Had atomic explosions of the Hiroshima

[14] See P. M. Morse and G. M. Kimbal, *Methods of Operations Research*, New York, 1951, pp. 64-77; F. W. Lanchester, *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm*, London, 1916, passim; Ivan Driggs, "A Monte Carlo Model of Lanchester's Square Law," *Operations Research*, IV, No. 2 (April 1956), pp. 148-52.

[15] I must make it clear that this statement is true only when both belligerents have world-ranging missiles, and when deterrent defense is impossible. The size of a front or engagement in the past has been conditioned partly by the limits of the range of fire, which, as Lanchester has shown, is the precondition of gaining military advantage by concentration.

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magnitude turned out to be the largest procurable, our era might well have had to face the prospect of Lanchester's Law applying in the fashion described. That would have involved, as well as the present technological scramble for accuracy, a ruinous armament race in respect of ballistic missiles and their launching-platforms, tighter and tighter alliances, and therefore the reinforcement of current polarizing tendencies—unless swift development of a third bloc had restored the balance of power. In the future, that kind of world could conceivably ensue from any of several patterns of further technological innovation. The least improbable pattern would need to comprise a system of (1) anti-projectile measures that could minimize the danger to a large area, e.g., a major city and its environs, and yet would hamper or prevent the launching of projectiles from similarly protected areas, together with (2) interregional missiles a good deal more accurate than those at present in view. Clearly, such a coincidence of innovations is most unlikely, and the disjunction of all the patterns of innovation which would adequately protect the economy but not the means of attack is only less so. But only some such coincidence could reverse the historical consequences of the megaton bomb and weaken, in possible victims of surprise attack, the presently incontestable motive for preparing not counterattack but reprisal. This concludes the digression.

To show that speculations like Amster's and Sherwin's are, at least in their broad features, more than academic, we may refer to a paper circulating in the general staff of the U.S. Army before and during May 1956:

> The bringing of mass destruction weapons into the art of war may require a more limited, or circumscribed application of military force in pursuit of national goals. In order to attain an honorable state of peace within the context of equal nuclear weapon capability by all adversaries, the United States and its allies may be required to pursue limited military and political objectives as a primary course of action if for no other reason than that attainment of limited objectives offers a better alternative than mutual destruction. If [so,] by the realization that full use of nuclear weapons would fail to satisfy the purposes for which such weapons are used, but instead would bring about utter world devastation, concentration on the pursuit of limited objectives may become intense by all adversaries in war.
>
> It is therefore conceivable that the ultimate manifestation of war, 'total war,' may be abandoned in favor of the prosecution of lesser action, such as the peripheral wars or police actions, as primary courses of action.[16]

[16] Quoted in *New York Times*, July 15, 1956, p. 22.

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The *New York Times* cited these expressions of view when commenting upon the rumored cut of 800,000 in U.S. defense personnel, which it had divulged two days before; and prefaced the quotation with a reference to "an expressed national policy of using small or tactical atomic weapons even in local aggressions." The new tactical armory thus mentioned must be expected to induce change in the international situation only less important than that caused by the H-bomb. For instance, the threat of loft-bombing[17] with "small" atomic explosives can prevent Lanchester's Square Law operating to the advantage of the Power deploying the larger conventional force.

Those, generally speaking, are the short-term reasons why both the USSR and the USA have independently reduced such forces of late. But it would be a mistake to assume therefore that no country henceforth will have a use for infantry or naval task-forces or troop-carrying planes or such. When, as in civil war, the enemy's forces are mingled with a population or an economy that one is interested in preserving, or when, as in guerrilla-campaigns, his troops are mobile and widely scattered, conventional arms alone, employed in conventional fashion to hunt them down, will serve as instruments of policy. Relatively small contingents from major Powers may therefore come, as it were, vicariously into this kind of conflict with each other, upon the soil of debated areas like Korea, Indo-China, or Egypt. But great campaigns involving conventional forces seem less and less likely.

In dealing with the large nuclear weapons, I have made much of the contention that attack has outrun defense. Yet that in no way contravenes the difficulty soon to be encountered in attacking with conventional forces a nuclear Power no larger than the least of them, Great Britain, yet armed with tactical A-weapons as well as H-bombs and the means of delivering them. For the time being, nuclear Powers seem safe from each other's conventional forces. Why, then, should not any Power industrially and technologically competent turn itself into a nuclear Power? And why are the existing nuclear Powers not exercising their overwhelming strength against non-nuclear Powers?

Answers to both questions may be approached by means of the first five of the principles laid down in Part I of this study, so long as there are also assumed the special military conditions of the deterrent state or—for the immediate future—of the stages of transition from balance to deterrence. Let us assume, first, a state of total deterrence,

[17] Loft-bombing enables the dropping of atomic bombs by planes without destruction of the planes themselves.

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and one in which, moreover, ballistic missiles have been so developed that any city-sized tract could probably be hit from anywhere else on the earth's surface. The military significance of geographic location will be felt only in regard to the business of deterring *conventional* forces; tactical nuclear weapons will guard frontiers and seaboards from attack by army, navy, or airforce, but will be themselves "deterred" from attacking by the great batteries of intercontinental rockets, which thereby will be exercising what we shall call "global deterrence." As far as these last are concerned, their field of fire will extend anywhere except within a hundred miles or so of themselves. Therefore the notion of allocating *global* forces will apply in a different way: the Powers forming any nuclear bloc will be *completely* allied with each other at a global level, even should they maintain tactical nuclear forces against each other; and their joint global forces may be thought of as allocated *completely* against all other nuclear blocs, though not more specifically against any one than against any other.[18]

The deterrent state thus constitutes a more rigid and in some ways a cruder international system than do situations embodying the balance of power. Within the electric-fenced paddocks of measured retaliation, there will be little point to nice adjustments of the bloc's global deterrent force, and no place (such as was envisaged in Principle 1) for degrees of alliance with other blocs short of the absolute. Should the Powers within a bloc maintain *tactical* deterrent forces against each other, we may expect there to be an optimum size and optimum allocation for those forces, since the dominant Power in a bloc (or, in a bloc of comparative equals, the H.Q. controlling the global deterrents) would be compelled to guarantee each of its subordinates from nuclear attack by the others. The optimum tactical deterrent allocation would therefore correspond to the dimensions of one's neighbors' potentials for maintaining conventional forces, and to the policing requirements of their Ministries for Internal Affairs. On the other hand, struggle for power between global-deterrent blocs—which is pretty well identical with the struggle for long-run security—will turn mainly upon the issues of weapon-development, economic growth, and political stability,

[18] In terms of the imaginary diagram described on p. 497f.: global deterrent relationships in a world for which geographic location has lost military significance are in theory to be plotted along the line between the points of "total alliance" and "total opposition," since there is no longer a point of "total indifference." Indeed, only those two remaining *points* are needed for the global relationships of a peaceful deterrent state; while for the unlikely deterrent war, the level of deterrent forces allocated against each distinct foe will intersect the line to form a part proportional to the number of foes the Power depicted is fighting against.

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since in the game of allocating forces each Power will have open to it only a few, completely transforming, and all but irreversible moves—moves from one absolute enclosing alliance to another, or to nuclear independence at the tactical or the global level. Principle 3, therefore, though it will continue to apply in some measure, has much less significant application in a deterrent than it has in a balancing world.

Principle 2, on the other hand, plays a more important role in the deterrent state, though it must be taken in conjunction with the requirement, for deterrent strategies, of forces of optimum size (see above, p. 510). That conjunction implies, in the growth of a Power's potential, a critical level at which, but not before which, the Power ought to acquire its own private armory of *global* deterrents. What conditions determine this critical level? (As far as concerns policy-making, this is the prior question; and it has to be answered before an answer can be given, one way or another, to the question of a critical level for the adoption of anti-conventional—i.e., *tactical*—deterrence.)

Obviously, the economic ability to maintain an optimum-sized global force must be the prime condition. Sometimes, that alone should determine the critical level. A Power like the USSR, for instance, placed as it has been during the present decade, would have been very foolish (in terms of power politics) had it delayed nuclear armament for the sake of rather more economic growth. But those whose long-run prospects are less favorable—lesser Powers, for instance, sharing in a Great Power's quest for ever more effective weapons and liable, should each set up shop for itself, to be denied the Great Power's discoveries—may well refrain from straightway crossing the threshold of global deterrence. The kind of judgment here called for from statesmen will never be replaceable by numerical calculation. They will have to decide whether any possible innovation could put an end to the deterrent state, converting it either to one in which the discovering Power's defenses had become *physically* impregnable, or back to the balance of power; if so, how likely and how far off in the technologically most advanced countries such an innovation might be; and lastly, to what extent their present alliance's chance of finding this philosopher's stone should be discounted against the greater *certainty* of the short-run security that their own nation might provide for itself by immediately developing its own means of global deterrence. The Principles immediately relevant to situations of this type are, of course, 2, 4, and 5.

Considerations of prestige may also offer strong inducements toward

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crossing the nuclear threshold; for this would make one in the old sense a Great Power at the least. In historical usage, that title has been awarded any Power thought to be unconquerable except by an alliance of Powers, while—by a usage less generally employed—the Power (if there be such) with a fair chance of defending itself against the whole world has been called a Super-Power. Since, as we have been assuming, that kind of status and security would be predicable of any deterring Power, still higher classification would be needed for those blocs or Powers which in the deterrent situation would command the remaining, non-military, sources of influence upon other nations. An illustration may help: in a few years, the United Kingdom may possess a nuclear armory sufficient to deter a (highly unlikely) coalition of the USA and the USSR. Even so, Britain's would not approach the sway now held by those two Powers, the one through her economic predominance, the other through her ideological influence as well. But—to take an impossible example—should Australia within the next couple of decades establish her own global deterrent force, she could not, without absurdity, be considered a Great Power. Productive capacity and, to a lesser extent, the political sympathy and support of aliens will become in the deterrent situation the favored instruments of power, directly and also for their uses in the scramble for innovating weapons. The larger and more substantial the economy, the more secure in the long run both the Power which controls it and, at a second remove, the clients of that Power.

Here we should also take into account a possible new phenomenon, the casting-off of clients. Very secure Great Powers such as the USA may come to find the sponsorship of NATO, for example, more expensive than it seems worth, especially if a firm push out of the USA's deterrent paddock might force NATO countries to extemporize one or more of their own. Neo-isolationism is not a wholly unthinkable policy. Whether it or any of the other possibilities we have been glancing at will ever be realized depends upon several cumulative imponderables—the chances of radical innovation, the opportunities for subversion, the strength of such movements as that for German unification, and so on. Concerning these, the present analysis is not designed to take us very far. It suggests, however, that if the Powers dominant in each of the several major deterrent blocs make much use of subversion and economic pressure, against each other or against their subordinates, then the groupings of nations as they form up to cross the threshold of global deterrence will approximate to self-sufficient economies. If, on

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the other hand, subversion and economic pressure turn out to be inadequate substitutes for the old media of power, every industrialized country may try, sooner or later, to acquire its own deterrent force. As far as they affect the new situation, Principles 2 and 4 lend most of their weight to the latter hypothesis. Indeed, it follows from them, if we keep to our previous abstract model of intrinsic international relations and build into this model the general acceptance of the quite plausible assumption that neither the defense of cities against nuclear attack nor the offensive against means of attack can soon become significantly more efficient—see above, pp. 510-11. If the situation does develop along these lines, remarkable consequences seem likely in other fields—e.g., demography—which would then confront any crowded nation with the alternatives: limit your population, or let starvation limit it. The viability of the deterrent state would seem, then, to depend upon the various Foreign Offices' discounting an element of absolute surprise, i.e., upon their dismissing the possibility of a quite unthought-of and revolutionary weapon. If so, international affairs in the approaching era must constitute an order that for intrinsic reasons cannot be completely determinate.[19]

On the other hand, the extrinsic imponderables, political and economic, need not be quite so unmanageable. Moving again out of this study's special competence, we may guess that it will not be easy to subvert the highly industrialized population of a country secured by deterrent armory from external attack. And as for economic warfare, the present distribution of the world's raw materials and the prospects opened up by peaceful use of atomic energy do not suggest that embargo, sanction, or other interferences with trade are likely to substitute perfectly for military pressure or the threat of it. If therefore the general pre-conditions of the deterrent state maintain themselves for several generations, the earth may be imagined as parceling out itself more

[19] Trends of 1957 suggest that this is a feature of prime significance, whose implications should perhaps have been built directly into our theory of the deterrent state. Suppose that military planners were to be offered many and divers novel weapon-systems, and told that fundamental research foreshadowed—without specifying—the possibility of many more. Now, though they could guess at the several probabilities that their potential enemy would adopt one or another of the systems already envisaged by them, they would have to allow also for the possibility of his commitment to systems they had not conceived of. Should their estimates of that possibility grow very large, military planning would become impossible—what range of contingencies could they be instructed to prepare for? (The deterrent situation itself can be defined as one in which planning for traditional *victory* is impossible.) If this happened, they would presumably recommend either immediate attack or a complete understanding with the enemy—in either case, the sudden end of deterrence. Recent breakthroughs in electronics and space-study provoke such speculations.

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and more into impregnable areas of deterrence, some inhabited by blocs or confederations of peoples, others by single Powers, and the pressure of population upon resources which will characterize the economically poorer areas working itself out not in military or migratory expansion, but in reinforcement of the authority of their central governments.

If the global kind of deterrence were the sole kind militarily feasible, we ought, probably, to exclude the single-Power blocs (except perhaps for Russia) from that picture, and limit the total of blocs to three or four large ones. Though by recent standards global deterrence should not prove so very expensive for a great bloc or Power, the main recurring expense being, very likely, for research, yet the threshold of intercontinental-rocket production, involving as it does a great *variety* of scientific and industrial techniques, should for a couple of decades at any rate remain too high to be crossed by any Power but the USA, the USSR, the UK, perhaps the Germanys as the inventors of the V-2, and Powers whom any of these may choose to equip with the materials and technicians—not a very likely event.[20] Within the blocs forming around these countries, in a world where nuclear weapons had no tactical use, the junior partners might not be able to preserve their national integrity; and if not, there would be only a few neutral states surviving to grow into deterrent Powers as their standards of industrial production and research should improve. It is indeed conceivable that this should be how the deterrent state turns out; but unless the present leading Powers unwontedly cooperate, the new possibilities of *tactical* uses for nuclear weapons are likely to produce a rather more complex situation.

A lesser Power possessing tactical nuclear weapons that could be dropped from planes or fired by other conventional arms would be able to prevent conventional invasion from any comparable Power, and thus to stand off all but the controllers of the global deterrents. Even they, moreover, should they wish to act directly against it, would have to threaten the cities and economy of the tactical-deterrent lesser Power, which, if it were bold, might go a long way toward calling their bluff. The easier but irreversible response would be for the controllers of global forces to arm neighbors of the troublesome Power with tactical nuclear weapons as counter-deterrents. (We should remember also that no method is yet in sight for preventing development of nuclear

[20] Japan should have been included in the list of candidates for deterrent status. I probably underestimated the willingness of, e.g., the United States to help other Powers over the deterrent threshold, which will be higher than I had supposed; see footnote 10.

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weapons in plants for the peaceful production of atomic energy.) In the long run, these new tactically deterrent Powers would have to come to some arrangement with the global-deterrent blocs, either as members or as guaranteed neutrals. But even in such a semi-dependent position, they would still to some extent control their own foreign policies and research programs, and thus remain candidates—insofar as their economies were developing—for the rank of "global-deterrent Power."

We have assumed throughout this study that national policies are always in some measure adapted to the sequence of future international situations as the policy-makers envisage it. If then, in the next decade or so, our rulers come to accept the deterrent as much the most likely future state, we may expect them to consider the desirability of expanding their nations' spheres of influence or even of occupation before that kind of thing should become impossible. Still more, they will wish to prevent the future expansion of any opposing World Powers. Such policies may issue in one of two contrary outcomes: the less likely would be an agreement and virtual alliance among the present nuclear Powers, in order to share out the world between them. This they could not do without both the threat of nuclear force against pre-nuclear countries, and a ruthless domination of their foreign policies. The sort of thing put forward in the last paragraph, concerning the tactical atomic weapon's potentialities as a preserver of national independence, might indeed weigh with them on the side of this alternative. But the more likely one is that the Great Powers will continue to fear and to respect each other, each letting the others understand that she regards the territorial integrity of neutrals like India to be among her own vital interests. It must be realized of course that where deterrence is the rule, such (usually tacit) guarantees can be given for no more than defense of the neutral's frontiers—by, say, intervening with tactical atomic forces. Reprisal against the aggressor's homeland is practically excluded, and assistance for the neutral's government against subversion has less chance of success the stronger and more generally distributed the subversives. Furthermore, this guaranteeing of neutrals can be managed only where both the guarantors have means of approach for their interventionist forces. Geography will therefore retain some, though a diminishing, significance.

In certain features of our present world, something of the foregoing can already be recognized. I shall take this as an opportunity, then, of applying the general theory to the transitional processes, after first adding to it several principles concerned with the deterrent system.

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But the reader should be reminded again that these later principles are meant to constitute an abstract model informing a state of affairs which, unlike that informed by the balance of power, has never been actual before now. Of course this ought not to make any difference to the validity of such purely formal principles; yet in human fallibility one cannot help feeling much more confidence in an argument of which the links have been tested by history as well as criticism. Another source of doubt about this stage of our analysis lies in the thought of unthought-of innovations—weapon systems based on quite different features of the physical universe, which might make deterrence obsolete in its turn. Consciously discounting that element of possible surprise, however, we can extend the theory of international systems to cover the deterrent state:

(8) *A deterrent state or system will emerge from a power-balancing system whenever the development of military technology makes (i) the physical destruction of all of an opponent's forces impossible, and (ii) the physical destruction of his economy very easy.* For reasons for this principle, see above, pp. 510-13.

(9) *In any given configuration of a deterrent state, the technical pre-conditions of deterrence establish optimum points for the size and the allocation of deterrent forces, both tactical (i.e., for deterring conventional attack) and global (i.e., for deterring nuclear attack).* For reasons, see above, pp. 510 and 518-20.

(10) *A Power will adopt the global-deterrent defense (and, therefore, tactical deterrence as well) when, but only when, (i) it has developed an economic and scientific potential which could maintain such forces at the optimum points, and (ii) it is prepared to discount the possible advantages of subordination to any other Power whose technological resources might at some time provide the sort of armory which would transform the deterrent state as a whole.*

(11) *A Power will adopt the tactically deterrent defense when, but only when, (i) it has developed a potential which could maintain such forces at the appropriate optimum point, and (ii) it is not prevented from doing so by its membership in or domination by a global-deterrent bloc.* For reasons for this last pair of principles, see above, pp. 522-23.

(12) *The optimum for the size of a global-deterrent force is a product not only of the technical pre-conditions of deterrence but also of the number of independent deterrent Powers or blocs in the system; and it rises as (more or less) a multiple of that number.* The background of

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this twelfth principle will be found on p. 514 above, where possible limitations of the Amster-Sherwin strategy were discussed. But the point can be made in terms more general than that. Any type of global-deterrent defense will depend upon all parties' assuming that each party would have some means of deterrence surviving an all-out anti-force attack by a coalition of the rest. Now, that assumption could be true only if, when any new Power adopted the deterrent defense, each of the older deterrent Powers were *either* to make an increment to its deterrent forces such as would offset the highest loss likely to be incurred by those forces, were the new deterrent Power to attack them alone (which gives grounds for Principle 12, and in part for Principle 13); *or* to ally completely with at least one other deterrent Power and thereby supplement that margin of their joint forces which would survive an attack by the opposing Powers. Along with several other principles, this second alternative underlies Principle 15.

(13) *Further innovations in military technology would reintroduce into the deterrent system certain features of the power-balancing system, if and only if they should enable an alliance, consisting of all but one of the Powers in the system, to destroy so much of the excluded Power's deterrent force as to leave that Power without the means of effective retaliation against the alliance. Innovations would produce this effect, were they to increase the probability of the allies' destroying the other's force, to a degree of probability which would be the lower the greater the number of Powers in the system.*

(14) *Further innovations in military technology would wholly restore the balance of power if they restored a parity between the destructiveness of missiles directed against forces and their destructiveness when directed against economies.* This principle, of course, is simply the reversal of Principle 8.

(15) *If, after general establishment of the deterrent state, the means of delivering global deterrents were to be made gradually more effective against deterrent forces, the deterrent system as a whole, after having tended at first to break up a polarized world-situation, would more and more tend to restore it, by reducing the number and increasing the size of global-deterrent blocs.* This is in virtue of Principles 10, 12, and 13. The reader may be interested to compare it with our conclusions about the balance of power and its tendencies of development, as set out in Principle 7.[21]

[21] See also footnote 10.

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In the light of the foregoing theory, a scramble after innovations reveals itself as the nemesis of the deterrent state. Recent experience tells us how important already is the competition for the first intercontinental missile, for the first satellite, and for all the varied scientific gadgetry which they require. We might interpret it also as the deterrent state's version of the armament race; for if there are optimum sizes and allocations for deterrent forces,[22] then the classic armament race, explicable by means of the Lanchester equations, need not occur. But by the same token, the parallel under deterrence for *disarmament* seems far to seek. How could a scramble for innovations be checked?

One method is worth consideration of a sort that compels reference to moral convictions and aspirations toward world-wide community, so far rigidly excluded from this analysis. A strong movement for the restoring of completely open scientific publication could, if it were successful, weaken the nations' motives for single-minded concentration upon the inventing of new weapon systems. Whenever a military innovation happened to be made possible by discoveries in basic research, each of the larger industrial Powers would have to start racing from the same mark, and the discoverer would be less advantaged. Instead, the race would tend to go to the bloc with the larger or more adaptable productive resources. During a long period in which general deterrence made actual war impossible, the international republic of science might develop institutions and like-minded relationships cutting across state sovereignties and alliances, and thus create the elements of a concrete world community.

This line of approach seems to me less utopian and less oppressive than proposals for world government. But I should think it quite impracticable, even so, until the three present nuclear Powers get intercontinental missiles, and unless they do so before other substantial Powers can cross the global-deterrent threshold. Scientific and cultural interchanges, meanwhile, can be a most necessary preparation.

[22] "The objective of deterrence, as well as the allied objective of achieving victory should war be forced upon us, will be served as much as it will ever be served when there are on hand sufficient atomic weapons to defeat an enemy just once, and this regardless of the number he may have. When this point is reached, the competition, if it still exists, will no longer be one of simply making weapons and weapons material; it will become, instead, mainly one of designing, developing, manufacturing, and training men to use new and effective means for delivering weapons or preventing their delivery against us and our armed forces." E. W. Titterton, *Facing the Atomic Future*, Melbourne and London, 1956, p. 333.

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III

Already, the fundamental defenses of the USA, the USSR, and possibly the UK are deterrent. At the same time, changing allocations of military force reveal that in many regions, and for some purposes in all, the balance of power still operates. How may we expect these two differing systems of international relationship to combine?

My tentative hypothesis would be that the deterrent strands, though fewer and less apparent than the others, are setting the pattern even now, both directly and also because governments in the determination of their foreign policies are already taking them into account. With the Soviet's first explosion of an H-bomb, the general fear of another world war seemed to evaporate a little. While this study is being revised for publication, Britain and France are in process of reoccupying the Suez Canal; yet no atmosphere as heavy as that during the Berlin blockade can be felt. The great blocs, that six months ago looked monolithic, are suddenly cracking at the joints; and very minor Powers are taking turns in calling the tune for international affairs.[23] Our analysis suggests that what appears as frantic gambling with the balance of power may in fact evince recognition that a *major* war is almost out of the question: each Great Power knows it can exploit opportunities that would have been forbidden it had the others been able to threaten attack; while the smaller nations seem to be appreciating the consequent greater fluidity of the world situation. If that fluidity comes also to be widely recognized as a temporary thing, likely to be more and more restricted within the shrinking non-deterrent areas as deterrent Powers increase in number or in the extent of their influence, then we may expect the nations, great and small, to make the most while they can of the possibilities for expansion which fluid situations present. The most favored means to expansion will probably continue for a while to be conventional forces, but sooner or later some nuclear Power is apt to take the short way and use tactical atomic weapons.

For these reasons, we should expect that the transition from balance to deterrence will be characterized by much *more* intense activity in those areas where power-balancing still prevails. Minor wars, reversals of alliance, and revolutions will be frequent. Furthermore, the total configuration of Powers will be severely shaken every time one of their

[23] Another six months later the great blocs, though no longer "monolithic," appear to be patching their cracks. I still think the Berlin blockade brought us much nearer to world war than did Suez and Hungary.

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number acquires tactical atomic weapons, and even more if it acquires the long-range means of global deterrence as well. This is the notorious "fourth-country problem." It is called so because the fourth country to acquire such weapons will thereby grow impregnable and yet will be able to bully its former equals, the non-deterrent neighbors, and because with each recruit to the deterrent ranks, the cost of deterrence will rise considerably (the problem is therefore most worrying to Britain, the poorest of the nuclear Powers). Medium nations precariously balanced against their neighbors will have the strongest motives for becoming fourth or fifth or sixth countries. We should also notice that these accessions will alter the world situation by changing national *interests*, which are in part a function of national defenses, as well as the other way round.

The fourth country will require considerable industrial and scientific resources. It is nowadays being recognized that population sets a ceiling to both of these, in the latter case by limiting the number of scientists and technicians, and the intellectual reserves from which they can be drawn, in any given population. If, then, the prospect of the deterrent state calls for acceleration of economic growth, the rising nations as well as the Great Powers may be expected to intensify their demands for both scarce materials and scarce labor- and brain-power.

Political evolution, bound up with but distinguishable from economic, is and will be another transformer of the transitional state. Nationalistic movements, whether springing from an actual unity of culture or dependent for their success upon uniting quite diverse groups of undeveloped peoples, can still break out in parts of the world that have not yet been blessed or afflicted with this potent organizer of man. The state of deterrence, in many ways as we have seen a rigid one, offers little promise nevertheless of sterilizing such sources of national genesis; while comparative studies of economic growth indicate a strong self-governing national polity as one necessary condition for industrial revolution. Closely associated with national resurgence, and finding their commonest expression in it, ideological movements also are likely to help alter the relative potentials of the nations by real and not always imponderable pressures. Even the smallest atomic bomb, we should remember, would not be often of use in that civil strife by which national and ideological movements most frequently come to power.

Our prognosis—much disturbance, but none of it turning into world war—depends for its latter clause upon our diagnosis of a rising deter-

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rent state; but, for the former, it assumes that no concert of Great and nuclear Powers will share out and police the diminishing realms of the balance of power. I do think, indeed, that they are unlikely to do so. But the very expectation of the intensifying conflict which would be consequent upon their continuing hostilities *might* induce them to compose their differences as best they can, and attempt a regulation, if not a settlement, of the disputes of lesser Powers. Events since the death of Stalin, and especially some in the past year, suggest that though Russia and China and the West still seek to aggravate each other's problems of suppression, neither side is anxious for the explosive, unpredictable world that could emerge from the total collapse of either.

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NEW HORIZONS FOR COMPARATIVE POLITICS

By DANKWART A. RUSTOW

I

THE rapid drive of formerly colonial and dependent countries toward independent nationhood has gone hand in hand, over the last decade, with a thorough reorientation in the discipline of comparative politics. In Southeast Asia, on the Indian subcontinent, in the Near East—everywhere, the Western powers have surrendered their former positions of imperial domination. Even in Africa, once the dark continent of colonialism, fully half the population now has emerged to self-government. In all, a score of new nations has joined the roll of sovereign states, and their global importance is attested daily by far-flung programs of economic assistance, by the gradual shift of the cold-war front from Europe to Asia and Africa, and by the recent redistribution of voting power in the United Nations. Little wonder that specialists in comparative government, once snugly secure in their study of the countries of Europe and the Commonwealth, cross the oceans in increasing numbers to study public administration in Egypt, local government in Uganda, economic planning in India, communism in Malaya, or party developments in the Philippines. Not long ago Western man ruled the world: today he studies it.

This sudden shift of interest implies, no doubt, some dangers. The skeptic may warn that the breathless pursuit of the "background of tomorrow's headlines" could induce political scientists to discard the ballast of theoretical notions acquired in their more leisurely and methodical past, or that continued preoccupation with problems of capital formation and of cultural change will tend to turn them into amateur economists and amateur anthropologists. I shall argue in the following, nonetheless, that the current reorientation in comparative politics is a logical stage of growth and development and that it holds out the prospect of genuine theoretical advances.

Some sixty or seventy years ago the systematic study of comparative government began with a historical and analytical examination of the constitutional and legal institutions of the democracies of Western Europe and North America. This narrow focus hid from view a large number of economic, cultural, and historical variables, and thereby

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permitted the formulation and refinement of a body of closely related theoretical insights. Subsequently, under the influence of men like Bryce, Ostrogorski, Michels, and Lowell, political scientists became alive to the crucial role played by parties and other political groupings in operating the constitutional structure. This shift was accentuated by the study of European dictatorships since the 1920's, which demonstrated, among other things, the totally different practical content that could be given to similar formal institutions. At the same time a closer examination of public opinion and propaganda revealed the importance of social and psychological factors. A widening of empirical horizons thus went hand in hand with a revision and extension of theory. With some significant modifications, the sociologically oriented group theory of politics has been successfully applied to the interaction of such forces as the army, the party, the managerial elite, and the secret police in a totalitarian system.[1] Still, theoretical neatness and precision have been preserved at the price of limited applicability. Embarking upon the investigation of a universe made up of some one hundred contemporary political systems, political scientists began by examining first half a dozen, and then as many as fifteen or twenty. By and large, their attention remained centered upon a single major culture—the industrial civilization of modern Europe with its American and East European offshoots.

The new interest in the politics of Asia, of the Near East, and of Africa for the first time suggests the possibility of a global study of comparative politics, based on the entire body of available evidence. To approximate this goal, systematic inquiry must be extended not only to the colonial or newly independent countries but also to the countries of Latin America and to the long-neglected smaller nations of Europe. But surely a science that is resolutely leaping from its accustomed preserve of Britain-France-Germany-and-Russia to such exotic regions as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Afghanistan will be able to reconnoiter Bulgaria, Iceland, and Colombia along the way. Once again the extension of the empirical base must be accompanied by systematic elaboration of the theoretical superstructure. The besetting infirmity of political science has been its preoccupation with current events and with problems of obvious pragmatic relevance. For the first time, perhaps, daily events themselves are providing the needed corrective. Where once they tended to reinforce our parochialism, they now impel

[1] See, e.g., Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, and Barrington Moore, *Terror and Progress—USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.

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us to greater universality. In proportion as the theoretical difficulties can be resolved, comparative politics will become truly world-wide.

II

No one who has attempted to study political processes in some of the newer locales of political science, or who has tried to distill his findings in the classroom, will lightly shrug off the obstacles ahead. Somewhat schematically, these may be divided into difficulties of data-gathering and difficulties of interpreting the data obtained.

The obvious and urgent need for additional linguistic preparation is perhaps on balance the least formidable among the difficulties of data-gathering—although in the case of languages such as Chinese or Arabic it can be an impressive difficulty indeed. More serious is the fact that many important areas are physically barred to the scholarly investigator. Until the recent relaxation of Soviet policies, travel in Russia and its satellite empire was difficult or impossible; movement in such guerrilla-torn areas as Algeria and Malaya is severely circumscribed; and the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina are generally inaccessible to the unbeliever. While Soviet research can place reliance on newspapers and other published sources, the scarcity or absence of publications rules out this alternative for many other areas.

The low level of communications within most Asian, African, and Latin American societies hampers research at every turn. Many of the ordinary reference tools for political research are non-existent, inadequate, or unreliable. Census returns are likely to be scanty, full of statistical and arithmetic errors, and outdated; there is a shortage of biographical directories; court decisions may be unpublished or even unrecorded; newspapers lack indices and often substitute editorial opinion for factual report. A widely prevailing notion which equates politics with conspiracy may obscure the investigation of even those political activities that move within the safe bounds of legality. But the difficulty is not so much that a foreign society intentionally withholds information from the investigator. Frequently, the immediate participants in the political process themselves turn out to be quite uninformed about the background factors that provide the setting for their own activity.

The most serious obstacles tend to be psychological. The very presence of the observer in a jungle outpost in Burma, in a Levantine bazaar, or in the highlands of Ethiopia is a by-product of modern industrial technology which, spreading from Western Europe, has made the remote parts of the globe geographically accessible and politically interde-

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pendent. For most of the peoples exposed to it, the impact of this modern technological civilization has been a painful process, associated with colonial servitude, with the dislocation of time-hallowed habit and custom, and with economic misery no longer accepted as inevitable. Resolutely as he may cling to his chosen role of impartial observer, the student willy-nilly is to some extent an agent and participant in this cultural clash between tradition and modernity. The very notion of scholarly detachment may seem not only novel but patently insincere to his respondents.[2]

Nor does the foreign society meet the student with a single, solid front; hence no dramatic act of penetration will remove the cultural difficulty. Many non-Western societies are fragmented and culturally discontinuous. Even where geographic communication and economic intercourse are highly developed, religious, ethnic, or caste barriers may block intellectual and emotional contact among Turk, Kurd, and Arab, among Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh, among peon, landlord, and merchant, among White, Indian, and Mestizo. The group most readily accessible to the observer—the Westernized intellectuals—may turn out to be the least reliable informants about the remainder of the society. Almost inevitably, the Western education of the upper strata reinforces class divisions by endowing them with a cultural dimension.[3] The Asian intellectual hence may feel more at home in Oxford, Paris, or New Haven than in the villages or cities of his own country. He may be consumed by a sense of shame at what he considers the "backwardness" of his own society and thus be tempted to adopt elaborate rationalizations whose value as evidence of culture conflict may be great, but whose heuristic utility is likely to be nil.

The difficulties of conceptualization are even more imposing. A political scientist writing a book some twenty years ago on the government and politics of a European country probably was well aware of the political significance of the country's cultural heritage, of its level of economic development, and of its social structure. Yet he generally could condense his treatment of these matters into a single background

[2] Lucian W. Pye, reporting on his interviews with surrendered guerrilla Communists in Malaya, writes: "The introductory remark that the interview was being conducted in the interest of social science by one attached to an American university, and that it was in no way an intelligence operation, seemed so unlikely and even fantastic to the SEP's [Surrendered Enemy Personnel] that it had to be eliminated for the sake of achieving frankness." *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya*, Princeton, N.J., 1956, p. 123n.

[3] See George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (1955), pp. 1022-41.

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chapter, at times appropriately entitled "Land and People." Author, reader, and subject matter all were part of the same civilization, and the range of cultural or economic variation within that civilization was not excessive. The author could take it for granted, moreover, that he was dealing with an established political system, embracing a given population, and occupying a given geographic territory. Although he might trace the history of English liberties to Magna Carta, he did not have to start his broader treatment of the British political system with King Alfred, William the Conqueror, or Henry VIII. Finally, whether he was analyzing the role of parties, social classes, and pressure groups in a democracy, or the component structures of a totalitarian system, he was dealing with a set of well-defined and highly articulate organizations.

The contemporary political scientist studying the politics of non-Western countries ventures on an enterprise that, for a variety of reasons, is of vastly greater complexity.

First, he will find it impossible to treat culture either as a fixed datum or as a mere background factor. Again and again he must try to capture in his mind a picture of a highly dynamic and fleeting cultural scene. And although the pace of change in most parts of the world has greatly quickened of late, the quest for an imaginary "fixed point" when traditional culture last appeared in its "pure" form is likely to lead the student on a wild goose chase from Atatürk to the Tanzimat period to Sulaiman the Magnificent and to the Byzantine Empire; or from Gandhi to the 1857 mutiny to Warren Hastings to the Moghuls and back to the Upanishads. A cursory glance at the present-day Asian and African scene, moreover, will convince the observer that culture is not only the setting but also the central theme of politics. In Turkey, in China, in India, in Ghana, or in Saudi Arabia—wherever he turns, he will find that the rate, the extent, and the direction of cultural change are at once the overriding issues and the prime determinants in the political process. The impact of industrial technology calls into the arena new political forces, such as a trained officer corps, a professional middle class, or an urban proletariat; and in turn political decisions such as the opening of Japan, or secularization of politics and purification of language in Turkey, or the drawing of linguistic state boundaries in India are having profound effects on the content of culture.

Second, the political scientist who ventures beyond the study of the major European powers frequently encounters political systems that lack clear delimitation and are very far from established. In a global

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context, societies such as China, Japan, or Ethiopia which have a historically rooted sense of identity within a set of more or less natural boundaries would seem to be the exception rather than the rule. The unity or division of the Arab countries; the establishment on the Indian subcontinent of one, two, or more independent nations; the adoption in Indonesia and Nigeria of unitary or federal government; separation versus federation in the West Indies and in Central Africa—these have been issues of prime importance influenced by the prevailing political constellation and in turn bound to become determinants of future political patterns. Even the composition of the population in newly independent states has been profoundly affected by such policies as the population exchange between India and Pakistan, or the "Ingathering of the Exiles" in Israel and the corresponding displacement of Arab Palestinians. That the level of economic development also is subject to variation and that it relates to the political process as both cause and effect hardly require special emphasis in this age of international economic assistance.

Third, the student of non-Western politics quite commonly must deal with political issues that are tangled, confused, and but dimly perceived by the protagonists; with political interests that are latent and unorganized; with social and political institutions which, like the state itself, are in a process of gestation. The dairy farmer in Wisconsin and the factory worker in Milwaukee both know that their prosperity and welfare depend largely upon government action. Each belongs to an association that represents his interests both in Madison and in Washington. Politics for them is by and large a rational process and they participate in it with a fair degree of rationality. In voting for political candidates they are likely to judge in terms of the candidates' expressed, organized views. By contrast, no Near Eastern *fellah* and very few Near Eastern townspeople have any political or economic organizations to represent them. Nor is it clear what they expect of their government or what the government would and could do for them. While the peasant is often politically inert, his city cousin is likely to be involved in politics at the first sign of riot or government crisis. In many of the more secluded non-Western countries, it would be a rash overextension of the term to speak of a "public opinion." Elsewhere, where strategic segments of the population are drawn into the political vortex, their action is likely to be spasmodic, vehement, and self-contradictory.

It has become rather commonplace to assert that the countries which

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have won their independence in the last decade are "caught between the millstones of two revolutions"[4]—a political revolution for national independence and a socio-economic revolution. This is an undue simplification. In many places there is indeed abundant revolutionary ferment; but no such simple dichotomy can fully account for it. Cultural change, the delimitation of the nation's boundaries and the orientation of its foreign ambitions, centralization versus local autonomy, the quest for a national language, economic development and redistribution, industrialization, patronage and personal power, religion and secularism —all these explosive issues are thrown at once into the cauldron. And the politician's universal compulsion to be all things to all men leaves him to find what foothold he can amid the erratically shifting alignments.

Fourth, the profound differences among non-Western countries and between them and the West pose sharply the question of comparability. Textbooks on European governments have at times been criticized for being little more than collections of country monographs that leave the task of integration and comparison to the baffled reader—and the solid cloth binding. If this is a problem within the traditional Europe-and-Commonwealth orbit, what prospects are there of achieving valid comparisons of the political activities of the auto worker in Detroit, the Bedouin shaykh, and the Calcutta jute mill operator? And where, amid the uncertain boundaries within ex-colonial empires, is the scholar to find the appropriate units of comparison? Are they to be the Fertile Crescent or Syria, Jordan, and Iraq? India and Pakistan or Sind, Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh? Indonesia or Sumatra, Java, and Celebes?

III

The difficulties are real, yet by no means insuperable. Take first the difficulties of data-gathering and conceptualization. It is well to bear in mind that the discontinuities of cultural context, the lack of communications, and the rapid change of behavior patterns that complicate the task of observation are also among the most crucial substantive features of the political process to be analyzed. A clear grasp and appreciation of the obstacles to data-gathering will therefore go a long way toward solving the problem of conceptualization. As we have already remarked, the interaction of modern Western and traditional cultures, of which the observer's own journey is only a single and be-

[4] Gamal Abdul Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 41.

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lated example, is one of the most pervasive influences on the politics of non-Western countries.

The specialist in non-Western politics, it is true, will at times be perplexed by the many profound differences in the political patterns which he encounters. Even within one and the same world region he discovers pronounced contrasts between, say, the commercial cosmopolitanism of Lebanon and the tribal isolation of Yemen, or between the influence of Buddhism in Burma and Thailand and of Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia. But a broader view reveals that the impact of the West and of modern industrial civilization has resulted in similarities both in the cultural and socio-economic setting and in the political process itself. As a first approximation some of these uniformities and trends may be summarized under the following headings:

(1) *Economic development.* The economic problems of what our current jargon terms "underdeveloped countries" have been widely publicized in recent years and hence need not long detain us here. The economies of Asia and Africa, like many of those in Latin America and South and East Europe, are generally characterized by extremely low standards of living and education. Primary production—whether in agriculture or mining—predominates over industry and the service trades. Birth rates are high, communications poor, and rates of capital formation meager.

The Industrial Revolution of Europe and North America was largely a process of non-directed discovery and exploration. The over-all goal of human control over the natural environment was clearly perceived, yet the specific tools of control were fashioned *ad hoc* and *de novo*. In the process of emulative industrialization in Asia and Africa, by contrast, specific goals and techniques are demonstrated with painful vividness by the achievements of the older industrial economies. A dire sense of urgency arises, and the processes of capital formation that were gradual and fortuitous in Europe centuries ago must now be planned, coaxed, and sped along. The major choices seem to be induced saving or foreign assistance—one resulting in a short-run reduction of consumption, the other a threat to national pride. Expectations soar far ahead of performance. The temptation to raise consumption levels at once becomes well-nigh irresistible, and thus endangers the very expansion of the capital base which would ultimately support such raised levels.

(2) *Cultural ambivalence.* In the cultural field the impact of the West gives rise to tensions, discontinuities, and amalgams of varying

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degrees of stability. Because of Western superiority in technology, in economic resources, and in military power, Westernization is not experienced as a self-directed and voluntary process. In colonial areas, it becomes a policy imposed by defeat. In countries defending their independence, it is an imperative of survival. The typical intellectual attitude toward the West thus has been one of ambivalence—of admiration and hate, of eager emulation and indignant rejection.[5]

This ambivalence is epitomized in the peculiar character of non-Western nationalism. National consciousness as a rule has been a direct or indirect product of the Western impact, but it finds its most vigorous expression in the militant struggle for political independence from the West. As Professor Emerson has said, ". . . it is so clearly and strikingly the impact of the West which has brought to fighting consciousness societies which in their own roots derive wholly from non-Western sources."[6] Yet, once victorious in their struggle, nationalist leaders often become a potent force in their societies for continued and intensive Westernization. The Turkish nationalists marched to the War of Independence (1919-1922) to the strains of Mehmed Âkif's hymn "To Our Heroic Army," which exhorts the Muslim faithful to rise in arms against the evil designs of "that monster called Civilization which has but one tooth left in its jaw."[7] During the following decades, however, Turkey outdid most other non-Western countries in adopting Western forms of dress, law, alphabet, education, and art. The Jordanian nationalist officers who, late in 1955, engineered the ouster of General John Bagot Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion promptly proceeded to replace its Bedouin headgear with a Western-style military cap. In India and Pakistan, English has remained the only *de facto* linguistic link among the political leaders of scores of millions whose native tongues are Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Gujerati, Tamil, and innumerable others. Ten years after independence, India's government began a concerted drive to unify and translate into the metric and decimal systems a bewildering array of local weights, measures, and coins that had survived with little change under centuries of European rule.

The same ambivalence results in a search for shortcuts to Westerniza-

[5] For a fuller elaboration of the concepts of amalgamation and ambivalence in this context, see Dankwart A. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Center of International Studies, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 6 and 10ff.

[6] Rupert Emerson, "Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XIII (1954), p. 133.

[7] Cf. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey, 1920-1955," in Richard N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West*, The Hague, 1957, p. 74.

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tion and hence in a quick acceptance and equally sudden rejection of ephemeral Western ideological currents.[8] The strongest appeal of communism in the ex-colonial and other non-Western countries is precisely that it offers such an apparent shortcut.[9] At the same time, romantic glorification of the distant non-Western past often serves as an effective weapon against the traditionalist influence of the more immediate past and hence as an important device for Westernization.

(3) *Transformation of the social structure.* The pre-Western social structure was generally characterized by a low degree of what Karl Deutsch has called "social mobilization."[10] The strongest feelings of solidarity attached to units, such as the extended family, the tribe, the village, the caste, the sect, the guild, which were much smaller than the modern nation, and often these units were the only seats of effective social power. In some cases, as in precolonial Africa, they were almost fully independent and self-sufficient. Elsewhere—as in China, Japan, and Ottoman Turkey—they were embedded in loosely knit imperial structures. Economic symbiosis among distinct ethnic, religious, or social groups resulted in what has been termed a plural society, or an ethnic division of labor.[11] The acceptance of Western cultural patterns by indigenous elites was likely to accentuate existing cleavages between the ruling class and its subjects, between town and country. Increasingly, however, new channels of mobility opened up as ascription gave way to achievement. With the reception of Western patterns, the smaller units—the tribes, villages, and castes—were enveloped in an emerging larger, national context; at the same time, the Western cultural and military impact put considerable strain on the imperial superstructures —occasionally, as in Mughal India and Ottoman Turkey, leading to their complete disintegration.[12]

(4) *Disparities between constitutional form and political content.* The political similarities among non-Western countries are equally

[8] For some Near Eastern illustration, see Rustow, *Politics and Westernization*, pp. 12ff. Similarly, Paul M. A. Linebarger *et al.* describe the Japanese as "always somewhat gullible in seeking the Western fashion in politics and economics" (*Far Eastern Governments and Politics*, New York, 1954, p. 363n.).

[9] Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The World and the West*, New York, 1953, p. 15.

[10] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, 1953.

[11] For the former term, see e.g. J. S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice*, 2nd ed., New York, 1956, *passim*; for the latter, Carleton S. Coon, *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East*, New York, 1951, p. 27.

[12] Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard observe an analogous effect of colonial rule on the tribal structure of African society. The power of strong chieftains generally was reduced, whereas among the smaller tribes, where no established chieftaincy existed earlier, such positions were fostered. See their *African Political Systems*, London, 1940, pp. 15f.

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striking.[13] All colonial countries upon gaining independence, and nearly all colonial countries, have embraced the outward forms of Western representative institutions. Constitutions are solemnly adopted by national constituent assemblies. Representatives are elected from geographic constituencies. Laws are enacted by parliaments and administered by presidents or prime ministers assisted by their cabinets. Indeed, there is often a boundless trust, unmatched since the days of John Austin, in the omnipotence of legislation. Separation of powers or cabinet responsibility, parliamentary committees, government corporations, independent judiciaries, guarantees of civil rights, federal or unitary administrations—these and other familiar Western themes recur.

But almost as widespread as the tendency to adopt Western representative institutions are the difficulties which non-Western countries confront in operating them. The absence of a strong and established sense of national unity, the prevailing weakness of parties and other voluntary associations, the widespread lack of administrative experience, and the vicissitudes of a turbulent international situation all contribute to these difficulties.

(5) *Insecure nationalism.* For all the militant clamor of nationalist sentiment, nationalism in Asia and Africa is generally weak and inexperienced and rests on a precarious foundation of national unity. In some non-colonial countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia, the administrative centers never established intimate enough contact with the outlying districts to allow for the attachment of strong loyalties. Elsewhere colonial boundaries were forcibly imposed on a diffuse pattern of traditional organization—joining disparate ethnic elements, as in Nigeria and Libya, or dividing areas such as the Arabic "Fertile Crescent" where a sense of unity was beginning to emerge. In addition, colonialism, by a divide-and-rule policy, often accentuated existing cleavages. Even where colonial empires coincided

[13] Three members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council have contributed to a penetrating and suggestive discussion of the Western cultural impact and its political implications which coincides at many points with the above analysis; see Kahin *et al., op.cit.* For a similar position, cf. Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (1956), pp. 402f.

For particular non-Western regions, see e.g. George Lenczowski, "Political Institutions," in Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed., *Mid-East: World Center*, New York, 1956, pp. 118-72; G. E. von Grunebaum, "Problems of Muslim Nationalism," in Frye, ed., *op.cit.* (note 7); Rupert Emerson, *Representative Government in Southeast Asia*, Cambridge, Mass., 1955; Lennox A. Mills, *The New World of Southeast Asia*, Minneapolis, 1949, pp. 288-342; Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*, Baltimore, 1956, pp. 37-168; and James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (1955), pp. 44-57.

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with geographically well-defined regions, as in India and Indonesia, the removal of foreign rule gave added scope to a variety of divisive tendencies. In plural societies of mixed ethnic settlement such as India and the Near East, the creation of territorially defined national polities led to the wholesale dislocation of minorities, to boundary disputes and irredentism. Local autonomy, far from securing a harmonious balance among the diverse regions, often has posed a threat to national unity and survival—witness the Iranian experience in Azerbaijan and the short-lived Indonesian federal experiment. In the Indian member states and in Ceylon, the desire for a single language in politics, administration, and education has exacerbated feelings among the various linguistic communities.

(6) *Diffuseness of political movements.* The institutional channels for the expression of political interests and opinions are most imperfectly developed throughout the non-West. In some countries like Iran, Thailand, and many of the Arab states, durable political parties have been totally lacking. Elsewhere, as in India, Burma, Egypt, Turkey, and Ghana, a single party has dominated the scene, the opposition being split, suppressed, or otherwise ineffective. In very few countries has there been that orderly alternation between government and opposition which the traditional Anglo-American theory of representative government presupposes. In the colonial countries, the struggle for independence demanded the concentration of all political forces in a single movement, thus inhibiting any natural differentiation of opinion. Almost everywhere a strong tradition of patrimonial authority on the local or national level has discouraged free party competition. As a result, many of the existing parties are held together less by a common program or well-defined interests than by the personality of a leader or a common desire for the spoils of office. Other voluntary associations, such as labor unions and business or professional organizations, are non-existent or immature—and hence less than effective in providing political expression for their constituents. The weakness of the party and associational structure has drawn into the political arena a number of extrapolitical organizations. Among these, the army officers and the university students often have the advantage of being among the earliest mediators of Westernizing, modernizing influences and also are among the earliest beneficiaries of social mobility and merit advancement. The armies have the added advantage of expertise in violence in a situation where non-violent processes of decision-making by deliberation and compromise are not customarily employed or are ineffective.

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Extremist groups such as the Muslim Brethren in Egypt or the Fidaiyan-i-Islam in Iran have combined a traditionalist ideology with highly up-to-date methods of organization and terrorism. And the ubiquitous Communists have done their best to undermine governmental stability in alliance either with extreme nationalists or with bona fide social reformers.

(7) *Administrative inexperience.* The shortage of trained administrative personnel is almost universal—with the partial exception of countries like Japan, China, and Turkey which are the fortunate heirs of ancient indigenous bureaucracies. The situation is immensely aggravated by the enormous expansion of governmental functions, which has perhaps been the single most notable consequence of the impact of modernity on non-Western countries. In bygone days, a sultan or raja might exercise despotic power within his palace and perhaps in his capital. Yet apart from occasional military expeditions, his ability to affect the daily lives of his subjects was severely circumscribed by the inadequacy of transport and by the universal rule of traditional law and custom. Governmental functions consisted largely in the maintenance of a royal court and of a small professional soldiery and in the periodical appointment of governors for the outlying provinces. In the middle of the twentieth century, by contrast, any self-respecting government endeavors to levy taxes on the most diverse economic activities, to provide education and to secure employment to those whom it has successfully educated, to prevent famine and unemployment, to build up industry and communications, to control domestic prices, to balance foreign payments—in short, to ensure the spiritual and material well-being of millions of subjects. As one ponders this sudden and staggering expansion of the scope of government in non-Western societies, one is inclined to marvel less at the ever-present possibility of inefficiency and corruption than at the skill and dedication which non-Western administrators generally bring to their tasks.

(8) *Hazards of the international scene.* The international situation confronting the independent countries of Asia and Africa is too well known to require detailed comment. All of them are left in an international power vacuum. The ex-colonial countries as a rule owe their independence less to their own strength than to the defeat or exhaustion of the colonial powers in two cataclysmic world wars. Similarly, many of the non-colonial countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Thailand, survived precariously amid opposing pressures from rival imperial powers. Nearly all the non-Western states depend on foreign economic and

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technical assistance to satisfy the urgent aspirations of their newly awakened masses. Most of them since the fall of China find themselves within a radius of 1,000 miles or less from the frontiers of the Soviet bloc, and none of them could expect to resist invasion by itself. But the conclusion and maintenance of effective alliances are made difficult by the same factors that tend to invite aggression in the first place. While quarrels in Palestine, Pushtunistan, Kashmir, and elsewhere pose serious obstacles to regional cooperation, colonial memories cloud relations with the Western powers. Soviet pressure, moreover, presents not only a military but also a political, economic, and psychological threat.

(9) *Need for leadership.* The task confronting the leaders of non-Western states today is immense and beyond anything familiar to the West in normal times. They must preside over the founding of new commonwealths, groping for a sense of unity and common purpose in the absence of unitary traditions or established patterns of popular participation. In a period of rapid cultural change, they must (in Professor von Grunebaum's expressive phrase) play "to two galleries at the same time,"[14] legitimizing their actions in the eyes of both the traditionalist and the modernist segments of the population. They must try to satisfy the impatient clamor for economic advancement with the help of administrators lacking in training and experience. They must face the hazards of an ominous international situation over which they have at times little, if any, control.

The most effective form of leadership in such situations appears to be that provided by a small but growing elite dedicated to the service of a wider community and to the task of construction and modernization —an elite that serves its apprenticeship under a traditional order but demonstrates its mastery in building a new one. Such were the Westernized Ottoman officers at the close of the Tanzimat period who formed the Young Turk movement and later provided the key supporters in Atatürk's nationalist transformation. Such were the Japanese military and civilian oligarchy of the Meiji period. And such has been the Indian Congress Party.

At moments of acute crisis the survival of a newly founded political community may depend in addition on the presence of a single charismatic figure—such as Atatürk, Gandhi, Nehru, or Nkrumah. The charismatic leader provides a ready point of attachment for emotional

[14] Von Grunebaum, in Frye, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 26. See also his earlier essays in "Studies in Islamic Cultural History," *American Anthropologist,* Memoir No. 76 (1954), pp. 1-19; and "Islam," *ibid.*, Memoir No. 81 (1955), especially chs. 7, 11, and 12.

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loyalties uprooted by the collapse of tradition; yet by focusing national energies on the constructive tasks ahead, he can transfer these loyalties to the emerging community of the future.[15]

IV

Systematic empirical investigation will no doubt invalidate or modify many of the generalizations just outlined. Insofar as they have any plausibility, they would seem to justify the hope that the problem of comparison can indeed be resolved. It will be well to remember that comparison presupposes the existence of both differences and similarities—that differences among empirical phenomena are not of themselves an impediment to comparison. Comparability is never a quality inherent in the data; rather, it is bestowed upon them by the observer's mind. As soon as two sets of activities—however remote from one another in time, space, and appearance—can be identified as political, they are, to that extent, comparable.

It would be idle to expect valid comparisons to emerge from a Procrustean treatment that would force Western and non-Western materials alike into the mold of categories, such as the executive, the legislature, the party system, and the rights of citizenship, derived from Western experience alone. Comparison of non-Western countries may take the initial form of a growing and cumulative body of monographs on individual countries and their political problems.[16] Or it may take the form of comparison of a specific institution or problem in several non-Western countries—e.g., studies on the role of the army, of religion, of political leadership, of nationalism, of economic development, or of communism within the political process. Both types of study have important contributions to make, and each to a large extent reinforces the other. For example, the role of military leaders in transforming the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish Republic would have to be analyzed against the background of the social and political structure and the intellectual, religious, and international situation of Turkey

[15] Kahin *et al., op.cit.*, p. 1025.

[16] See, e.g., David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, Princeton, N.J., 1955; Marcel Colombe, *L'Evolution de l'Egypte*, Paris, 1951; Jacob M. Landau, *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt*, Tel Aviv, 1953; J. C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine*, New York, 1950; Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq*, London, 1951; Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Iraq, 1900-1950*, London, 1953; George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949; George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952; and Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan*, Berkeley, Calif., 1953.

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since the eighteenth century. But it could be greatly illuminated by systematic comparison with the situation faced by nationalist leaders and other civilian and military reformers in, say, India, Japan, or the Arab countries. There has been a cautious and praiseworthy tendency in the literature on non-Western politics to proceed from the specific to the general. Studies of individual countries thus have generally been followed by comparative studies embracing an entire region.[17] But as the example just given indicates, interregional comparisons, though doubtlessly more difficult to execute, will prove even more rewarding.

Although the non-Western specialist at present, then, will normally center his research interest on a single country or world region, he must not allow himself to become intellectually isolated from other area specialists. Much of the current interest in the politics of non-Western countries stems from a realization that our theorizing in comparative politics has proceeded from too narrow an empirical base.[18] Nothing would be gained by supplementing a parochial study of the politics of continental Europe, of the United States, and of the English-speaking Commonwealth with equally parochial studies of the Near East, of Southeast Asia, or of Tropical Africa.

It would be equally wrong to posit a pervasive dichotomy between Western politics, on the one hand, and non-Western politics, on the other. The contemporary politics of Asia and Africa offers an enormous range of diversity—from the rather closely knit social structure of industrial Japan to the loose tribalism of Afghanistan; from the intense political consciousness of Turkey to the systematic depreciation of human power urges in India; from the monolithic governmental structure of Yemen to the mosaic of Indonesia. Furthermore, many of the more baffling and complex problems of contemporary non-Western politics have their parallels and analogies in the political experience of Europe and America. The impact of Western European industrial technology and military organization had comparable (if far from identical) results in the Russia of Peter the Great and of Lenin, in the Germany of Bismarck, in the Japan of Meiji, in the Turkey of Mahmud II and of Kemal Atatürk, and in the Egypt of Muhammad Ali and Abdul

[17] See, e.g., Sydney N. Fisher, ed., *Social Forces in the Middle East*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1955; Alfred Bonné, *State and Economics in the Middle East*, 2nd ed., London, 1955; George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed., Ithaca, N.Y., 1956; W. Macmahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in East Asia*, Melbourne, 1952; Furnivall, *op.cit.*; and the literature cited in note 13.

[18] Cf. Roy C. Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government*, New York, 1955, pp. 9ff.

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Nasser. The perplexing problem of finding the appropriate unit of political comparison recurs in Southeastern Europe. (Should the entire area, by virtue of its common history of Ottoman-Habsburg and Bolshevik domination, be considered a single unit, or does the rather short-lived separation of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia justify distinct treatment?) The East European successor states to the Ottoman, Habsburg, and Romanov Empires quite generally faced the shortage of administrative talent, the precariousness of nascent nationality in areas of mixed ethnic settlement, the recurrent conflicts between democratic theory and dictatorial practice, and other problems which the ex-colonial successor states are facing in our own day.

The Latin American countries in particular would seem to constitute a perfect connecting link between contemporary Western and non-Western political experience. Their liberation from colonialism preceded that of the Asian and African states by a century and a half. While some of them have developed along very nearly European lines, others appear to offer a modified version of the present non-Western experience. Such features as ethnic and cultural cleavages, major realignments of boundaries, chronic governmental instability, the prominence of personal leadership and of military coups, and the need for economic development—all these are equally characteristic of many Latin as well as many Asian and African countries.[19]

The challenge facing comparative politics is to elaborate a conceptual apparatus in keeping with the vastly extended global scale of its empirical investigations. A systematic re-examination of the Western model would seem to be inevitable. Factors once treated as constants, such as area, population, the level of the economy, and the established existence of a state, are now becoming variables within the over-all political process. Residual categories such as cultural background must be more fully absorbed into the analytical model. Above all, the political scientist is compelled to construct a dynamic rather than a static model of politics—one that will account not only for the interaction of political forces at a given moment, but also for their evolution over

[19] It should be remembered that Latin America includes some areas such as Puerto Rico and the British West Indies which, like much of Asia and Africa, are in the process of transition from colonialism to independence. On Puerto Rico, cf. Henry Wells, "Ideology and Leadership in Puerto Rican Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (1955), pp. 22-39. For the independent countries of Latin America, see e.g. Asher N. Christensen, ed., *The Evolution of Latin American Government*, New York, 1951; and Miguel Jorrin, *Governments of Latin America*, New York, 1953.

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longer periods of time.[20] There is every indication that these theoretical revisions, even though prompted primarily by the study of non-Western areas, will be of equal value in the interpretation of many aspects of Western politics.

In this task of rebuilding the political model there is much that political scientists can learn from other social science disciplines. In attuning himself to the particularities of a given foreign culture, the student of non-Western politics will profit from the researches of the comparative linguist, the social anthropologist, and the literary and religious historian. Economists have grappled for some time with the problem of dynamic theory which political science now encounters. The elaboration of sociological theory by Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, and others provides a large number of concepts that have proved suggestive for political inquiry. There is much room also for interchange with historians, once students of comparative politics resolutely abandon the rather implausible notion—implicit in much of their past work—that man became a political animal around A.D. 1900. Historians, moreover, have long lived with the broader perspectives of interaction among culture, society, economy, and politics which political scientists tend to rediscover in their current endeavors.

There is considerable evidence that this need for interdisciplinary cooperation is well appreciated in the other social sciences. Sociologists and anthropologists, in turning to the study of major non-Western societies, have gathered data and formulated hypotheses that are immediately relevant to an interpretation of non-Western politics.[21] Econ-

[20] Macridis, *op.cit.*, pp. 11ff. Herman Finer, erupting into rhyme in the preface to his most recent work, declares:

> Political science without history has no roots;
> History without political science has no fruits.

(*Governments of Greater European Powers*, New York, 1956, p. ix.) Ernest Barker's essay on *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660-1930* (London, 1944) and Crane Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1938) are outstanding examples of political comparison across the centuries—though both are limited to countries in the West. Such works as Herman Finer's *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (rev. ed., New York, 1949), Carl J. Friedrich's *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (rev. ed., Boston, 1950), and R. M. MacIver's *Web of Government* (New York, 1947) distinguish themselves from most other general treatments of the subject not only by their systematic (rather than country-by-country) organization, but also by their richer historical and philosophical perspective.

[21] See, e.g., Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, Philadelphia, 1939; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *op.cit.*; Bertram J. O. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies*, I, The Hague, 1955; Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt*, Princeton, N.J., 1957.

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omists increasingly tend to accord an important place to political factors in their explanation of the process of economic growth.[22] And a group of prominent historians recently concluded their conference with a plea that historians continue "to improve communications with fellow social scientists."[23]

There is equally much that political scientists will be able to learn from one another. The need for cooperation and interchange among the various Western and non-Western area specialists has already been emphasized. Beyond this, it seems likely that the new interest in non-Western politics and the consequent re-examination of traditional concepts and hypotheses may help to bridge the gap that has opened up over the decades between comparative politics and political theory. There probably is no other scholarly discipline in whose academic curriculum "theory" has been so largely equated with "history of doctrine." Even within this context of doctrinal history, the conventional treatment of political theory tends to focus rather narrowly on theories, from Plato to Rousseau and Mill, on such subjects as political obligation, the proper locus of sovereignty, and the respective limits of state powers and of individual rights. Topics such as the rise and fall of political communities, the historical interplay of integrative and disintegrative forces, and the expansion of political functions as a result of intensified social communication are very largely neglected. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theory of the social contract—which, on the face of it, was an attempt to discover in abstract terms how political communities come into existence—tends to be interpreted as an expository device to explain rights and obligations in existing commonwealths.[24] The Platonic concept of the lawgiver, evolved by Rousseau into a rudimentary theory of how basic institutions are formulated in nascent political systems, appears to have caught the imagination of few historians of political theory.[25] The time-honored theories of comparative politics of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu have been incor-

[22] See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan*, Durham, N.C., 1955; and a forthcoming study, *The State and Economic Growth*, ed. by Hugh G. J. Aitken. Both volumes incorporate a series of papers originally prepared for conferences sponsored by the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Economic Growth.

[23] Richard D. Challener and Maurice Lee, Jr., "History and the Social Sciences: The Problem of Communications," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1956), p. 337.

[24] See, e.g., Bertram Morris, "The Substance of the Social Contract," in Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy, eds., *Essays in Political Theory Presented to George H. Sabine*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1948, pp. 113-29.

[25] See Plato, *Nomoi, passim*; and Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, Book ii, ch. 7.

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porated into the accepted canon. For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, emphasis has been placed largely on the growth of such political-economic ideologies as liberalism, socialism, communism, and fascism—to the neglect of more empirically based theories of men like de Tocqueville, Pareto, Maine, Gierke, and Max Weber. As comparative politics turns with renewed vigor to the elaboration of theoretical concepts, and as political theory becomes less preoccupied with mere exegesis, there is hope for a far more fruitful and organic relationship between research and theory in politics than has generally obtained in the past.

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THE POLITICS OF SOVIET DE-STALINIZATION*

By ROBERT C. TUCKER

A REVIEW of the political situation in post-Stalin Russia may well begin with a reflection on its historical uniqueness. Stalin, who sponsored the "Russia first" theme in Soviet propaganda, established a real and momentous "first" for Russia by his own death. Never before had a totalitarian dictator of one of the world powers died, or been put to death, before his totalitarian system collapsed, or came near collapse, in war. Hitler and Mussolini, who lived long enough to bring down their systems in ruins, furnish no parallel.

The first four post-Stalin years in Russia, therefore, provide a spectacle of what may happen in a totalitarian political system when the dictator who shaped it leaves it intact and technically at peace.

The history of those four years is a story of conflict over power and policy among the heirs of Stalin, of starts and stops and fresh starts in the attempt to carry out reforms from above, of ambitious new departures and shattering setbacks in Soviet policy, and, finally, of the gradual political awakening of popular forces in Russia and Eastern Europe, spectacularly in Hungary. Through it all runs a fundamental theme and problem: *change*. The great question which Stalin posed by his death was not, Who shall take the place of Stalin? It was, rather, What shall take the place of Stalin*ism* as a mode of rule and pattern of policy and ideas? The issue around which Soviet politics and Soviet history have revolved ever since Stalin died is the issue of de-Stalinization. The death of the dictator exposed the integral relationship between Stalin as the ruling personality and Stalinism as the system of rule.

In order to set out the elements of the problem of de-Stalinization analytically, we will first sketch a picture of the foregoing process of Stalinization, viewing Stalinism as a political form which evolved over a period of years, beginning approximately in 1928, and which went through a sequence of phases. Such a sketch will make possible a systematic approach to a whole cluster of questions involved in de-Stalinization, such as: Why did Stalin's death necessitate de-Stalinization? What

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might de-Stalinization mean in terms of changes in the Soviet political system? How much of this meaning is embraced in the official concept of de-Stalinization with which the ruling group has been operating? To what extent does the popular concept of it diverge from the official concept? How has the process of de-Stalinization been influenced by the struggle for factional ascendancy within the post-Stalin regime?

Our purpose here is to cast some fresh light upon this complex of intimately interrelated questions.

I. The Command and Control Structure

The Soviet political system is not, of course, a form of government in the familiar sense. It cannot even be thought of simply as an arch-authoritarian regime. It is rather a system of society in which government is the ubiquitous fact of national life, penetrating every pore of the social organism. This monstrous inflation of governmental functions is a ludicrous commentary on the doctrine of Karl Marx. According to Marx, all organs of government would "wither away" following the great social revolution and a momentary interlude of proletarian dictatorship, and there would emerge a stateless and classless society or, as stated in the *Communist Manifesto*, "a vast association of the whole people." In fact, the October Revolution produced a vast association of bureaucrats and bureaucracies. Lenin himself ruefully observed, some time afterward: "We have created a bureaucratic utopia."

The Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, followed by the establishment of a one-party dictatorship and the nationalization of the Russian economy, destroyed the democratic regime that had been set up some months earlier when the Czar abdicated. It also nullified the previous sixty-five years of Russian history, during which, despite many setbacks, a trend of basic liberalization had been making itself felt. The Revolution thus created conditions for a reversion to that long period in Russian history which had been characterized by the ascendancy of the state over society, and by government through bureaucracy, with the Czar as head bureaucrat. Bolshevism set the stage for a rebirth, under a new name and in a far worse form, of the classical political system of Russian czarism as it had existed before the great reforms of the mid-nineteenth century.

It was Stalin, however, not Lenin, who made himself the key instrument of this process and restored the institution of the autocracy in all but name. In the later years of Stalin's rule, Czar Ivan the Terrible, the supreme historical apostle of Russian absolutism, became the

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dictator's favorite figure among those whom he regarded as his forerunners. In 1947, Stalin called in a famous Soviet film producer and ordered him to make a film showing Ivan as a "great and wise ruler." He commented that, of all the leaders in Russian history, Ivan and Lenin were the only two who had introduced a state monopoly of foreign trade.[1] This remark indicates the nature of Stalin's understanding of socialism. It did not seem to him an ideological deviation to look upon Ivan the Terrible as his great historical forerunner. He saw in Ivan a true socialist, a Stalinist of the sixteenth century. This fact is full of implications for an understanding of Soviet Russia's history in the Stalin period, and of the events that followed.

The governmental system as Stalin left it might be described as an elaborate, completely centralized bureaucratic mechanism for the command and control of society. The centralization of effective governing authority in Moscow was so extreme that semi-official Soviet idiom divided the whole Soviet realm into the "Center" (Moscow) and the "Periphery" (all the rest of the USSR). For example, a high official of the theoretically sovereign government of the Ukraine at Kiev informally described himself as "a worker of the Periphery." This was the actual situation behind the façade of Soviet "federalism," according to which the USSR consists of a number of independent "union republics." The real status of the republics is illustrated by the fact that in July 1956 one of them, the Karelo-Finnish Republic, was abolished by a stroke of the governmental pen in Moscow, and was incorporated as a sub-unit into the huge central territory, the Russian Republic, or RSFSR. This reduced the number of republics to fifteen, including, in addition to the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and the three Baltic, three Transcaucasian, and five Central Asian republics.

There are three main systems of governing organs: (1) the Soviets, forming the nominal machinery of local government, plus the Supreme Soviet, a facsimile of a parliament; (2) the system of ministries, subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which is the government in the technical sense; and (3) the Communist Party, headed up by its Central Committee.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party now has a total membership of about 250, and is offically considered the supreme *de facto* governing body of the land. Its permanent machinery functions under the control of the Secretariat, now headed by Khrushchev. In

[1] S. M. Dubrovsky, "Protiv idealizatsii deyatel'nosti Ivana IV" (Against idealization of the activities of Ivan IV), *Voprosy istorii*, No. 8 (1956), p. 128.

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soviets, ministries, and party, actual authority is concentrated to a very great extent in small and closely interlocking presidiums: the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, headed by Voroshilov; the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, consisting of its chairman, Bulganin, and five or six first vice-chairmen; and the Presidium of the Central Committee, or the Party Presidium, which now consists of eleven full members and six alternates, and which is not known to have a regular chairman. Among the three organs, the Party Presidium is pre-eminent in real power. It is, at this time, the focal organ of dictatorial rule.[2]

Below these peak levels, each of the three systems is a hierarchical structure of administrative-managerial organizations with networks of primary organs of various kinds extending throughout the country. Thus, the system of soviets consists of many thousands of province, town, district, and rural councils, with a membership of one-and-a-half million all told, and with each unit directed by an executive committee or bureau. The party has its parallel structure of committees at all levels, from union-republic central committee down to the town and district committees; each of these is directed by its secretariat. The party committees are the important nuclei of local authority. The "big man" in a Soviet town is the first secretary of the town party committee; the "big man" of a province is the head of the province party committee. Then there is a network of 350,000 primary party cells in factories, farms, and institutions of every kind. These perform a variety of functions of control, surveillance, agitation for plan fulfillment, and systematic indoctrination of the party membership, now numbering about 7,200,000. There are a number of other governing systems of lesser importance, including the trade-union structure, with its Central Council in Moscow, and the Komsomol, or youth organization, with a membership today of 18,500,000.

According to provisional Soviet plans announced in the early spring of 1957, the system of ministries is to undergo very extensive reorganization on the economic-industrial side. At this time of writing, however, it continues to exist more or less as Stalin left it. It is an enormous bureaucratic complex charged with the planning and administration of the national economy, operation of banks, factories, stores, and state farms, administration of the police system and courts, the armed forces,

[2] Actual administrative direction of the work of the bureaucracy of local soviets is concentrated not in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, but in a Department of Soviet Organs in the Council of Ministers. The functions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet refer mainly to the activities of the Supreme Soviet itself. However, in a formal sense, the authority of this Presidium extends to the system of soviets.

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education, cultural activities, and foreign relations. It comes to a head in the USSR Council of Ministers, consisting at present (March 1957) of the chairman, the vice-chairmen, about fifty ministers, and the heads of state committees, such as the State Planning Committee, or Gosplan. In addition, each of the fifteen union republics has its own local Council of Ministers, as well as its own local Supreme Soviet. The ministries themselves fall into three groups: all-union, union-republic, and republic. Only the first two groups come under the USSR Council of Ministers.

The direct jurisdiction of the all-union ministries extends to all organizations throughout the country in the particular field concerned. For example, an industrial ministry directly controls all enterprises in its system, regardless of their location in the country. The union-republic group, which includes the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the MVD, the Ministry of Culture, and others, directs its subordinate units in territories of the union republics through affiliate-ministries of the same name in the capitals of these republics. Hence these affiliate-ministries operate according to the so-called principle of "dual jurisdiction," being subordinate both to their local Council of Ministers in the given union republic and simultaneously to the head ministry in Moscow, from which the actual orders come. The third group, the republic ministries, are those operating under the direct jurisdiction of the Councils of Ministers in the capitals of the union republics. Most of these administer industrial enterprises of local importance to the given union republics. It results, of course, from this setup that all workers and employees are government workers. The collective farmers are an exception to this rule, since, technically, the collective farms are classified as co-operatives rather than state institutions. But they are state institutions *de facto*, and the collective-farm peasants are, in effect, employees of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Every ministry in the Stalinist system was a governmental empire, a vast realm of bureaucracy. A ministry of one of the branches of heavy industry—say, the steel industry—would be describable as a gigantic monopolistic concern, with its own permanent board of directors, planning bureau, subdivisions, trusts, distributor agencies, down to and including the actual steel mills and hundreds of subsidiary enterprises. It had its own means of transport, internal communications system, technical training colleges, housing fund, recreational facilities, company trade union, and police department.

This bred a big-business mentality in the top managers. In the autumn

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of 1955, the author traveled with a party of Americans on a short revisit to Russia and Eastern Europe. At a diplomatic reception in Moscow, Mikhail Pervukhin, one of the younger industrialists in the Party Presidium, remarked to us: "You call it General Electric, we call it the Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry." Pervukhin wanted to suggest that these two industrial giants were pretty much the same thing. This was the voice of Soviet monopoly capitalism speaking. But "capitalism" may not be the best word for it. A few days later, in Warsaw, an official of the Polish government made the following remark: "We have now eliminated capitalism," he said. "The next thing we have to do is to eliminate *feudalism*." The Pole was closer to the real point. The vast industrial empires ruled by the ministries in Moscow were feudalistic structures of the age of industrialism. And the 87,000 collective farms were (and are) feudalistic, too: they represent a revival of the institution of Russian serfdom, save that now the serfs use tractors and the sole landowner is the government.

II. The Process of Stalinization

This great bureaucratic structure of command and control did not come into being all at once; it evolved. The October Revolution and Lenin's party dictatorship laid the foundation and paved the way. But the evolution itself took place under the direction and pre-eminent influence of Stalin. Without in any way relaxing the iron rule of the party, Lenin, in 1921, announced the so-called New Economic Policy, or NEP, under which the state retained only the "commanding heights" of the economy, giving some scope for private enterprise and allowing 25,000,000 private peasant farms to exist and contribute to economic revival. This is one reason why, in the Russia of the 1930's and 1940's, many looked back on Lenin and his era with a certain nostalgia; Lenin died in time to be remembered fondly by the generation which experienced what came afterward. Here already we see a central political contradiction of Khrushchevism, which would claim Lenin's name without granting Russia a new NEP, and which would denounce Stalin's crimes without fundamentally dismantling the governmental structure that Stalin built up.

Stalin, using the party dictatorship, of which he had gained control by about 1929, and the secret police, which he increasingly succeeded in wielding as a personal instrument, ended the NEP and then shaped, perfected, and vastly expanded the command and control structure. His idea was to effect in this manner the total state regimentation of

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society, creating in the totalitarian political structure a mechanism for unlimited exploitation of the human and natural resources of Russia with a view to amassing power in the hands of the Center. The forced industrialization, beginning with the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, and the terroristic collectivization of peasant farming in the succeeding four years were the twin policy programs on the basis of which he carried through the process of total state regimentation of society. This was the period of the emergence of a full-blown, as distinguished from a merely embryonic, totalitarian state system. The policy programs called for more and more coercion and controls, including internal passports, massive regimentation of the labor force, more and more concentration camps, and police terror as an integral part of daily life. Expansion of controls and governmental functions called for more and more bureaucratic regulation; and this in turn further augmented the need for controls, including controls over the bureaucratic controllers, and so on in a vicious circle. Stalin, possibly with the image of Ivan the Terrible already in mind, christened the whole process the "building of socialism." Actually, it was the first great stage of Stalinization.

No sooner was the basic work accomplished (approximately in 1933) than Stalin turned his attention to the next and culminating step, which was to reconstitute the autocracy. This occupied about five years of time, from 1934 to 1939. That period witnessed the virtual extermination of the Bolshevik Party, carried out by Stalin in the name of Lenin and Bolshevism.

Every true totalitarianism is a one-man system and comes to power through the subversion of a pre-existing political regime. In the case of Hitler, the pre-existing regime was the Weimar Republic. In the case of Mussolini, it was the Italian constitutional monarchy. In those instances no one could doubt that a regime had been subverted. Stalin's case was exceptional, and therefore deceptive, because here the pre-existing regime was a ruthless party dictatorship, and the destruction of it was effected without any official admission or overly obvious sign that a continuity of political life was being broken. So authoritarian was the rule of the Bolshevik Party in Russia that it could be eliminated as a living political organism and replaced by the autocracy of Stalin without the world's quite realizing that something of real consequence had happened. But Stalin himself was at least subconsciously aware of what he had done, and showed it when, in 1952, he expunged the very word "Bolshevik" from the title of the party and the official vocabulary of the regime. He banned the use of the word "Bolshevik" in the Soviet

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Union, evidently feeling uncomfortable at the sight and sound of it. The word was revived immediately after he died.

This is a point of critical importance for the analysis both of Soviet politics of the 1930's and 1940's and also of the post-Stalin period. We are accustomed to thinking in terms of a continuity of party rule in Soviet Russia from October 1917 to the present. Actually, however, after Stalin's blood purges of the middle 1930's there was no longer in any real sense a ruling *party*, just as there was no real ruling *class*; there was at most a privileged stratum of bureaucratic serving-men who lived well and wore medals but who were pure instrumentalities rather than holders or sharers of power. To call this stratum an "elite," as is sometimes done, is to invite misconception of the actual situation which had come to prevail under Stalin; it was only an ersatz elite.

The one-party system had given way to a one-person system, the ruling party to a ruling personage. Through the massacre of the bulk of the Bolshevik leadership and the exile of many thousands more, Stalin completed the transformation of the former ruling party into a transmission belt of autocracy, an administrative-bureaucratic mechanism totally submissive to his will. Only the *local* party bosses retained a semblance of actual authority. They became little dictators, ruling their localities at the pleasure of the big dictator in the Kremlin. And they had to watch out for the local head of the secret police, who was also working for Stalin.

Accordingly, although the Soviet Union continued to be a party-ruled state in Stalinist mythology, the former ruling party became in fact merely the first in importance of the mass organizations in the totalitarian system. This suppression of the party was especially accentuated after World War II. The post-Stalin regime has not openly admitted this. Its euphemistic formula is that the "cult of personality," as Stalin's absolute despotism is called, merely "diminished the role of the party."

However, Khrushchev's secret report last February cast more light on the matter.[3] It revealed that of the 139 Central Committee members elected at the Seventeenth Congress in 1934, 98, or 70 per cent of the supreme governing body, were arrested and shot in the purges; of 1,966 delegates to the Congress, 1,108 were purged. Even this was only one major segment of the slaughter. Khrushchev uses the phrase "many thousands of names" when he mentions the lists of selected purge vic-

[3] All following citations of the report are taken from the purported text as issued by the State Department and published by the *New York Times* on June 5, 1956.

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tims which were sent to Stalin for his personal approval before sentence was carried out. Of course, some Bolsheviks survived, including Khrushchev and others of the present inner circle, at the price of serving Stalin vigorously in the grisly business of purging.

But what happened to the party as a party in the process is best reflected in those sections of the secret report which deal with the postwar period. The Central Committee was supposed, according to the party statutes then in force, to meet in plenary session once every four months. Khrushchev says: ". . . in the last years Central Committee plenary sessions were not convened." Actually, the last officially reported plenary session was that of February 1947. Thus, the supreme governing body not only did not govern; it did not even meet. As for the Politburo, often regarded in the outside world as the real organ of dictatorship in Stalin's Russia, Khrushchev says that its sessions "occurred only occasionally, from time to time." Its regular functioning ceased, it appears, early in 1949, when one of its members, Nikolai Voznesensky, chief of Gosplan, was shot on Stalin's orders, along with a number of other very high officials.

Stalin formed various committees of Politburo members, which he called quintets, sextets, and septets, to deal with particular matters which he assigned to them. The Politburo, supposedly a supreme policy-making body, ceased in any effective sense to exist. In 1952 at the Nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin changed its name to the Presidium and enlarged the total membership to about thirty-five, including a large number of younger men. According to Khrushchev, Stalin was planning to kill off the old guard. The case of the Kremlin doctors, announced in mid-January 1953, was a manifest preparation by Stalin for a new blood bath. Six weeks later he was dead. It is probable that he was killed just prior to the scheduled opening of the trial of the doctors, to prevent the purge process from starting down its deadly path to members of the erstwhile Politburo.

Thus, in the second major phase of Stalinization, which took place in the mid-1930's, Stalin created an absolute autocracy through the suppression of the Bolshevik Party. This meant, in effect, the liquidation of the Soviet ruling class.[4] Here again we must refer to Ivan the Terrible in order to elucidate the subjective rationale of Stalin's actions, the method in what might seem to be merely madness.

[4] The concept of the party as the ruling class was introduced by Lenin, who said in August 1917: "Russia used to be ruled by 150,000 landlords. Why could not 240,000 Bolsheviks do the same job?"

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In directing the orgy of treason trials and executions of party cadres, Stalin imagined himself to be acting as Ivan had acted in asserting his absolutism against the ancient landed aristocracy, the Boyars, who were bloodily suppressed on charges of treason and sedition. He even used the pseudonym "Ivan Vasilyevich" (the first name and patronymic of Ivan the Terrible, the initials of which corresponded to those of his own first name and patronymic, Iosif Vissarionovich) in some secret inner correspondence of the purge period.[5] Later, in the conversation with the film director in 1947, he allowed himself to criticize Ivan on just one point. Ivan, he said, had made the mistake of failing to liquidate five remaining feudal families, had not carried through the suppression of the aristocracy to a finish; but for this omission, he suggested, there would have been no Time of Troubles in Russia after Ivan's death. "And then Iosif Vissarionovich added humorously that 'Here God interfered with Ivan': *Grozny* liquidates one feudal family, one Boyar line, and then for a whole year repents and prays forgiveness for the 'sin,' whereas what he should have done was to act still more decisively!"[6] Stalin, we see, not only took Ivan the Terrible as his political model; he conceived himself as the pupil who surpassed the master in the politics of the blood purge.

One further important point requires mention here. Ivan created an institution known as the *oprichnina*, which was an instrument for the liquidation of the Boyars and a mainstay in his administration of the state. The prerevolutionary Russian historian Kliuchevsky describes the *oprichnina* as an all-powerful security police. It was organized as a kind of state within the state. The *oprichniki* wore black and rode black horses; their special insignia consisted of a dog's head and a broom attached to the saddle. In the folk memory of the Russian people, the *oprichnina* lingers as a symbol of black crimes and terror, as does its chief, Ivan the Terrible. Stalin unquestionably modeled his NKVD quite consciously upon it. The Soviet security police, originally the terrorist weapon of the Bolshevik Party's dictatorship, became the weapon with which Stalin broke the back of the ruling party. Its functions expanded as its importance rose during the 1930's, until finally, under Stalin's direct guidance, it became a kind of state within the state, an *oprichnina* of Stalinist Russia, inspiring terror, practicing torture, watching over everything and everybody, carrying on the kidnaping of Soviet citizens as a matter of settled official policy. In the

[5] Alexander Orlov, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes*, New York, 1953, p. 206.
[6] Dubrovsky, *loc.cit.*

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later Stalin years, the idealizing of Ivan the Terrible was extended to include the idealizing of the *oprichnina.* Stalin inspired this, too. In the 1947 conversation in the Kremlin, "Iosif Vissarionovich noted also the progressive role of the *oprichnina.*"[7]

If Stalin destroyed the Bolshevik Party as a political organism and ruling class, how, we may ask, did he take its place all by himself? What was the Stalin autocracy, considered as an institution? The basic political system has been described here as a complex, three-way, state-party-soviet structure of command and control of society. The autocracy, as Stalin reconstituted it, was a superstructure of command and control, superimposed upon this basic structure, making the Soviet system one single organization in the most literal sense of the word. Concerning the title and detailed operation of the actual organ of the autocracy, there is still some uncertainty. Some sources speak of a personal Stalin "secretariat." But according to a refugee account which seems authentic, the organ was something meshed in more closely with the actual machinery of rule.

It was the so-called "special sector" of the Central Committee apparatus, operated by and for Stalin along the lines of a personal secretariat. Through its own special representatives stationed at control positions, this organ operated the police system in accordance with Stalin's bidding. All his directives for trials and purges were funneled through it. All information was channeled into it. It had a foreign section through which Stalin conducted Soviet foreign policy, and so on. In short, the superstructure controlled and commanded the control and command apparatus at all key points. It was, as it were, a little gear box through which the entire massive machinery of Soviet rule over nearly 900,000,000 human beings on about one-third of the earth's surface was operated. By manipulating the levers in the control panel, Stalin could cause all kinds of things to happen. He could play politics as though on a piano, touching a key here and a chord there, with results as diverse as a blast in *Pravda* against Churchill, a purge in the Ukraine, a plan for a new power station on the Volga, a propaganda campaign about germ warfare, a re-evaluation of Einstein, or a government change in Bulgaria.

Naturally, this super-control system was not an efficient or even a rational instrument for governing a third of the earth. For various reasons, it failed to transmit upward much necessary information. Many needed decisions were not taken; many that were taken were not needed.

[7] *Ibid.*

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The policy line—and there had to be a policy line on almost everything, even, for example, genetics—remained completely rigid until, at length, a particular key was touched, whereupon the shift was radical and instantaneous, and often quite demoralizing to the officialdom which had to implement it. The rigidity forced policy into maladjustment with ever-changing reality, and the radical shifts often widened rather than narrowed the gap. So the system, plainly, was not efficient. But it satisfied Stalin's craving for total control and command, and that, essentially, is why he built it up and perfected it, and also why he clung to it with compulsive tenacity despite all evidence that it was inefficient, sluggish, contrary to Soviet state interests, harmful to international communism, or anachronistic in an age of modern technology and swift events. It is not surprising that in his final years Stalin became a hidebound conservative in almost everything that had to do with the Soviet system: he wanted everything to stay just as it was—namely, under control.

One earlier incident testifies to the neurotic character of this need for total control. Khrushchev notes in the secret report Stalin's refusal, in 1941, to believe that Hitler intended to attack Russia—despite all warnings received—and also his great panic when the attack came. This behavior is explicable when we consider that the threat of attack, and later the attack itself, seemed to Stalin to jeopardize the entire control and command structure he had built up, which represented not only his life's work but, literally, his *life*—that is, his personality: he needed it in the same way that an addict needs his dope, and reacted to the threat of its downfall the way the addict would react to a threat to the dope supply—with panic. He said at the time, according to Khrushchev, "All that which Lenin created we have lost forever." This, perhaps, was his way of saying: "All that *I* created is tottering, and I feel lost." Danger to Russia could not, as such, have caused these panic reactions in Stalin; but danger to his super-control system could. This helps to explain why nothing much could change in the Soviet Union until Stalin died, and also why various things immediately began to change when he *did* die. De-Stalinization did not start with Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in early 1956. The first and the essential act of de-Stalinization was the death of Stalin.

This analysis may help to bring into focus the much-discussed question of the relation between the Stalin autocracy and the Soviet order. It is often maintained that Stalin was a necessary product of the "system." One objection to this argument is that it tends to regard the Soviet

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system as a static thing, born whole and intact out of the October Revolution. In reality, as the foregoing discussion indicates, there was a parallel and interactive evolution of the system and the autocracy. Thus, the Stalin phenomenon must be viewed as historical cause as well as historical effect. It is true that the pre-existing party dictatorship provided a highly favorable political milieu for Stalin's drive to absolute power. The Russian national tradition of centralized bureaucratic rule and passive popular acceptance of it also helped to smooth the path for Stalin. However, these objective circumstances did not make the rise of the Stalin autocracy inevitable; at most they made it a possible or probable tendency.

What converted the tendency into an historical reality was not the nature of Russia or the nature of Bolshevism: it was the nature of Stalin. That is, the nature of his personality was a factor of crucial importance in shaping the history of the Stalin period. Furthermore, once in existence, the autocracy became an autonomous historical force, reshaping its own political milieu, transforming the whole Soviet system into a mechanism for the projection of Stalin's power and personality. In this sense it may be said that the Stalinist political system was a product of Stalin. It is precisely the latter point that is overlooked, no doubt deliberately, by the Soviet view as voiced by Khrushchev in the secret report. That view treats the autocracy as a kind of regrettable excrescence on the otherwise healthy organism of the Soviet system, something which just grew and eventually caused all sorts of painful complications, now happily in the past. The elimination of the excrescence, it is held, restores the organism to its normal state of health. The official Soviet concept of de-Stalinization is founded on this false minimizing of the meaning of Stalinization.

What general conclusion may be drawn concerning the historical inevitability of Russian Stalinism? Inevitability is a retrospective idea. That is to say, whatever happens in the world *becomes* inevitable in retrospect by virtue of the fact that it happened: everything having been precisely as it was beforehand, the event in question resulted. Therefore, the meaningful issue is not whether Stalinism was inevitable, for the fact that it "happened" makes it so in retrospect, but rather: What were the critical conditions of its inevitability? In particular, would the Leninist party dictatorship have been transformed into a Stalinist-type totalitarian autocracy (i.e., into Soviet fascism) if there had been no Stalin: if, say, J. Djugashvili had died in infancy? The answer to which the foregoing discussion points, and which the pages

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to follow will bring out more clearly, is: Perhaps, but not necessarily. For the pathological personality of Stalin was a critically important factor in the outcome. It could be argued, with this in mind, that if Stalin had never existed, some other equally and similarly pathological personality would have certainly been there to capitalize on conditions and shape events in like fashion. This is the position that an orthodox Marxist, for example, might take. But it is impossible to substantiate. How a Soviet Russia minus Stalin would have developed from the 1920's to the 1950's must remain, to some extent, an open question.

III. The Climax of the Stalin Period

The period from the end of World War II in 1945 to Stalin's death in early 1953 forms the climax and concluding chapter in the development of Russian Stalinism. It was the period of Stalin's own greatest autocratic eminence in the affairs of Russia and of his personality's greatest impact upon the affairs of the external world. It might well be called the *Stalinshchina*—The Time of Stalin. The story of the currents and countercurrents of events inside Russia during those years is one of enormous inner complexity, and has not yet been fully and satisfactorily understood in the Western world. No serious effort at systematic analysis of it is possible in this brief over-all survey. However, a few salient points require mention.

One of the most important new developments of the postwar period was the externalizing of the Stalinization process. This had started with the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics and eastern Poland in the period just prior to the war, but was interrupted by the Soviet-German hostilities. When the war ended, Stalin pushed ahead with a grandiose endeavor of Soviet empire-building, which carried Stalinization to most of Middle Europe and parts of Asia. Like the process inside Russia, Stalinization abroad proceeded through a series of consecutive stages. Now, however, the pattern having been laid down and the techniques learned and perfected, the agencies of Soviet power were able to compress the re-enactment into a very short span of years. The formation of the satellite empire meant the incorporation of the countries concerned into the Moscow command and control structure, their reduction to the status of Soviet "union republics" in all but name. Communist China, for various reasons, appears to have occupied a somewhat exceptional position in this picture, and Yugoslavia successfully rebelled against full-scale Stalinization. Otherwise the process was carried through consistently and to the fullest possible extent.

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In the countries which were to become satellites in the complete sense, Stalinization meant, first, the process of *Gleichschaltung*. This Nazi term connotes a forcible bringing into conformity. In the process of *Gleichschaltung*, the institutional structures of the satellites-to-be were brought into line, in all essentials, with the basic structure built up earlier in the USSR. This corresponded to the first phase of internal Soviet Stalinization. Secondly, Stalinization in the satellites meant the establishment of firm Soviet control over the native ruling groups and apparatuses of power. In these external territories, the two phases of the process proceeded more or less simultaneously. One of the reasons for this is that some elements of the native Communist leaderships, instanced by Gomulka in Poland, were reluctant to co-operate in all aspects of the *Gleichschaltung*. For example, they were not eager to push through the full-scale and forcible collectivization of the peasantry. Hence the snuffing-out of any tendencies toward independence in the local Communist leaderships was a prerequisite for unrestricted imposition of the Soviet structure on all the satellite countries.

The Stalin-Tito conflict was, from Stalin's point of view, simply an untoward incident in the general process of clamping down total control upon the Communist leaderships in all the satellite countries. Perhaps he even felt that it had its "constructive" political uses, since it afforded him a pretext for the savage repression of elements in those leaderships (Kostov, Rajk, etc.) that were suspect of independent tendencies, for the dispatch of Marshal Rokossovsky to be the new Russian viceroy in Warsaw, and so on. The trials and repressions of Communist leadership elements which Stalin engineered in the satellite countries from 1949 onward, culminating in the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia in 1952, were the counterpart in external Stalinization of the extermination of Russian bolshevism in the 1930's. The aim was to make political "dead souls" of the satellite ruling parties just as had been done with the former Bolshevik Party in Russia. Henceforth they would exist as well-oiled transmission belts of the superstructure of command and control in the Kremlin.

From the internal Soviet point of view, the *Stalinshchina* meant, to begin with, "back to Stalinist normalcy." It is precisely for this reason that the year 1945 may be taken as the historical starting point of the internal political unrest which began to make itself evident on the surface of Russian life in the post-Stalin period and especially in the latter part of 1956. For the reimposition of Stalinism-as-usual was precisely what the Russian people as a whole did not want and did not

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expect in 1945. Popular sentiment was epitomized in the remark of a Russian army officer in Moscow on VE-Day: "Now it is time to live."

The term "reimposition" does not refer to the institutional structure, for that did not alter during the war years. However, the atmosphere of life in Russia did alter. In the face of the ordeal of invasion and the dread possibility that the Russian people would not support the defense effort, the Stalin regime relaxed the police controls somewhat, and particularly the police terror. Equally important, it took steps to encourage the belief among the people that the postwar period would be the beginning of a "new period" of growing internal abundance and freedom. For example, peasants were encouraged to hope that the kolkhoz system would be disbanded, or at least drastically liberalized, after the war. Soviet intellectuals were allowed to look forward to what they called a "postwar breathing spell," meaning a relaxation of official controls on the country's intellectual and artistic life. There were rumors in wartime Moscow that, after the war, the United States and Great Britain, Russia's highly popular allies, would be permitted to open department stores in the Soviet capital, and so on.

These were some of the expectations of the Russians. *In effect, the people expected a beginning of de-Stalinization.* They expected to hear from Stalin at the war's end a speech similar to the one given by Malenkov in August 1953, when he announced a new course in which Russian energies would be invested, at least in part, in raising the Russian standard of life. Instead, when Stalin addressed them over the Soviet radio on February 9, 1946, he gave a lecture on the timeless virtues of the "Soviet method of industrialization," eulogized the collectivization of agriculture as its counterpart, sketched a vista of endless further five-year plans oriented toward heavy industry, signalized a new period of international tension, and extolled the Stalinist order as "superior to any non-Soviet social order" and "a form of organization of society which is perfectly stable and capable of enduring."[8]

This was Stalin's credo of conservatism in all that concerned the Stalinist structure of command and control. The system was to remain intact; nothing was to change. Thus were the popular hopes for a measure of postwar de-Stalinization dashed to pieces. "We were deceived!" echoes down the postwar years in the statements of Russians who escaped. They had fought and bled for a decent Russia. When it was all over, they received the *Stalinshchina.* Then and there, the prerequisites began to develop for an opposition movement from below.

[8] *Pravda,* February 10, 1946.

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However, this was not evident on the surface of events in the early postwar years. The popular attitude was not then notably rebellious; rebellion will appear only when desperation is ignited by a spark of hope. There was very little hope left in the people of Russia during the postwar years of Stalin's reign. What happened was that most people came to look upon the command and control structure as an alien environment, something that had to be lived in perforce, but which was not a real home. Many of them emigrated inwardly. There were a great many manifestations of this attitude, which might be summed up as passive resistance to the conditions of Soviet existence, a failure of response. Examples were the shirking of work on the kolkhoz; low or declining labor productivity; youthful delinquency in many forms; utter indifference to politics (*apolitichnost'*), total uninterest in official ideas (*bezydeinost'*), alcoholism as a way of life for very large numbers of Russian men, hack work in every profession, soulless formalism in the behavior of the bureaucracy, erosion of artistic creativity. Among elements in whom the need for inner integrity was still strong, especially among the youth, there was a rebirth of evangelical religion, carried on in underground forms, and there were tendencies toward oppositional political thought with an anarchistic tinge. For example, secret circles of university students in Moscow, Leningrad, and elsewhere preached among themselves the idea that Stalinism was a betrayal of socialism. In all save a few special fields of national life, such as military production and heavy industry, signs of regress appeared. The system flourished; the society entered into decline.

No amount of propaganda and indoctrination could counteract this decline. Propaganda cannot either create or abolish feelings; at most, it can influence or channel feelings which already exist. This is one explanation for the steady growth of official anti-Semitism in the USSR after 1946. It was, in part, the regime's way of endeavoring to divert away from itself the popular resentment of a life lived in a maze of controls. But the very fact that this was resorted to shows how ineffective the regular lines of indoctrination were proving. The secret police, which reinstituted an atmosphere of continual pervasive terror in the postwar years, could not correct this situation. The terror could do no more than hold popular attitudes in check, combat outward manifestations here and there, enforce a sense of hopelessness. As we now know, hard-bitten Soviet officials in high places saw this phenome-

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non of estrangement and failure of response, and the damage that was resulting; and they realized that it was in the regime's own interests to try by other means than terror and propaganda to counteract it. But who would explain all this to Stalin? Who would tell him that the Russian people, or large elements of it, were inwardly emigrating? No one, of course. For Stalin doted on the image of himself as the darling of the people and the international working class, as the beloved "Leader and Teacher" of a prosperous nation and progressive empire. To call in question the condition of the realm would be to call in question this glorious, idealized self-image of Stalin, and woe betide the Soviet official—be he high or low—who dared do this.

What happened, then, was that, by mobilization of submissive artists and intellectuals, a servile officialdom made reality *seem* to do Stalin's bidding. That is, it created for Stalin a fantasy-picture of Soviet reality, transforming it in *Pravda* and films and novels into a beautiful world of happy workers and peasants and ever-advancing progress and productivity, marred only by a few "alien elements" which occasionally penetrated and caused something to go wrong. This was no Potemkin village; it was a Potemkin Russia, fabricated not out of wooden façades but out of words and pictures and symbols of all kinds—an image of a Russia which did not really exist, but was *supposed* to exist. And because, in these circumstances, no real remedial measures could be taken —for the crisis and the need for reforms could not even be mentioned aloud—the discrepancy between the dream-reality fabricated for Stalin and the actual reality experienced by Russia grew greater and greater as the postwar years wore on.

In one area, agriculture, the practical consequences became so serious that the fearful subordinates took heart and brought up the question—very gingerly, no doubt—with the Boss. Here is what Khrushchev tells about the incident in his secret report: "All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never traveled anywhere. . . . He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture. Many films so pictured *kolkhoz* life that the tables were bending from the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently, Stalin thought that it was actually so." Thus was a picture created in which reality *appeared* to conform to the specifications set

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by Stalin's self-image. Needless to say, Khrushchev and his colleagues co-operated in a multitude of ways in the maintenance of this official illusion.

IV. The Limits of De-Stalinization

It is not hard to see why Stalin's death *had* to mean de-Stalinization. The Stalinist political order was a one-person system. The personality of Stalin was, by virtue of the intricate control mechanism described here, the focal force of Soviet politics, the sun around which the whole Soviet political universe revolved. Consequently, his death revolutionized the internal political situation in Moscow overnight.

There was no new Stalin-personality in the inner circle to take his place and operate the system as he had done. Stalin would not have tolerated such a personality close by for long; he would have seen in it an unendurable rival. He needed in his subordinates a combination of compliance and technical competence—that is, personality-types quite different from his own. He gathered around him skillful and sycophantic executors of his slightest wish, such as Molotov or Kaganovich; a fellow-Georgian expert in applying the screws of terror, such as Beria; an efficient managerial mind, such as Malenkov's; a respectful courtier, intelligent and totally dependable, such as Bulganin; a bulldozing ex-provincial boss who would drive the bureaucrats to action, such as Khrushchev; young technocrats, and a brace of old cronies. This was the entourage.

No one of its members had been built up even for the *appearance* of a true succession. The mere fact that Malenkov gave the main report at the Nineteenth Congress in 1952 did not begin to constitute a real grooming for the succession; and the quick collapse of the effort to portray him as successor just after Stalin died proves this. Stalin could not groom anybody even for an apparent succession because, no doubt, he could not brook the thought of being succeeded. Meanwhile, Soviet medical science was mobilized to solve the problem of rejuvenation. Stalin was encouraged to believe that a real solution was in the works, and that he would be in the Kremlin for a long time yet to come. When death came, it left a vacuum of individual supreme rule which no one was in a position to fill.

It also left the majority of the subordinates in no mood to permit a continuation of the autocracy. The infinite oppressiveness and universal insecurity associated with Stalin's personal reign were in some ways most painfully felt at the very top, in the terrorized ex-Politburo. The stifling repression of new ideas and programs, of fresh thoughts

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on policies that might be practicable and serve Soviet state interests, was also painfully experienced. As Khrushchev put it in the secret report, Stalin "choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will."

From this standpoint, Stalin's death was a great moment of liberation from the cramping confines of the autocracy as he had shaped and practiced it; and the thought would inevitably arise that the autocratic superstructure of control and command should be dismantled, and precautions taken to see that it could not easily be restored in future. The urge for personal security demanded it, and the urge of all concerned to participate actively in policy formation reinforced the demand. Finally, the crisis in Soviet affairs was evidently perceived with greater or lesser distinctness and depth by all concerned. They felt that the autocracy was largely responsible for the extreme acuteness and aggravation of the situation in the postwar years.

All this, then, contributed to the next step of de-Stalinization, which was revealed as early as March 1953, when the Soviet press began to talk emphatically about the principle of "collective leadership" and the harmfulness of what it called "one-man decisions." The real political fact reflected in these verbalisms was, apparently, the determination at the top to bar a Stalin succession and to eliminate the autocracy as an institution. The phrase "collective leadership" involved the assertion, in the first place, of a *negative* principle: "There shall be no new Stalin." No one individual would be permitted to assume autocratic command and control of the Soviet system.

Elimination of the super-control system of the autocracy involved a rather intricate set of readjustments at the apex of the Soviet regime, especially as regards the status and functions of the security police. Stalin, as mentioned earlier, had transformed the police into his *oprichnina*, the special executive mechanism of the autocracy. It became an enormous organization practicing permanent and pervasive terror against the population and government hierarchy at the pleasure of the boss in the Kremlin. From the very outset, the regime of collective dictatorship set about clamping control upon this organization and placing certain restraints upon its arbitrary activities of terrorization.

This all began as early as April 1953, when Beria was in charge of the unified interior ministry. Thus, de-Stalinization was associated from the start with the denunciation of police terror, and with moves to bring the police under collective control. Khrushchev's denunciation of terror in the secret speech against Stalin in early 1956 was only the

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culminating step in this campaign. It has been a question, not of doing away with the Soviet secret police, but of reforming its official manners and its administration. In other words, the police, according to the official concept of de-Stalinization, were no longer to be permitted to function as an *oprichnina*, as a state within the police state that Russia continues to be. It is interesting to note the reflection of this idea in post-Stalin historiography. An article in the Soviet historical journal in 1956 raises the question of Ivan the Terrible's *oprichnina*. It concludes that, together with the tyranny of Ivan which it served, it not only failed to play a "progressive role" (as Stalin affirmed in 1947) but "led Russia to the well-known events of the beginning of the seventeenth century."[9] That is, it led to the Time of Troubles. It is interesting to compare this view with Stalin's own, mentioned earlier.

We have seen that the early phase of Stalinization brought society under the total command and control of the state, and that a later phase brought the state under the total command and control of Stalin, destroying party rule in the process. De-Stalinization has apparently never had it in mind to go much beyond the repudiation and partial rectification of the second phase. This, as suggested earlier, exposes the dilemma at the heart of post-Stalin Soviet politics; for, in actuality, the two phases were consecutive steps in a single organic process of historical development. Consequently, the repudiation of the latter inescapably poses in the mind of the public the question of repudiating also the earlier phase and its consequences, such as serfdom in the form of the kolkhoz. But the Soviet regime has striven, and will no doubt continue to strive, to divide the indivisible, to separate phase two from phase one and hold on to the latter. In short, it will seek to preserve intact the underlying structure of command and control of Russian society, although not without significant readjustment.

The intention to separate the two phases of Stalinization shows through very clearly in the documents of the official de-Stalinization campaign, notably in Khrushchev's secret report and in the party decree of June 30, 1956 (which was the version of the anti-Stalin line published for the Russian people). "It would be a gross error," states the decree, "to draw conclusions, from the existence of the cult of personality in the past, concerning some kind of changes in the social system of the USSR."[10] This was published after word of the secret re-

[9] V. N. Shevyakov, "K voprosu ob oprichnine pri Ivane IV" (On the question of the *oprichnina* under Ivan IV), *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9 (1956), p. 77.
[10] *Pravda*, July 2, 1956.

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port had circulated through the country and it had become evident that elements of the intelligentsia were showing just such a tendency to "draw conclusions" about the need for changes in the social system, i.e., for the undoing of the first as well as the second phase of Stalinization.

It should not be thought, however, that any change had taken place meanwhile in the official concept of de-Stalinization. Even in the secret report, with its savage attack on Stalin, a line is clearly drawn between the two phases. Khrushchev in effect condemns Stalin for the second phase, for the whole sequence of events beginning in 1934 which has been described here as the destruction of the Bolshevik Party and restoration of Russian autocracy. His condemnation focuses almost entirely upon this, and upon Stalin's later arbitrary uses of the despotic power so gained. So far as the first phase is concerned, Khrushchev flatly states in the secret report: "Here Stalin played a positive role." The direct reference of this laudatory note in the great philippic is to Stalin's political battle against the oppositional trends in the party in the late 1920's and early 1930's, especially the Bukharinist opposition, with its notions of "cotton-dress industrialization" and co-operation with the peasantry. But, indirectly, this is an unqualified endorsement of the policies Stalin advocated in those battles, and hence of the whole first phase of Stalinization.

So intent is Khrushchev on establishing the point that he refrains from even a mild criticism of Stalinist coercive methods in collectivization and industrialization, although at the same time he amply documents the sadistic brutality of the methods which Stalin used in dealing with the party. There is no word, for example, of the dreadful human toll exacted by the terroristic collectivization of the Russian peasantry. In effect, Khrushchev suggests that Stalinist methods, intolerable when employed to break the Bolshevik Party, were acceptable when employed to break the Russian people. His double standard of moral evaluation of Stalin is governed by the determination to preserve and perpetuate the basic institutional order which evolved out of the first phase of Stalinization.

This same intent also governs a fresh falsification of Soviet history which began well before the official de-Stalinization campaign and which is continued in it. Briefly, the Stalinist trademark is removed from the basic policy pattern of Stalinism. The first phase of Stalinization is not attributed primarily to Stalin—who merely "played a positive role"—but to Lenin and "the party." As the decree of June 30 puts

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it, "Fulfilling the Leninist behests, the Communist Party set course toward the socialist industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, and the carrying out of the cultural revolution."[11]

The political logic of this version of Soviet history is transparent: if the institutional order which evolved out of the first phase of Stalinization is to be extolled and perpetuated while the absolute autocracy established in the second phase is condemned and dismantled, Stalin's role in the first phase must be retrospectively downgraded to that of a mere accessory of "the party." The inspiration of the Stalinist full-scale totalitarianizing of Russian society must be attributed wholly to Lenin. The first phase must be "de-Stalinized" only in the special sense of detaching Stalin's name from it. Re-falsification of Soviet history intertwines with restoration of historical fact in the official de-Stalinization campaign.[12]

The post-Stalin regime has managed so far to enforce this rigid separation of phases in the process of de-Stalinization. But there are various signs—including the admonition to the public not to "draw conclusions" concerning changes in the system—that an unofficial concept of de-Stalinization more far-reaching in scope than the official one has been developing in Russia, especially since the Twentieth Party Congress. It does not operate under the same constraint of separating the two phases. It envisages changes in the control structure which the present regime would deny, such as the emancipation of artistic and literary work from official censorship and tutelage, freedom from the strait-jacket of ideological conformity, the right of limited political dissent. It shades off at one extreme into a tendency not only to chafe at the limits of de-Stalinization, but also to question the Leninist legacy of dictatorship and one-party rule. If the coming period sees the emergence of an oppositional political movement from below among the Russian intelligentsia and elements of the working class—and it seems now quite possible or even probable that it will—we may expect many of the issues to crystallize around the divergence and conflict of the official and unofficial concepts of de-Stalinization.

And here the importance of the movement of "national communism" in Poland especially needs to be stressed. The particular significance of Poland from this standpoint lies in the fact that there the ruling group,

[11] *Pravda*, July 2, 1956.

[12] This process of re-falsification was prepared in Soviet official documents published in late 1953 and early 1954, and was analyzed in some detail in the writer's study, "The Metamorphosis of the Stalin Myth," *World Politics*, VII, No. 1 (October 1954), pp. 38-62.

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or a section of it, has challenged the Muscovite official separation of the two phases in de-Stalinization. Up to a point it has espoused the idea of de-Stalinizing society. According to some reports, the spectacle of this movement in Poland has aroused the keenest sympathetic interest among certain circles of the Russian intelligentsia. This is entirely logical. For it would appear that the Polish movement dramatizes the unofficial concept of de-Stalinization which has arisen inside Russia and which the ruling group there has been determined to repress. Moscow's covert hostility to Gomulka reflects, among other things, a fear of the potential political repercussions inside Russia from the spectacle of what is happening now—and, even more, what may happen later on—in Poland.

Inside Russia, then, de-Stalinization has in mind mainly the unraveling of the second phase of Stalinization. But even this limited process has many complexities when it passes beyond the enunciation of the negative principle of "No new Stalin." To rehabilitate the memory of a murdered majority of a party's leadership is not to resurrect them. To bring back some feeble old Bolsheviks in honor from Siberian exile is not to raise their party from the political dead or to restore an earlier time. Nor is it easy to reinfuse a real *esprit de corps* by agitational means in a demoralized political organism inured for decades to a regime of total servility to the big dictator and his local spawn. So revival of party rule is thus far not, in practice, a very impressive phenomenon. The Presidium, reduced to its pre-1952 small size immediately upon Stalin's death, became a "collective"—that is, a talking, debating, voting, fighting, and feuding—organ of government, with some apparent effort to introduce political order into its workings (although one issue, the Beria issue, was reportedly settled with a pistol at one of its meetings). The Central Committee was brought back from post-1947 oblivion to become, at least in theory, the supreme arbiter of the Presidium's squabbles. Khrushchev, as First Secretary, has tried very hard to pack the Central Committee with his supporters. It meets in plenary session at intervals of roughly six months, as the 1952 statutes demand. A party congress was held on schedule last year for the first time in many years; but its public discussions were mostly very tame and stereotyped, politically emasculated as in the past.

Although de-Stalinization would leave the basic command and control structure intact, merely cutting off the superstructure and making appropriate adjustments stemming from that, in practice the matter is not so simple. For the basic structure itself is not just a structure, but

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broadly includes its habitual mode of operation, its spirit, customs, techniques, and conceptions of rule; and all this was formed over many years under the peculiar conditions of the superstructure's mode of operation and conceptions, down to and including Stalin's own nocturnal work schedule. Everything was geared to the requirements of total autocratic control of the situation and events throughout the Soviet realm. Consequently, the elimination of the superstructure has posed many questions relating to reform of the workings of the basic structure and, especially on the economic side, to its partial reorganization. The keynote of de-Stalinization on this plane is decentralization, the diffusion of administrative authority, combined with the encouragement of discussion so long as it is thoroughly loyal and the unbinding of bureaucratic initiative so long as it works in the interests of the regime.

The movement to decentralize and rationalize the administrative system began almost immediately after Stalin's death with the bestowal upon ministers of certain new financial and other rights relating to decisions about the work of their own ministries, decisions previously made at a higher level. Further steps followed. Some units of the central administrative apparatus were moved from Moscow out into the provinces. In the first four post-Stalin years the bureaucracy was pruned in size, reportedly by about 900,000 officials. Planning procedures were simplified through reducing the number of centrally specified plan targets. The union republics were given a little latitude in planning their own budgets, and 11,000 various industrial enterprises were transferred from the jurisdiction of union or union-republic to republic ministries. In the Supreme Soviet, budgetary and other commissions were activated, having previously existed only in a formal sense, and an Economic Commission was formed in the Council of Nationalities, one of the two chambers, to discuss questions affecting the economic interests of the union republics. Proposals were advanced to spread higher educational institutions, now clustered in a few big centers, mainly Moscow and Leningrad, out around the country. The question was raised of drafting a new statute for the local soviets, under which these organs would have certain limited autonomous powers defined for them. Under a new charter for universities which was being informally discussed in late 1955, the rectors and deans of university faculties would be chosen by (officially approved) faculty representatives rather than appointed from above by the Minister of Education as before, and so on.

These initial departures in administrative reform culminate in the recently published scheme for a sweeping reorganization of the Soviet

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industrial administration. According to the "Theses" of Khrushchev's report on the reorganization plan, the present system of central industrial ministries is to be drastically revamped. Some of the great feudal structures described earlier are to be dismantled. Operational direction of industry and construction is to be vested in a number of republic and regional Economic Councils, which will control the working enterprises through intermediate units—specialized industrial combines and trusts. In short, the economic bureaucracy is to be broken up and spread out through the country. But it should be stressed that over-all decision-making authority for the economy is to remain strictly centralized in a strengthened Gosplan and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Planning, finance, and statistical administration are to remain centralized, as, apparently, are the administration of agriculture and some branches of transport, as well as certain industries. The new Economic Councils will be subordinate to the central economic authorities. And these, according to Khrushchev's "Theses," are to "suppress manifestations of autarchy or sectionalism, so that the interests of a given region will not be opposed to over-all state interests." In some respects, the thinking behind this scheme seems to hark back to the pre-Stalinist period in Soviet economic administration. This suggests that, at least so far as this aspect of administration is concerned, not even the first phase of Stalinization is entirely sacrosanct. But such a conclusion is subject to a great many qualifications, most notably with regard to agriculture, and it still remains, of course, to see how the scheme will be carried out in actual practice.

In assessing the causal factors behind the movement of administrative decentralization, it is important not to see it as something absolutely necessitated by objective conditions (of technological development, labor shortage, etc.), as though everything would snap back to full Stalinism as usual if only the regime could get away with it. Such an image of the situation is out of touch with some important realities. The point is that while the objective conditions do in fact dictate the urgent need for administrative reforms, for rationalization and decentralization, this is nothing very new. They also dictated it in 1950. But at that time the regime was fundamentally change-resistant—and Stalin made it so. Productively efficient operation of the system, as shown above, was not the crucial consideration then. The Stalinist compulsion to maintenance of absolute centralized control in every sphere interfered. It was the partial subsiding of this compulsion, through Stalin's death, which cleared the way for the moves which have been made and are

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now being made to decentralize certain functions, to reform the administration, and in general to take account of some of the objective conditions for rational operation of a modern industrialized economy. The underlying formula for this reorientation of Soviet methods of administration is describable as a transition in certain spheres from a form of control which is direct and absolute to another which is indirect and manipulative.

The curious course taken by de-Stalinization, a course marked by convulsive starts and stops, reflects, among other things, the fact that the Soviet regime has been divided from within during much or all of the period since Stalin's death. Had the regime been united at the top all along, the policy of partial reform would no doubt have been carried out in a more deliberate fashion than has actually been the case. Its conservatism with respect to much of the Stalin heritage would have been more clearly evident at every step. But the struggle for power between competing factions has complicated the picture. The principle of "collective leadership" has been interpreted above as negative in essence. No one is supposed to aspire to be a new Stalin, in the sense of reviving the autocracy. But this does not mean a moratorium on internal political conflict; it merely sets certain terms within which such conflict is supposed to be conducted.

In the new situation—with no clear line of succession marked out, with old animosities dividing the top leaders—the issue of power was bound, after Stalin's death, not only to arise, but to do so in a bitter form. Under the circumstances described, however, it would, and did, fall into the pattern of a conflict for factional ascendancy. That is, the root issue was not: Who shall take Stalin's place? It was, rather: Which faction shall be ascendant within the collective dictatorship? The first four post-Stalin months saw a Beria-Malenkov factional ascendancy, followed by Beria's fall and a kind of interregnum, during which Malenkov headed the Council of Ministers and Khrushchev, his chief rival, headed the party apparatus. Early in 1955, Khrushchev managed to oust Malenkov and install his own confederate, Bulganin, in the premiership, inaugurating the Khrushchev-Bulganin factional ascendancy.

The contest for factional ascendancy inevitably aggravated, and in turn was aggravated by, conflict over policy, especially about the scope, timing, and tempo of de-Stalinization. In other words, the question of de-Stalinization arose not simply in the form of "Shall we de-Stalinize?" It arose also in the form of "*Who* shall de-Stalinize?" Steps taken along this line were bound to be popular among various elements of

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the population, and credit would redound especially to the leader or the faction which had associated itself in the public mind with the idea of de-Stalinization. This had at times an accelerating and at other times an inhibiting effect upon the process.

More specifically, for a faction already in the ascendancy but not securely so, as the Beria-Malenkov faction was just after Stalin's death, one promising way to consolidate its ascendancy was to take the lead in de-Stalinization, particularly in such aspects of it as the curbing of the secret police, the amnesties, the banishment of terror, and the denunciation of the very widely hated Stalin. And here the factional interest might conflict with the underlying conservative bent of the regime as a whole, by dictating an unsettlingly swift policy tempo. However, if it was in the factional interest of the temporarily dominant element to associate itself with the policy of de-Stalinization, it was *ipso facto* in the interest of the rival faction to *oppose* this policy for the time being, until its opponents were dislodged from places of authority, perhaps forming a bloc with extremely conservative elements of the regime in the process. This peculiar situation helps to explain the pattern of post-Stalin Soviet politics, in particular the starts and stops in de-Stalinization.

The first wave of de-Stalinization began almost on the day of Stalin's funeral, sooner than the regime's general power position necessitated or its over-all interests dictated. It did in fact start on that day, for it was in his funeral oration that Beria cryptically announced the forthcoming series of moves having to do with the curbing of police terror. This first wave was presided over by Beria, the head policeman, who exonerated the accused Kremlin doctors, denounced the methods of torture applied to them, sponsored the first amnesty, espoused the idea of cultural autonomy for non-Russian nationalities of the country, reportedly started to get in touch with Tito, made overtures to the West, and so on.

Abroad, this haste toward reform was widely misconstrued as a sign of the weakness of the regime. Actually, it reflected the weakness of the momentarily dominant Beria-Malenkov *faction* and its desperate desire to consolidate itself in popularity and power by spearheading de-Stalinization. Later, the June 1953 uprising in East Germany gave a coalition of opponents its chance to move against Beria, and his fall brought to an end the first wave of accelerated de-Stalinization. During the ensuing interregnum, Khrushchev and Bulganin, guided by their factional interests, pursued a generally conservative course with regard

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to de-Stalinization. They were concerned, first, to prevent too much political credit from accruing to Malenkov, who had announced a consumer-goods program in August 1953, and, second, to ensure that Molotov and other strongly conservative elements would support them in the eventual ouster of Malenkov.

But no sooner was Malenkov ousted than the victorious Khrushchev-Bulganin faction set out to consolidate its own ascendancy—among other purposes—by taking the lead in a new wave of accelerated de-Stalinization. This second wave culminated in the now famous secret speech of Khrushchev, which leaked out and became, in a way, the inadvertent act of instigation of the present period of unrest in Eastern Europe. Such are the strange ways of history.

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Review Articles

FOREIGN AID

"A Proposal" Re-examined

By RAYMOND VERNON

Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957, 170 pp. $2.75.

THIS is a year for introspection on the nature and effects of United States foreign aid programs. It is a year in which a dozen or more major reports have been produced for and by Congressional committees, Presidential commissions, and private bodies on how we have performed and how we can better our performance in doling out our aid to other nations of the world.

It is scarcely any wonder that we should feel the need for sober introspection. After twelve years and over 60 billion dollars of foreign aid, the world position of the United States on the whole seems no less hazardous and uncertain than when it all began. And while this alone does not prove that foreign aid has been ineffective as an instrument of foreign policy, it does suggest the wisdom of examining the premises of the program once again.

As one reviews these twelve eventful years of foreign aid, one is tempted to draw two conclusions about the drift of events. Though the various foreign aid programs of the United States have represented a highly constructive and imaginative development in the history of international relations, one senses that we have lost the initiative in controlling the flow and purpose of our foreign aid. Time was when we felt able to plan for the longer run; to develop articulated objectives and criteria in our programs of aid; and to invite the participation of other nations in the administration of a program without fear of subverting its purpose. All these characteristics appeared in the structure of the World Bank; and many of them endured in the Marshall Plan, for all the urgency of its mission. But the extent of our drift is measured by the fact that none of these characteristics was visible in the latest of our innovations in foreign aid—the $200,000,000 authorization for a Middle East program.

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Today, therefore, our lead time seems somehow to have shrunk. An increasing share of our aid is being diverted to the business of quenching local fires, while the basic design and underlying goals have become less and less evident. Partly because of the increasing sense of urgency and improvisation, formal international mechanisms and articulated international goals in the dispensation of our funds have come to seem less and less possible or relevant.

The proposals of the team of Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow are based on the contention that a long-run, large-scale foreign aid program, if administered on the basis of appropriate criteria and institutions, could gradually alter the political outlook and social structure of the underdeveloped countries, increasing their attachment to the democratic institutions and humanitarian values of the maturer democracies. The authors take it for granted that our foreign aid programs are no weapon for the tactical parry and thrust of day-to-day international politics. And their return to earlier emphases brings once more to the fore what would otherwise seem largely irrelevant—the question of the policies and the international organization that might best apply to a reoriented foreign aid program.

Those who feel that the effectiveness of our foreign aid dollars is steadily being impaired by the shortening perspective of our present aid policies cannot fail to welcome the Millikan-Rostow approach. The two main contentions of the authors seem close to unassailable. The contention that the effectiveness of our aid will be increased if it is placed on a longer-run footing is buttressed with cogent argument. And the view that greater international participation is required if we are to secure a maximum return also seems solidly based.

What is more, the authors show no hesitation in looking squarely at an issue which most proponents of foreign aid are disposed to walk around. They are perfectly willing, even anxious, to recognize that economic aid by itself is no guarantee of greater security for the United States; that such aid, administered without regard for its impact on the political institutions of the grantee, could even increase our difficulties by giving enough strength to the people of weak and torpid nations to express their discontent in popular revolts.

Because the book does offer the serious student of our foreign aid programs something to chew on, one has a sense of being almost churlish in recording some second reactions of a critical character. Yet it is the fate of the reviewer that he cannot afford the luxury of sup-

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pressing such reactions, lest in doing more than justice to the authors, he does less to his readers.

I. The Conditions of Aid

In the past twelve years, we have come to savor the rich variety of conditions which the dispenser of aid may impose upon a recipient nation. Of course, the development of such conditions is not an inevitable concomitant of an aid program; the Soviet Union, for instance, has demonstrated some skill in buying commodities from nations in distress, pretending that the transaction was purely "commercial," and placing no apparent conditions at all upon its bail-out operations. For our part, the accountability of our Executive branch to the legislature and the public has permitted no such freedom of action. We have been obliged to place evident conditions on our aid; and these conditions have formed a continuous spectrum from measures designed to ensure that the money was effectively spent on economic improvement to measures aimed at subsidizing our own merchant marine or cutting off trade with Communist China.

The drift, of course, has been from conditions of the former type to those of the latter and it is a drift which Millikan and Rostow would arrest. For one of its consequences is to lay requirements on the unstable rulers of young unstable nations which they could not easily accept even if they wanted to. The fact which the authors would have us recognize is that we tie the hands of would-be aid recipients with our self-serving conditions; we thereby prevent their developing along lines compatible with our own long-term interests; or we compel them to look to the Soviet bloc for "unconditional" aid which the latter is quite willing to offer in order to gain a foothold in the body politic of the underdeveloped nations.

But the authors do not propose to offer unconditional aid to the underdeveloped nations. They have far too much respect for foreign aid as the essential catalyst of economic growth to risk its being frittered away in half-considered, ill-timed plans. Instead, they lay out their own conditions to replace the politically tinged conditions toward which the United States has been pressed.

This brings us to our first problem. For as one sums up the conditions that the authors develop in one section and another of the book, one is taken somewhat aback by their formidable, even forbidding, nature. Requests for aid, of course, are to be justified in advance by fairly

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specific plans—hardly an unreasonable request. Recipient nations must be technically able to carry out any proposed project "with reasonable efficiency." Except for nations in the most rudimentary state of economic development, the specific projects must be fitted into an over-all program designed to make "the most effective possible use" of the nation's resources, and at the same time they must be consistent with the goals of the society on which the nation is based. In some dilute sense, each project should be expected to add enough to the nation's product to justify the expenditure. Steps must also be taken to ensure "balanced development" in those parts of the country that are not directly benefited by the aid. "All sectors" of the population must be considered in the plans of the country's leaders. There must be grass-roots support for the programs and local leadership must be developed to that end. While diversification of any nation's economic activity may be desirable and may be encouraged, the plans proposed should nonetheless be consistent with the objectives of world trade expansion and international specialization.

One could labor the obvious problems of internal consistency among all these objectives. But extended comment of this sort would run the risk of being captious and would obscure a more basic concern about the spirit of these proposals. These objectives, we shall have to assume, represent a series of goals carefully framed and seriously intended. Unlike some of the phrases of the hortatory preambles in foreign aid legislation, they should not be regarded as dust to be thrown in the eyes of wavering adherents to the program. This being so, one is led to suppose that the standards would be seriously applied either as pre-conditions to the grant of aid or as goads during its later administration. But, applied in either form, standards of this sort would be objectionable in the extreme. They would violate every vested interest in some of the autocratic nations with which we now must deal and they would fan every prejudice of the young xenophobic nations with whom our foreign relations are most difficult. They would prove no more tolerable than proposals that these nations eschew government ownership of business or demands that they curb trade with the Soviet bloc.

If this were a different sort of book—if the authors' object were to map out a program applicable to the best-of-all-possible worlds rather than to this imperfect globe as we find it—the utopian tinge in their proposed standards would hardly require comment. Their deliberate choice, however, has been to try to frame a "realistic" program—that is to say, one which a determined and dedicated leadership could conceiva-

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bly sell and implement in the face of the inevitable interests hostile to it. Employing this sort of standard—a standard admirably achieved at other points in the book—the authors seem much too optimistic, in this reviewer's opinion, in their appraisal both of the level of understanding of the underdeveloped countries' leaders and of the level of wisdom of the world's economists.

The present governments of most underdeveloped countries cannot conceivably measure up to the task as the book envisions it. Some, like that of Ethiopia, are autocratic and have no notion of the meaning of "developing local leadership," even assuming that it were possible. Others, like that of Saudi Arabia, place priorities on the demands of the city mobs, in recognition of their relative revolutionary power, to the neglect of nomadic and agricultural groups; still others, like that of Burma, have dogged notions of their own about investment priorities, using yardsticks obscure and unacceptable to the Western economist; and some unfortunates, like the government of Indonesia, have almost no effective machinery for administration, although they have a crying economic and political need for aid. We must be prepared for the likelihood, therefore, that the governmental machinery for executing the foreign aid projects will sometimes be weak and willful, and often downright antipathetic to Western concepts of enterprise and democracy.

Beyond this—and here is the most painful task of all for the professional economist—we must recognize that our understanding of the processes of economic growth is still embryonic, hampered by rudimentary theory and even less adequate facts. Accordingly, our appraisals of the relative merits of competing approaches to economic development must be undertaken with considerable humility. We have no right to hope, as the authors do, that there is a "right" foreign aid program that would take the threat out of the Soviet economic offensive. We have no basis for anticipating, except in the very long run, that such a program would reduce East-West trade to a riskless marginal activity for all countries. Yet despite these weaknesses, misgivings, and shortcomings, we must be prepared to step up the flow of our aid.

In short, if we are to take our cue from Millikan and Rostow and insist on realism, our safest ground is to assume that the asymmetrical calculus so typical of foreign policy decisions will prevail—that we may gain very little from an adequate program of foreign aid but shall probably risk much more from an inadequate one. This is justification enough, in the reviewer's eyes, for increasing the magnitude and lengthening the time dimension of our foreign aid programs.

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II. The Administration of Aid

Having considered the scope and purpose of a productive foreign aid program, the authors of *A Proposal* then turn to the administrative structure most appropriate for its execution. The appropriate organization, they find, must have much larger elements of international control and administration than is now the case.

The appeal of an international organization is evident once one accepts the premise of the authors, as this reviewer does, that the benefits to the donor in a foreign aid program are best obtained by a dilute process, through gradual changes in the economic and political structure of the developing country. And the attractiveness of such an organization becomes even more evident if we assume that the reactions of grantee to grantor in such programs may not be those of gratitude or appreciation but the contrary. Even if one is not prepared to accept these premises, the record of international institutions engaged in foreign aid offers an impressive argument in itself.

For as one surveys the various institutional arrangements through which international aid has been funneled in the past twelve years, two of the outstanding successes have in fact been dominated by strong international institutions, namely, the World Bank and the OEEC. To be sure, the two institutions have been engaged in very different types of activity; but their similarities have been at least as evident as their differences. Both have been characterized by very strong secretariats—the World Bank throughout its existence, and the OEEC during the period in which it was involved in the administration of the aid program. Both have served as a buffer for the principal donor, shielding it from the political onus of placing pressure on aid recipients. Both have stimulated a sense of self-respecting participation on the part of the aid-receivers.

Nevertheless, the authors evidence a high degree of realism, almost bordering on despair, as they discuss the prospects for Congressional approval of a plan for the international administration of a new foreign aid program. They conclude that an international organization with the power to collect and dispense funds simply is not in the cards, as long as the United States is overwhelmingly the principal source of such funds. The United States rejection of the SUNFED proposals is felt to be an acid test of its attitude on such matters.

Instead, they turn to devices analogous to the Colombo Plan structure: The proposals of prospective beneficiaries would be submitted to

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an international secretariat for screening in accordance with agreed international standards, such as the standards proposed by the authors; the secretariat would make its recommendations to the prospective donor states; but the states concerned would then enter into bilateral agreements on the actual loan or grant of funds. The bilateral approach would give the donor nations the opportunity to single out their special favorites: the United States would presumably assist Brazil before it made a grant to Indonesia, while the United Kingdom might be disposed to give a first call on its funds to the Commonwealth. And this element of bilateralism would give our Congress the sense that it had not lost control of the aid program.

That is a good try: but is it good enough? Let us go through the process step by step. To begin with, the international secretariat would screen the various proposals for aid to ensure that all of the proposals met the agreed international criteria. The grantors would then be free to select their grantees; but here the difficulty begins. For one can hardly expect that the bilateral deals which the grantors will prefer to execute will exactly match the grantees' screened needs; there will be nations in no political position to command the donors' favor and others, relatively speaking, embarrassed by riches. If in such cases the international secretariat were so influential as to be able to reroute the grantors' offers to fit the grand scheme, then the element of sham in the arrangement would be apparent. Once it was clear that the United States could be persuaded by such a secretariat to reduce its offers to Brazil in order to increase those available to Indonesia, we would have to assume—at the level of realism adopted by the authors—that the Congressional problem would be back in our laps again.

What is more, it is hardly realistic to expect that Congress would insist on a program of foreign aid which was formally bilateral without insisting also on many of the conditions which tend to defeat the purpose of the aid: on the 50-50 shipping clause; on the Battle Act restraints; on publicity provisions; on administrative supervision; and so on. If the bilateral agreements of the United States were to retain such provisions while the agreements of other donors—the Soviet Union, for instance—did not, the invidiousness of the staged comparison might be greatly increased over the present unstaged and unorganized aid-granting contest.

The authors see these problems, of course. And their answer is the obvious one: If nations are not determined to cooperate in the program, it simply will not work. But this is an answer which begs the question;

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for the purpose of the book is to find a program which is both realistic in its conception and possible of adoption.

Where does this leave us in planning the organization of a new foreign aid program? It would seem to force us back upon a re-examination of some of the authors' basic premises—two of these premises in particular. Need we assume, after all, that we are realistically foreclosed from thinking in terms of true international organizations for the control and funneling of our aid? The reviewer is not at all sure that this approach is so obviously less realistic than the alternatives proposed by the authors. Congress has manifested a clear hostility to "give-away" programs such as SUNFED, to be sure; but it has shown nothing but respect for the World Bank, it has authorized United States participation in an International Finance Corporation, and it has been prepared to support such international institutions as the European Payments Union and the European Coal and Steel Community. Semantics and associations have been critically important in such decisions: "A glass of milk for every Hottentot" is a barb aimed at fuzzy-minded do-gooders, but CARE packages can be utterly respectable.

One is pushed by reactions of this sort into a belief that the international institution must not be rejected with total finality. Various proposals for global or regional "banks" of one sort or another still should be regarded as in the running. Alfred C. Neal, CED's president, Harlan Cleveland, former deputy ECA administrator, and numerous others have tried to develop ideas of this sort. Some of these proposals have been more limited in size and function than our foreign aid program demands but all of them are possibilities which ought not to be set aside prematurely.

Another premise implicit in the authors' proposals is that there is no important place in international relations for a program of bilateral aid, except within the larger framework of some international system. Here the authors and the reviewer would follow somewhat divergent paths, the divergence being created by a difference not so much in principle as in emphasis and degree. To this reviewer, the authors' case seems strongest with respect to aid directed at long-term objectives—that is, aid whose benefits are to be derived through its diffused effects on social attitudes and economic expectations; in such cases, *ex hypothesi*, the donor is not relying on gratitude or on pressure to achieve an immediate and specific political end. But this would still seem to leave considerable play for the transfer of financial assistance among nations in other settings.

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As long as we choose to look on our international relations "realistically," there still is likely to be room for the judicious use of bilateral aid for purposes to which a broadly based international institution could not be party. Such possibilities as a crash program to support the building of large tankers by Western Europe or of alternative oil pipelines in the Middle East should not be foreclosed. Nor would one wish to hobble the use of aid as a lever in the delicate game of conditioning the attitudes of the Polish people toward the Soviet Union. Moreover, there may be cases for the continued use of bilateral aid to tide over a crumbling government or to lubricate the creation of a new regional institution. We cannot be so sure of our ground on this point as to place a near-total reliance on internationally developed criteria to govern our aid-giving activities.

The fact that one recognizes the possibility that bilateral aid may have a major place in international politics should not be misconstrued, however. This does not mean that bilateral programs are desirable *per se*. Such programs are no better than the policies they implement; and they cannot be expected to perform very well as an adjunct of policies which are themselves ill-conceived, vacillating, and opportunistic. This, in fact, may be a more important source of the apparent decline in the impact of our bilateral aid programs than the form that the programs take.

III. The Proposal for Price Stabilization

Another major theme in the Millikan-Rostow work is the proposal for a "food and fiber bank," a bank which would serve a number of functions. One such function would be to channel the hard-currency aid of the United States and Canada into the stabilization of markets which are critical to underdeveloped areas, as the market in rice is critical for Burmese development. Another would be to provide an international distribution mechanism for the wheat and cotton which the United States is prepared to offer as part of its foreign aid contribution; ready international reserves of such crops, it is felt, will give the underdeveloped countries more assurance in launching on development programs which are likely to increase their intake of such products.

American economists have understandable pangs of conscience in discussing international price stabilization schemes. Unlike other countries, the United States has no great stake in these schemes; our international balance of payments is not critically vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of a few commodities and no major segment of our economy would be impoverished beyond succor by substantial variations in

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such prices. In the light of these facts, we have resisted the demands of other countries for international stabilization agreements, arguing principle with force and seeming conviction. We have resisted, that is, in all but two cases—in the case of wheat, where we aggressively organized and supported an international stabilization agreement; and in the case of sugar, where we cooperated actively in an agreement. In both cases, the agreements legitimated and supported domestic price stabilization programs which the United States had instituted in spite of its principles.

This knowledge is a part of the psychic complex which induces some Americans to tread lightly in any critical evaluation of international stabilization agreements. They feel inhibited in pointing out, for instance, that international price stabilization schemes tend to fall under the control of the producing interests in the various countries, as represented by their national ministries of agriculture, and that such schemes easily degenerate into devices for increasing agriculture's terms of trade at the expense of industry. There is unlikely to be a stabilization scheme without a parity concept behind it. And there is unlikely to be a parity concept that is not loaded in favor of the interests which have created it.

More pervasive than this difficulty, however, is the fact that any international price stabilization scheme of the sort proposed is bound to place pressures on the nations that have not already done so, to organize their national food and fiber economies around centralized governmental institutions for import, export, and production control. Now it may be, at this stage in world history, that one is shouting into the wind when one speaks of the risks and drawbacks of such institutions; perhaps the world's agriculture is already too rigidly set in that mold for any serious possibility of modification. Yet one cannot help but resist the forces which push further and faster in this direction—and this for two reasons.

First, there is nothing reassuring in the technical performance of agricultural authorities which have administered national programs of production and sale. To be sure, there have been periods of desperate scarcity when such institutions have been the essential rationing mechanism, and periods of inflation when they have been the taxing mechanism; there have been periods of glut, too, when they have been the essential relief mechanism for impoverished farmers; but there is not much to be said for their performance when the pendulum is reasonably far from either end of the arc. In between, we have had the Gold Coast's

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uninspired performance in cocoa, Burma's fumbling on rice, the United Kingdom's dubious bacon and egg schemes, the unhappy activities of the United States on a dozen different crops, and scores of other cases.

Many of these schemes have been unfortunate not only because of their unimaginative record on the technical level but also because they have converted questions such as the sale price of an export crop from commercial issues into political ones. Whenever the centralized agency in Ghana sells her cocoa crop or the Burma board sells her rice crop, the terms of sale are a potential threat to the tenure and security of the government in power. Face-saving maneuvers pandering to domestic ignorance of world market conditions become as much a part of the process of crop disposal as shopping for the highest price. When market conditions demand it, the process of adjustment cannot easily be forced back upon the growers, even when the adjustment is necessary in the interests of the exporting country itself.

In pointing out these difficulties, we must not lose sight of the fact that the problem of unstable export revenues still remains to bedevil the developmental plans of many backward nations. We owe the authors a debt for calling attention to the problem once again. But surely a constructive proposal should be formulated in the light of the relevant experience. And there is little in the experience of national or international agricultural price-stabilization schemes to suggest that the authors' proposals would cure more problems than they would create.

IV. Some Other Proposals

The Millikan-Rostow work grew over a period of a year or two from a brief, provocative memorandum to a 170-page book. In the process, it inevitably picked up some supplementary notions only loosely related to the main themes. One of these is a discussion of the problem of channeling the generosity of the American people, so evident in their wholehearted support of private foreign aid programs, to a tangible support of public foreign aid funds. This leads them to speculate whether some Americans might be willing to buy Treasury-guaranteed small-denomination bonds which presumably would provide United States contributions to foreign economic development. The bonds might even be given "equity features" by tieing their rate of return to an index of national output in borrowing countries.

The objective of the proposal is beyond criticism, but the suggestion can only be described as pixyish. An issue with the risks running one way—the holder to get no less than Treasury yields, whatever the out-

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come—is difficult to envisage. The keying of return to an index of national output, in a world where changes in national output are often coupled with a reduction in the capacity to repay international obligations, seems beyond the bounds of serious consideration.

However, the authors have pinned no significant portion of their argument on the feasibility of the device. It may be more fruitful to turn to some of their more serious proposals. One of these is a proposal for the wider use of private technical assistance contracts in lieu of direct investment. Such contracts, of course, have been used in a number of cases. But their limitations and their risks need to be more thoroughly understood before they can be seriously offered as a significant element in a program for underdeveloped areas.

For one thing, contracts of this sort have been used most successfully in situations where the United States party is principally in the business of selling technical advice rather than in the business of making goods. This kind of arrangement is possible, therefore, in such activities as dam-building, refinery construction, and a few other major areas. But in activities where the necessary technical assistance is available only from existing manufacturers of the end-products concerned, their potential use is much more limited. For manufacturers are understandably reluctant to enter into the relatively unrewarding business of releasing their scarce technicians for tours of duty in foreign countries unless special inducements and safeguards can be offered. Therefore, although contracts with manufacturers do occur from time to time, they are likely or possible chiefly under limited circumstances: in cases in which the manufacturer concerned is allowed to acquire a direct interest in the plant receiving the technical assistance; and in cases in which the plant so benefited accepts limitations on the market in which it is to sell the product manufactured with such foreign help. Once conditions of this sort are imposed, of course, the question whether the recipient nation is in fact benefiting from the technical assistance beyond the very short run is no longer self-evident. These are issues, therefore, which need a thorough exploration before private technical assistance agreements can be seriously suggested as a substantial plank in a program of economic development.

This brings us to another point—this time a point of omission. There are limits, of course, to the ground that a slim book on foreign aid policy can cover. But the authors have managed to range widely within these limits; in the 170 pages of their work, they touch on almost every aspect of the problem of foreign economic development that lends itself to

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international action. Because the coverage of the book is so broad, the omission of one set of problems is all the more evident—the question of private restraints on the manufacture and sale of goods and services important for economic development.

This is a touchy subject. There are good grounds for arguing that it is better left alone because the disclosure of some few objectionable arrangements prejudicial to the underdeveloped countries can promptly be parlayed by propagandists into exaggerated and unfounded claims of "capitalist exploitation" and "Western imperialism." Yet one wonders if the current United States position on the subject is very wise or very tenable. For the United States position, in its briefest form, is this: that although restrictive business practices are harmful to international trade and living standards, the time is not ripe for international action on the subject; that an international agreement could only be reached at some common level well below current United States standards; and that such an agreement could easily be perverted into an instrument for justifying governmental cartels and for unfairly criticizing United States industry.

These may be legitimate worries, but one wonders how they will be interpreted by the suspicious statesmen of the underdeveloped areas; from their viewpoint, arguments of this sort may seem to justify every nascent suspicion about "capitalist exploitation." What is more, those who have read the British Monopoly Commission's recent report on the supply and export of electrical machinery, or its interesting reports on the supply and export of copper and of rubber tires, could not fail to speculate about the effects of export cartels upon the terms of trade of the underdeveloped areas; this may still be a very real problem, no less important than many which *A Proposal* considers. The authors might have performed a service, in view of the breadth of the frame which they gave to their book, if they had considered whether the United States should support new international measures in this field.

As this is written, one senses a clear shift in public reactions toward foreign aid. To the average Congressman, the foreign aid budget is always a logical target, no less so in 1957 than in any other year. Yet the heartening events of this year have been the growing public and Congressional recognition that the two basic themes of the Millikan-Rostow book may be valid, after all: that a significant portion of our aid must be placed on a long-term programing basis; and that such a portion should be administered through international institutions. Few people would gainsay the authors' claim to a modest share of the credit for

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effecting this shift in sentiment, based on the highly articulate defense of the thesis in their timely book.

This is perhaps the chief claim of *A Proposal* to a significant position in current foreign policy writings. A reviewer determined to judge it as a reasoned probing of all of the critical issues of foreign policy may conceivably score a few points. But its principal tenets survive and it continues to represent a skilled adventure in political advocacy. And it seems likely, after all, that this is what it was intended to be.

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AMERICA AND AFRICA

By JAMES S. COLEMAN

Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1956, 134 pp. $2.75.

DURING the past few years developments in Africa, and particularly the issue of future Afro-American relations, have become fashionable topics for speculation, exhortation, and policy prescription. John Gunther has produced an *Inside Africa*; in two hour-long programs Edward R. Murrow has brought the Dark Continent into the homes of millions of American televiewers; and *Life, Time*, the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and other national news publications have given increased space to African events. The area has been visited, and its problems publicly appraised, by both Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Vice President Nixon. On the Congressional side two special reports on Africa have recently appeared, one by Representative Frances P. Bolton of the House Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, and another by the staff of a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. In the American academic world there have been four special survey conferences on Africa (Princeton and Chicago 1954, Washington 1955, and Philadelphia 1956). New area programs and special courses on Africa are being inaugurated at several universities, and the formation of a Society of American Africanists, which would publish a scholarly journal on African topics, is being considered. When one contemplates the recency and magnitude of these developments, it would seem that the word "American" should be substituted for "African" in the cliché, "African Awakening."

Given this ferment in thought and interest, and considering his deep personal concern over the future relation of the United States to the underdeveloped and uncommitted world, it is not surprising that Mr. Chester Bowles has undertaken to appraise the challenge that Africa poses to America. In this small volume, which the publishers rightly claim to be the first to deal primarily with America's relation to Africa, Mr. Bowles vigorously criticizes the negativism of past American policy and proposes what he feels to be a new and more positive approach. He commences his argument by quoting the discordant "voices of Africa"—voices of the embittered African nationalist and the fearful white settler, the colonial administrator and the mis-

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sionary, as well as the ubiquitous Indian merchant. With great skill he dramatizes the sharp conflicts in motivation, aspiration, and interest among the actors, and the deep cleavages and disunities which characterize the peoples of that vast continent. The voices he includes are indeed authentic, and no important voice is omitted, unless it be that of the inarticulate bush peasant, who in the long run may be the final arbiter.

In another chapter, also largely descriptive, Mr. Bowles briefly, but quite fairly and accurately, surveys the response of the colonial powers to the challenge which immediately confronts them and, of course, ultimately the whole Western world. Here again, with considerable emphasis, he underscores the complexity and diversity of the range of problems and relationships in the different areas. He is realistic about the magnitude of the task of orderly colonial liquidation, the hazards of early independence, and the intractability of such situations as prevail in the plural societies of Kenya, the Central African Federation, and the Union of South Africa. He places credit and blame where most Western liberals would put them. Some of his observations and descriptions might well have been qualified or amplified, but given the brevity and general structure of the book, his highly generalized appraisal of colonial policies is unexceptionable. It is rather in his evaluation of what he calls "The Scope of the Challenge" and in his prescription of "An American Approach to Africa" that a reviewer finds an array of assumptions, propositions, and arguments requiring more detailed comment.

The future of Africa, Mr. Bowles affirms, is being shaped and will be determined by three factors: (a) African nationalism, which will inevitably and everywhere triumph in the end; (b) the indispensability of African raw materials to the Western world; and (c) the potentiality of the Communist alternative, particularly as a result of the new Soviet offensive launched in the underdeveloped and colonial areas in 1955. These forces and factors at once define the scope of Africa's challenge to us and dictate the nature of our response. The latter should be a policy "that serves our interests effectively and within our traditions."

What specifically should be the elements of such a policy? Put most briefly, he urges that we abandon our alleged policy of negativism, silence, and inaction and adopt a *positive* new policy, the main elements of which would be: (1) American support of African aspirations in the United Nations by making full use of the legal powers

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of the Trusteeship Council, and by using our influence to expand its role (e.g., the appointment of resident United Nations observers in all trust territories); and (2) a proposal by the United States (with Britain, if possible) of a Charter for Africa based on the five key principles suggested by the late Cordell Hull as a guide to the colonial powers in their postwar relationships with the colonial peoples of Africa and Asia—namely: (a) political, economic, social, and educational advancement; (b) maximum "Africanization" of positions in local government; (c) the progressive extension of such measures of self-government as the African peoples are capable of maintaining in the light of their various stages of development toward independence; (d) the fixing of dates "on which the colonial peoples would be accorded the status of full independence"; and (e) the development, organization, and marketing of natural resources "in the interests of the people concerned and of the world as a whole" (pp. 109-10).

Mr. Bowles' analysis and policy prescriptions are not unlike those set forth by Professor Hans Morgenthau in an article entitled "United States Policy Toward Africa."[1] Both men feel that we must dramatize our departure from past policy by declarations and deeds "of a spectacular nature." Except for the principle of scheduled independence, however, there is little essential difference between Mr. Bowles' proposed Charter for Africa and the principles set forth in the Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories (Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter), to which we and all African colonial powers are already committed. Presumably the chief virtue of the new Charter, unilaterally declared, would be that we could dramatize a new policy era and thus recapture the initiative we have lost.

The first observation prompted by Mr. Bowles' critique relates to his assertion that, as of May 1956, "America still seems to be adrift without a policy and without even a clear objective" (p. 131). This, of course, raises the question of whether in fact America has had an African policy. Here one would have to distinguish between official declarations of policy and specific courses of action. As for the former, it is unfortunate that Mr. Bowles declined to discuss, let alone mention, the specific declarations of policy regarding Africa made successively by Assistant Secretaries of State in 1950, 1953, and April 1956. In each of these one finds a frank exposition of the American policy dilemma regarding Africa and of the formula proposed to meet that dilemma.

For example, in 1953 Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade

[1] In Calvin W. Stillman, ed., *Africa in the Modern World*, Chicago, 1955, pp. 317-25.

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very forthrightly declared: (1) that we must "be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength and stability of certain European nations . . . [which] will probably represent, for many years to come, the major source of free-world defensive power outside our own" and that we "cannot ignore the legitimate economic interests which European nations possess" in their African territories; (2) that "there is such a thing as premature independence," but that there should be "orderly evolution," a term which "cannot be translated to mean indefinite prolongation of colonial rule"; and (3) that "by every word and action of our Government, we should make it clear that the old colonial relationship is dead and that it will stay dead," but that the State Department will refuse to be governed by abstract principles alone in its attitude to any colonial problem.[2]

The statement of Mr. George V. Allen in 1956 was, in effect, but a reaffirmation of these principles; e.g., "Because of our origins and traditions we are basically in sympathy with the desire for independence and nationhood of the emerging states, but we are also friends and allies of the powers who must help to share this new status. This places us in a position from which we hope and believe our influence can be exerted to make the transformation of Africa a process of orderly evolution and not one of violent revolution." He concluded that "A responsible foreign policy toward Africa requires of the United States a deep understanding of the aspirations and problems of the individual African countries both in their relationship with the European powers and in their urge toward self-determination so that we may lend our good offices and assistance in promoting an orderly progress toward independence and nationhood."[3]

We have then had an African policy, in the sense of recurrent declarations of general principles. There has not been the complete silence suggested by Mr. Bowles. Apart from this, in what respects do his analysis and proposals differ from established policy pronouncements? It would have been more instructive if he had pointed these out himself. With certain important exceptions to be noted later, it would seem that taken as a whole there is not much difference. The points of identity and divergence can be analyzed under the following headings: (1) the degree of respect for the European presence in Africa,

[2] Henry A. Byroade, "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," *Department of State Bulletin*, XXIX, No. 751 (November 16, 1953), pp. 657, 660.

[3] George V. Allen, "United States Foreign Policy in Africa," *ibid.*, XXXIV, No. 879 (April 30, 1956), pp. 718, 716.

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(2) the tempo of progress toward independence, and (3) the manner of affirmation of our traditional anti-colonialism.

There are several compelling reasons advanced by Mr. Bowles for a more positive American policy toward Africa. One is that by "approaching Africa through the capitals of the European colonial powers, we have, in the eyes of many Africans, assumed the reactionary coloration of these capitals" (p. 57). This stigma has been deepened, he believes, by the manner in which we have, with certain recent exceptions, tended consistently to support the colonial powers in the Trusteeship Council on all major issues. Yet, he argues, day by day the control of Africa's destiny is passing into the hands of groups "whose opinions and aspirations we have largely ignored" (p. 99). The pace of events in Africa, he affirms, can no longer be controlled by our European allies, but with "wise policies" we may be able to exert a determinative influence over developments. By reaffirming our belief in the rights of revolution and self-determination we will demonstrate to the African peoples that we are true to our anti-colonial tradition. But, he warns, "*we had better mean what we say*" (p. 133).

As the most powerful nation in the world, claiming to lead a "global coalition for freedom," America cannot, he feels, declare itself "to be a nonparticipant in the affairs of a continent boiling with change, without abdicating its position of leadership" (pp. 96-97). Moral considerations and the intense aspirations of colonial peoples are new and decisive elements in calculations of national power which even a narrow view of *Realpolitik* should recognize. Furthermore, our membership in NATO, which assumes that the Atlantic Nations face common problems, gives us, he declares, the "right not only to speak, but to act on African problems" (p. 129). Indeed, he argues that our basic objectives of national security (and, presumably, also those of our NATO allies) closely coincide with the objectives of responsible African nationalists. Finally, our alleged policy of benevolent non-involvement has pleased nobody—to the colonial powers we are "blundering sentimentalists" and to African nationalists we are "timid hypocrites."

There can be little question that Mr. Bowles presents a very persuasive case for a dramatic new policy. But just how far is he prepared to go? He makes several qualifying statements which could be construed as serious limitations to the course he proposes. He admits that exhortation has strict limits to its effectiveness. Thus, "Pressure on the European powers that drives them to discard United Nations machinery or that arouses right-wing fears of world government, however hollow,

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will not further the objectives which we are striving to achieve" (p. 122). Again, "pompous lectures to our European friends by American leaders, regardless of the applause they may win from the Africans, are more likely to set back the cause of orderly and responsible self-government than to advance it" (p. 128). Indeed, he grants that the area of American freedom to act independently is very small—"whatever we accomplish in the next decade will be largely within the context of continuing European authority or under its direct auspices" (*ibid.*). "The African is the underdog. But he is not always right. Nor is the colonial power always wrong" (p. 122). Clearly, if his own reservations and strictures were observed, the "positive" new policy of independent action he advocates would hardly be one which could compete with that of the Soviet Union in any contest for popularity among African nationalists.

As regards the issue of the tempo of progress toward African independence, Mr. Bowles is not an advocate of "immediate" independence for all territories. He thus recognizes and accepts Mr. Byroade's 1953 proposition that "there is such a thing as premature independence." Indeed, he states at the outset that those who argue that "all of Africa's colonies and protectorates can suddenly cut their ties with Europe and emerge as democratic, viable states, are certainly in error" (p. 4). He frankly accepts the fact that "most of Africa at this stage is less well equipped for self-rule than the Asians were after the war" (p. 45), that the obstacles to successful self-government are formidable, and that the objective of self-determination is "vigorously sought or even understood" by at most no more than a large minority. Thus he, like Assistant Secretaries of State Byroade and Allen, is an "orderly evolutionist." The only really new policy line he advocates, and this with great conviction, is that of scheduled independence. He believes that "Secretary Hull's fourth point, the setting of individual target dates for self-determination, offers the United States perhaps its best opportunity to encourage African support for an orderly, long-range program of colonial liquidation both inside the Trusteeship Council and in the non-self-governing areas" (p. 117).

Drawing upon the experience of the Philippines and Somaliland under Italian Trusteeship, he argues that despite the risks involved in a target-date system, it produces a psychological effect on both colonial peoples and administrators which inspires confidence and prevents nationalist extremism. He agrees that the schedule should be adjustable in the light of experience, and that the first step should be intermediate

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target dates which, like five-year economic plans, would aim at intermediate objectives progressively leading to full self-determination. How applicable, effective, and acceptable this proposal would be will be discussed at a later point. Suffice it to state that all African colonial powers have categorically rejected the target-date system.

On the third issue—that of the manner in and degree to which the United States should affirm its traditional belief in the right of independence of the African peoples—Mr. Bowles is emphatically on the side of a dramatic affirmation of our support of "full independence," which is the fourth point in Secretary Hull's list. Independent statehood, of course, has been the terminal form of political status implicit in the classical concept of self-determination. Apart from supporting the principle of self-determination of all peoples in the abstract, however, our actual policy as regards the specific application of the principle in Africa has been rather pragmatic. In his 1953 statement, Mr. Byroade stressed that the State Department refused to be governed by abstract principles alone. In a 1956 policy statement regarding North Africa, our Ambassador to France pointed out that while the people of the United States are anti-colonialist by tradition, they recognized that self-determination (defined as "freedom of choice") could take many forms and did not necessarily require a rupture between former imperial powers and colonial peoples. This is the fundamental difference—the support by Mr. Bowles of the classical concept of "full independence" for all territories, and the State Department policy of accepting and supporting various forms of "self-determination."

At the highest level of generalization, the unilateral declaration of a broad set of principles, such as those of the late Secretary Hull, might well serve as an American policy for the continent of Africa. Indeed, if the crux of Africa's challenge to America is the inevitability of the *ultimate* triumph of African nationalism everywhere—a proposition which cannot be accepted uncritically—then a pan-African policy is in order. Yet, as Mr. Bowles vividly points out, Africa is a continent of tremendous diversity. Clearly, therefore, there must be a hierarchy of policies—a continental policy embodying general principles, yes, but also regional or area, and even country, policies adapted to the very different situations and policy problems which patently exist. And the general principles embodied in the continental policy must be both flexible and adaptable. They must not leave us a prisoner of abstractions.

While Mr. Bowles recognizes—indeed, emphasizes—the many contrasting situations found in contemporary Africa, he has very little to

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say regarding specific policies for what might be called the different "policy areas." A suggested grouping of African countries and territories into policy areas is set forth in Table 1.

TABLE 1

POLICY AREAS IN AFRICA

AREA	POPULATION
I. *Independent Africa*	
A. *Arab-Muslim Bloc*	
(Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Somaliland*)	41,800,000
B. *Tropical Africa*	
(Ethiopia, Nigeria,* Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone,* Uganda*)	52,500,000
C. *Union of South Africa*	11,500,000
	105,800,000
II. *Colonial Africa*	
A. *Multi-Racial Territories*	
(Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Kenya)	12,100,000
B. *Trust Territories*	
(French Togoland, French and British Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika)	17,000,000
C. *Euro-African Territories*	
(Algeria, French West and Equatorial Africa, Portuguese Provinces, Belgian Congo)	56,300,000
D. *Special Territories*	
(High Commission Territories, French and British Somaliland, Spanish Africa, Gambia)	2,160,000
	87,560,000
Total	193,360,000

* Approaching or on the threshold of self-government.

He does, of course, make the important distinction between Independent Africa and Colonial Africa. For policy purposes, it is possible to include in the former category such dependent territories as Somaliland under Italian Trusteeship, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Uganda, each of which is approaching or is on the threshold of full independence according to a timetable of its own. In the case of Somaliland, the timetable was set by the United Nations, and in the case of the other three, it is being determined by negotiations between the United

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Kingdom and the African nationalists of the territories concerned. This first category constitutes over one-half of the population of the continent, and here our immediate policy problems are and will be of a rather different order than those in the four categories of Colonial Africa. A reaffirmation of Secretary Hull's five principles would have little direct relevance except to demonstrate to the peoples of Independent Africa that we support the liberation of their brothers in Colonial Africa.

American policy toward the independent countries in the Arab-Muslim Bloc and in Tropical Africa has not been completely negative. In the case of Libya and Somaliland, the American government was instrumental in the setting of target dates for their independence. American aid has been and will continue to be the main basis for Libya's independent existence. American relations with Liberia and Ethiopia are very close, both being recipients of comparatively heavy investments, economic aid, and technical assistance throughout the postwar period.

Sudanese and Ghana nationalists won their independence unaided. In each case our government took reasonably early action to indicate its positive support for the new African leadership. In 1954, three years before Ghana's independence, the United States Congress unanimously passed a resolution congratulating Ghana (then the Gold Coast) and Nigeria on their progress toward self-government. In 1953, again three years before Sudanese independence, a United States Liaison Officer was appointed to Khartoum; the United States took the initiative in requesting a special session of the Security Council to consider the admission of Sudan to the United Nations; and it was among the first of the big powers to appoint an Ambassador to the new Republic of the Sudan. In retrospect, it is doubtful if any policy other than "benevolent non-involvement" would have altered the outcome, and there is little evidence of a feeling among the Sudanese or Ghanians that we were allied with Britain in delaying their liberation.

It has been in our relations with Morocco and Tunisia, however, that the United States has most openly and avowedly supported an imperial power in its struggle with African nationalists. As our Ambassador to France pointed out in April 1956, we have "consistently supported France when North African subjects have been discussed in the United Nations." Moreover, he repudiated the pro-nationalist activities of private American citizens in the North African area. While throughout we have stressed that our support was on behalf of "liberal and mutually

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acceptable" solutions, nevertheless we favored the "closest possible interdependence between France and Morocco and Tunisia," considering such a relationship "one of the bulwarks of the free world."[4] Here strategic considerations have obviously been paramount. It is in this policy area that Mr. Bowles' criticism of our identification with imperialism is most to the point. The critical question, of course, is whether our pro-French policy during the liberation struggle has alienated the present African leadership in the two countries or otherwise made relations difficult. Evidence in the year since independence tends to suggest that it has not, and that given substantial economic aid, which has now been proffered, our pre-independence policy has not compromised our position.

In turning to the Union of South Africa, Mr. Bowles offers no solution and makes no policy proposals. He thus appears to accept the argument that under the present regime there is little prospect for a rational solution, and that, in any event, it is a situation about which we can officially do very little, if, indeed, anything. The strictures of the principle of domestic jurisdiction—a principle our own government would be the first to invoke, were there any external interference in the American South—render us impotent. Moreover, South Africa is strategically important. It is the supplier of some of the most critical raw materials, including uranium in particular; and, besides, its present government is violently anti-Communist. In order to remain persona grata, our official representatives in the Union must apparently keep silent. Our position on South African issues in the United Nations has been cautious and restrained. Thus our influence is limited to the activities of private American individuals and groups—which are by no means insignificant—and to the possible effect our espousal of higher ideals—like a Charter for Africa—might have.

But it is really what we can and should do about Colonial Africa that primarily concerns Mr. Bowles. Here again, however, there are great differences among the areas involved which he admirably describes yet tends to ignore in his policy prescriptions. There are at least four "policy areas" in Colonial Africa, differentiated by at least four factors: (1) the racial composition of the population, (2) legal status under international law, (3) the capacity for independent existence in terms of size and economic resources, and (4) the present political goals being pursued by the imperial powers concerned. These

[4] C. Douglas Dillon, "Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa," *ibid.*, XXXIV, No. 875 (April 2, 1956), pp. 553, 554-55.

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and other variables not only tend to limit the area of American freedom to pursue a policy but also determine the channels available for its expression. While the continental formula of scheduled and full independence for all African peoples (Hull's fourth point) may serve the laudable purpose of dramatizing and symbolizing our independence from European colonialism and our belief in the right to freedom for all peoples, it gives us little guidance in formulating concrete policy positions on the vastly different situations we confront.

It is in the multi-racial territories of Central Africa, where white settlers are already almost completely entrenched in power, that we face one of our greatest policy problems. The situation is most acute in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Our government has strongly supported the Federation; indeed, as a result of the recent exchange of ministers between Salisbury and Washington, we have undoubtedly helped to speed up the movement for dominion status under white domination. Once this is achieved, not only will we find ourselves in the same position of enforced silence and impotence as in the Union of South Africa, but the liberalizing influence of the British Colonial Office will be extinguished. Dominion status (that is, independence) now, or in the foreseeable future, is the last thing most of the Africans in this area desire.

Apart from painting an accurate picture of the situation in this area, and expressing the hope that a "true multi-racial partnership" will be forged, Mr. Bowles has no specific policy recommendations. The Hull formula of scheduled and full independence is patently inappropriate, for that is precisely what the white minority desires most urgently. Thus it could be argued that the most liberal policy the United States could pursue in this area, as well as in Kenya, would be to support the maintenance of Colonial Office control—that is, imperial rule—until such time as the African community is strong enough to hold its own.

It is in the trust territories that Mr. Bowles rightly believes we can exert our strongest influence and most freely espouse the Hull principles. Actually, our representative on the Trusteeship Council, Mr. Mason Sears, has already announced that "all five points advocated by Mr. Hull are for all practical purposes now part of U.S. policy within the Trusteeship System."[5] Even here, however, there is a danger of becoming a prisoner of abstract principles. This Mr. Bowles recognizes in his realistic observation that separate independence for each

[5] *The Reporter*, September 20, 1956, p. 7.

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trust territory is not necessarily the only solution—union with a rapidly developing contiguous colony is possible and may be desirable.

The remaining two policy areas—French, Belgian, and Portuguese Africa, and certain special territories—have at least two-thirds of the population of Colonial Africa. These are the areas of doubt, not only because we know so little about them—and they about us—but also because their future political orientation is quite uncertain. Even if we accept Mr. Bowles' argument that the peoples in these areas will in time demand "full independence," there remains the problem of our policy toward transitional political arrangements.

The French, Belgians, and Portuguese have similar policies in that they are seeking to establish some form of permanent political association between the metropole and the overseas territories. They differ in that both the Belgians and French (at least for their Trust Territories) do not completely exclude the idea of ultimate independence, whereas the Portuguese consider Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea as provinces of Portugal. What should the American attitude be toward such policies? Again, Mr. Bowles offers only the principle of scheduled independence.

In contemplating the development of new political systems in this policy area, it could be argued that at this stage a non-committal and pragmatic policy regarding the precise form that self-determination should take would not be inimical to the long-range interests of either the United States or the African peoples concerned. The size of some of the territories, the degree of existing economic integration and interdependence between certain of the territories and the metropolitan countries, and the possibilities and potentialities of larger-scale Euro-African political systems, *if freely agreed to by the African peoples*, should not be ruled out by the doctrinaire espousal of "full independence." Indeed, it could be argued that it would be out of character for us to do so. Despite our revolutionary anti-colonial tradition, we have devised a variety of new relationships with our own former colonies ranging from full independence (Philippines) through commonwealth status (Puerto Rico), locally self-governing dependencies (Virgin Islands), and complete assimilation (presumably the destiny of Hawaii and Alaska). Thus, while we might openly and dramatically advocate early "self-determination" for all African peoples, and vigorously insist that such self-determination be absolutely free and unambiguous, it would be pre-judging the issue and patently inconsistent with our own tradition to demand "full independence" for all peoples. This may be

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playing with words, but it is a point which Mr. Bowles might well have left unambiguous.

A strong case can be made for the proposition that political arrangements other than full independence are never a complete fulfillment of the principle of self-determination, not only because such arrangements tend to be unilaterally determined and imposed by the imperial powers, but also because they fail to satisfy that crucial psychological craving to have complete mastery over one's destiny. On the other hand, *if* a political arrangement other than "full independence" was clearly the result of an *absolutely free choice* by formerly dependent peoples (e.g., Malta or Puerto Rico), is there any reason why in Africa such alternative political formulas should not be accepted as satisfying the principle? Indeed, in the discussion of the "factors question," the Fourth Committee of the United Nations has in effect accepted such alternatives (i.e., "the free association on a federal or unitary basis of a territory on equal status with the metropolitan country"). Thus, for example, Gambia may go the way of Malta, and French Somaliland may follow Martinique and Guadeloupe. For their own protection, Swaziland and Basutoland may remain indefinitely in a semi-dependent status under the protective power of Britain. Moreover, the possibility of a genuine and mutually agreeable Belgo-Congolese, or Franco-African, federation should not be completely ruled out. Admittedly, past French behavior inspires little hope. But at the moment the two leading "nationalists" of French West Africa (M. Leopold Senghor and M. Felix Houphouet-Boigny) tend to favor some form of permanent association with France, on the basis, of course, of full equality. Autonomist sentiment may grow and ultimately triumph—everything depends upon the vision and liberality of French and Belgian statesmanship. After the ordeals of Indo-China and North Africa, France may finally have learned a lesson.

It is believed that in the same way that he has accepted the idea of the union of trust territories with neighboring progressive colonies, Mr. Bowles would agree that alternatives to full independence are not out of the question, provided the African peoples concerned genuinely agree. If so, Mr. Hull's fourth point would require certain amendments.

Although for policy purposes Mr. Bowles tends to approach Africa as an undifferentiated continent to which a simple formula, such as the Hull principles, can be indiscriminately applied, nevertheless he makes several specific policy recommendations that are practicable and have immediate relevance. On the official side he advocates, among

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other things (1) a greatly expanded program of economic aid and technical assistance, particularly to Independent Africa; (2) rapid expansion and improvements in the quality of our official representation throughout Africa; and (3) a reorientation and expansion of our information programs with special emphasis upon establishing contact with the African masses; and (4) the upgrading of the African section in the State Department.

On all these counts there is clear evidence that changes along the lines recommended by Mr. Bowles are being made, and in most instances were in fact under way at the time he wrote his book. There can be little question that his criticisms of the extremely low priority accorded African affairs by officialdom in the past are echoed by most informed persons on Africa. He, like Mr. Mason Sears, believes that the most urgent fact we confront is the establishment of closer direct contact with the African peoples of Colonial Africa. But he tends to underestimate the very real limitations to such an endeavor, particularly in the multi-racial areas of East and Central Africa and in Belgian and Portuguese (and, to a lesser extent, French) territories. In Central Africa there is already the example of the official in the Indian High Commissioner's Office who departed rather suddenly, presumably because of too close contact with Africans. While the tendency in the past has been to be overly deferential and cautious, there are grave risks in flirting officially with persons considered to be seditious by the government to which one is accredited. And in many of the areas concerned most articulate Africans are considered just that. International law compels us to respect the existing legal order, even though privately we may oppose it; and diplomatic protocol imposes its own strict code of accepted behavior.

One crucial question is whether our official representatives in Colonial Africa are in fact fully utilizing their very limited area of freedom. If they are doing so, it would hardly help to publicize the fact. In any event, our USIA libraries throughout this vast area have become havens of multi-racialism. The allegedly pro-African activities of USIA representatives in Kenya have become the target of very bitter attacks by some of the white settlers of that colony. Our Consul-General in Salisbury has been more outspoken in his public comments than most foreign representatives (e.g., "I must confess I have not found many Europeans in Rhodesia who appear to be giving much serious thought as to how, as a practical matter, to assure the continued cooperation of responsible Rhodesian African leaders in the times and

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trials that lie ahead"[6]). Unfortunately, such constructive frankness tends to be nullified by conflicting observations like that contained in the recent official report of Representative Frances P. Bolton: "The Europeans are striving to make . . . [the ideal of partnership] work, and the African people are wholeheartedly determined to make themselves worthy of the part they are to play." Actually, very few Europeans in the Federation genuinely believe in any form of racial partnership which would command the loyalty and support of politically conscious Africans; and most of the latter are not reconciled either to protracted white domination or to the permanent denial of full African self-government which the present political formula implies.

A second critical point is whether, if direct contacts are in fact being made with the African community, they are with the *effective*, as distinguished from the European-favored, leaders of the African people. In most territories of Colonial Africa there tend to be two sets of African leaders, one comprising the so-called "moderate and responsible" Africans—who are tolerated or even supported by the European governments—and the other consisting of the nationalists of varying shades of radicalism who command far wider acceptance among the African peoples and are the type that elsewhere has ultimately triumphed. The problem of leadership identification is further complicated not only because there is mobility between the two sets, but also because the dynamic processes of social change have resulted in considerable fluidity and instability in leadership ranks. A leader today may not be one tomorrow. In any event, whether out of ignorance regarding the real state of forces operative within the African community, or out of deference to colonial governments, we have tended to make our contacts with, and give our official leadership grants to, the officially sanctioned African leaders—namely, those tending to support imperial authority or white leadership. Whether the end result will improve or worsen the American position is debatable.

Some of the crippling limitations to establishing contact with the emergent leadership of Colonial Africa might be overcome by a collaborative effort on the part of American universities and colleges, private foundations, and possibly the government, to provide greater opportunities for qualified Africans to pursue higher education in the United States. Admittedly, there would be many problems in carrying out such a program. Official involvement in student selection would have to be avoided. The long-expected "tidal wave" of American stu-

[6] *East Africa and Rhodesia*, December 22, 1955, p. 591.

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dents is already beginning to overtax existing university facilities. Moreover, few Africans in Colonial Africa have the financial resources to pay for their transportation to this country; and it is frequently difficult or impossible for them to obtain passports, not to mention dollars. Nevertheless, if ways and means could be found, such a project would not only accelerate the development of new leadership groups, but would also promote closer personal ties and sentiments between those groups and the American people.

The disabilities we encounter at the official level are partially compensated by the growing activities of private American individuals and associations. For example, two African nationalist leaders—Tom Mboya of Kenya and Julius K. Nyerere of Tanganyika—have recently visited the United States as guests of such associations, whereas it might have been considered impolitic for our government to play host. The two most active of these associations are the American Committee on Africa, and the Institute of African-American Relations (of which Mr. Bowles is a member of the Board of Directors). American religious groups and trade unions have also played an important role. So long as such agencies exercise a measure of discretion and judgment, and so long as our government does not repudiate their activities—as has happened in the case of private Americans in North Africa—such unofficial approaches to the African people can help a great deal to offset indifference and inaction at the official level.

In fact, it is in the unofficial realm that Mr. Bowles feels much more could and should be done. He rightly points out that the record of American business interests in Africa has been good. The most outstanding example of the possibilities of the constructive role which can be played by such interests is seen in the varied activities of the Rhodesian Selection Trust (American Metals Company) in breaking the industrial color bar and otherwise fostering the principle of partnership in Central Africa. American foundations have already made contributions and are currently contemplating new programs of assistance on a scale not generally recognized. However, Mr. Bowles' statement that the "Russians are now outdistancing us," at least in the field of African studies, is rather exaggerated and unnecessarily alarmist. If the papers read by two of Russia's Africanists at a recent international anthropological meeting are an index of the state of Soviet knowledge regarding African realities, we need not be too disturbed, at least at this stage.

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It is clear that in writing this volume Mr. Bowles did not intend to offer new facts or original analysis; rather, his purpose was mainly hortative—to alert the American people to the danger of allowing emergent Africa to be lost to the Western world. Considering the neutralist orientation of most African leaders, however, the possessive implications of such a concern could be strongly resented. The book is not, nor was it meant to be, a work of scholarship. It is primarily a call to action. Here one does not find a cold and objective calculation of policy alternatives based upon immediate imperatives of national interest, but the exhortations of a distinguished American liberal eloquently pleading for a long view over the long haul. The book's real virtue is its reminder to the American people, as well as to European leaders and African nationalists, that despite our past neglect of Africa, a belief in freedom and human dignity for all peoples is a fundamental strand in the American tradition, and that leaders of the stature of Mr. Bowles are determined that the United States will use its influence to ensure the realization of these ideals in Africa, as elsewhere.

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THE MILITARY AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

By RICHARD D. CHALLENER

Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations*, New York, King's Crown Press, 1956, 547 pp. $8.75.

I

IT would be difficult to find a social scientist who is not aware of the impact of military and strategic problems upon all phases of contemporary American life and who does not realize the need for further studies in the many areas of public policy affected by military factors. In recent years, to be sure, scholars have responded to this need, but it is an undeniable fact that much of the work in the field of civil-military relations has so far been expended upon topics which date from the period of World War II and beyond. Moreover, we are not even two decades removed from the time when social scientists, with but few exceptions, spurned the subject of military policy. The gaps in our knowledge of the historical development of civil-military relations are, therefore, great; the scholar concerned with current problems simply does not have available the basic monographs which would provide historical perspective. For the student of American policy, for instance, it is relatively easy to find detailed studies which demonstrate the impact of military logic upon Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime policies in the Far East or show the influence of the ABC talks of early 1941 upon the diplomatic crisis with Japan; but it is impossible to find comparable histories which discuss the role of naval strategists in shaping Theodore Roosevelt's Far Eastern policies or consider the function of the General Board of the Navy in any of the major diplomatic crises of the Wilson years.

The obvious need to fill these gaps in historical knowledge serves as the primary justification for Alfred Vagts' massive study of the role of the military in the formulation and conduct of international relations. He has produced 547 double-column, extra large pages which cover every conceivable ramification of the problem from the nineteenth century to the present. Dr. Vagts contends that contemporary historians have so completely neglected the materials of military his-

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tory that he was compelled to do most of the basic spadework himself and that he was, therefore, forced to produce a lengthy compilation of the available evidence rather than a shorter, analytical study based upon materials already in print. The published volume, indeed, is far shorter than his original manuscript, which members of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University—for whom Dr. Vagts produced his study—edited severely.

Nonetheless, the result is a volume which, for reasons of sheer bulk alone, will deter all but the most dedicated of scholars. The compilation of data is so extensive that *Defense and Diplomacy* is a sort of Sears Roebuck catalogue of civil-military affairs on a global scale; there is something of interest in it for nearly every one, but at the same time there are pages of irrelevant merchandise. The conclusions are, on the whole, implicit rather than explicit—small, rather familiar trees hidden in a deep, almost impenetrable, and thoroughly Germanic forest of civil-military facts. Most of Dr. Vagts' examples are drawn from the pre-1914 period and, in addition, from Continental European experiences. The dearth of materials pertaining to the United States before 1941 is particularly evident. This concentration on European problems is quite understandable; memoirs, archives, and military histories of pre-1914 Europe are far more readily available. But, as Professor William T. R. Fox notes in his Foreword, "The 'normal' civil-military relationship . . . may appear to be the pre-1914 Continental pattern. Whether it is also the post-1914 Anglo-American constitutional-democratic pattern will surely be a matter for debate." Moreover, Dr. Vagts completed his manuscript in 1952, but it was not published until four years later. In the interim many significant studies, covering the same European ground which he has surveyed, have appeared—Gordon Craig's *The Politics of the German Army*, John Wheeler-Bennett's *The Nemesis of Power*, Raoul Girardet's *La Société militaire dans la France contemporaine*, to name but three.

This is not to say that the patient researcher will not find many significant historical subjects fully treated within the pages of this volume. Dr. Vagts has chosen a topical rather than a chronological plan of organization. Individual chapters deal with such pertinent subjects as general staff talks, theories of preventive war, the development of mobilization plans, the relationship of strategy and diplomacy. His treatment, therefore, makes it possible for the reader to compare, within the framework of a single chapter, the extent of the pre-1914 Franco-British military understanding with the German-Austrian ar-

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rangements, or the strategical thinking of a Moltke with that of a MacArthur.

II

Debate over the major portions of *Defense and Diplomacy* is more properly a matter for the historical journals and should not burden this review.[1] Nor would Dr. Vagts' volume merit a review in *World Politics* if its scope were entirely historical. But despite the fact that over 90 per cent of the text deals with pre-World War II materials, Dr. Vagts has something to contribute—albeit often in highly abbreviated form—on certain contemporary, and possibly timeless, problems of civil-military affairs. The justification for this review article arises from the fact that Dr. Vagts, with an unquestioned command of the historical precedents, discusses many important aspects of the problem of continuity and change in the role of the military in international relations.

Alfred Vagts, it might be remembered, has a long background of interest in military affairs and, more particularly, in the history of militarism. His *History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession*, published in 1937, depicted the sins and weaknesses of militarism, which he then defined as "the domination of the military man over the civilian, an undue predominance of military demands, an emphasis on military considerations, spirit, ideals, and scales of value." Militarism, Vagts concluded, "has meant also the imposition of heavy burdens on a people for military purposes, to the neglect of welfare and culture, and the waste of the nation's best manpower in unproductive army service."[2] *Defense and Diplomacy* also analyzes the militarism that pervaded the pre-1914 attitudes of European soldiers and sailors; it exploits the familiar theme of the conflict between the military and the civilian, ranging from their different "honor concepts" to their divergent analyses of the national interest. More-

[1] This reviewer would, for instance, like to dissent from Vagts' view that America's entry into both world wars can be considered in terms of the waging of preventive war—one of the "undeclared motivations," according to the author. Further criticism might also be directed against his easy assumption of the general revisionist approach to F.D.R.'s pre-1941 diplomacy. His general thesis is close to that of his father-in-law, the late Charles A. Beard, and includes the usual out-of-context quotations from Stimson's *On Active Service*. Vagts at least seems to believe that America fought the right war with the right enemies and engages in none of the polemics or painful moralizing of most of the revisionists. It is also open to question whether the few examples which he gives of the role of the military in pre-1917 American foreign policy do not present a misleading picture. In these matters he does seem to be guilty of carrying European stereotypes across the Atlantic.

[2] *History of Militarism*, p. 12.

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over, as a military historian, Dr. Vagts has always been especially critical of the tendency of military men to overvalue the contribution of their own specific arm or branch of the service and, out of inter-service rivalry, to fail to work together harmoniously. His other major work on a military topic, *Landing Operations*, stressed the perpetual inability of the army and navy to achieve genuine cooperation and argued mightily for unification of the services. This theme, too, pervades his latest study.

Dr. Vagts, however, has chosen certain aspects of the over-all problem of civil-military relations as crucial, and the remainder of this article will concentrate upon those issues which he regards as most relevant.

(1) *Soldiers in diplomatic posts.* Nineteenth-century liberals fondly hoped that civilians would completely replace soldiers as national representatives in foreign countries. The fact was, however, that long before the present era of total war, "the employment of military men as diplomats had been on the increase, periodically, if not generally speaking" (p. 53). With World War II the United States became fully involved in this process; President Truman, continuing the practice of Roosevelt, found it necessary to send many military officers abroad to represent American foreign policy. But to many Americans this phenomenon was still so strange that it provoked fears that a sort of creeping militarism was infusing American diplomacy. Dr. Vagts, however, contends that Truman's appointments were in large measure simply the inevitable result of an unfortunate shortage of trained civilians to fill positions that had to be filled; the military, in short, fell heir to civilian posts through civilian default. The selection of soldiers and sailors was also another clear indication of the United States' increasing involvement in the world's power struggles and the radical alteration in her own strategic position. At the outset of the Cold War—and, more particularly, at a time when her traditional self-confidence was being jarred—the United States, following the precedent of many European states, simply decided it was necessary to call upon the military for help.

Although Dr. Vagts accepts these developments as an inevitable by-product of the Cold War, he maintains that the results were, on the whole, no more successful than previous experiences of European governments. Truman's military diplomats failed to develop any special contacts in Russia, and they uncovered little information that would have been otherwise unobtainable. General Walter B. Smith, he ob-

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serves, "remained as unsuccessful in Moscow as a mere civilian." Yet Continental experience also suggests that the United States, in assigning officers to diplomatic posts, was running the risk of "the soldier's inclination to be disobedient in political assignments." And in the event of disagreements, the military are traditionally more difficult to remove or to discipline than civilian appointees.

(2) *Military conventions and general staff conversations.* The heritage of nineteenth-century liberalism, Dr. Vagts observes—and documents with abundant evidence—includes a "strong distrust, if not abhorrence, of staff conversations and military conventions." Yet even before the United States entered World War II her attitude had begun to change; American leaders began to repudiate this tradition in favor of, to use Dr. Vagts' phrase, "a good deal of executive absolutism." The reversal of the liberal heritage was completed after the war. "They [the American leaders] have thereby acted in defense of other concepts and interests of Liberalism that they consider more vital," he writes approvingly. "The guarding and preserving of such interests have come to rest more immediately than ever before in armaments and the best preparation for war. The exigencies of mid-twentieth century warfare . . . have brought on the fateful repudiation of the earlier inhibitions in the American customs of governing and to a large extent in the political psyche of America" (p. 147). Liberalism, in short, must now be safeguarded by the very methods which liberals have always abhorred.

Thus, when the Brussels Pact eventually turned into the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States, along with the other Western nations, took the unprecedented step of preparing for coalition war before the outbreak of hostilities. In another and equally striking reversal of tradition, the Western allies attempted to organize their military policy before the forces themselves were in being; the historical "norm," of course, has been for the military units to be available but not the organization to make them operate effectively. But most striking of all is the fact that the new defense arrangements have been given the widest possible publicity. Prior to World War II the liberal democracies had purposely kept any staff talks or agreements as secret as possible. The fear of adverse public reaction meant, for instance, that the Anglo-French conversations after 1906 as well as the Anglo-American talks of early 1941 had "little or no public character." In the aftermath of World War II, however, it was hoped that widespread publicity would not only impress the Soviet Union but also, and more significantly, win the

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all-important support of public opinion. The virtual revolution in the American attitude is strikingly revealed by the fact that, scarcely a decade after Roosevelt protected the public from knowledge of the ABC talks, the American people were treated to daily discussions of the problems and future of NATO.

It is abundantly clear that Dr. Vagts is particularly impressed by the leading role which military men played in the forging of these new bonds and in the revolution in American foreign policy. They were the first, he contends, to recognize that the Soviet threat was essentially a military one and demanded military countermeasures. Remembering their own experiences with coalition problems in World War II, they realized that combined staffs were the organizational minima for any future conflict and, therefore, favored a considerable abandonment of purely national planning for a future war. Many ranking American officers, according to Dr. Vagts, were willing to advocate an at least partial surrender of national sovereignty for the purpose of achieving a collective defense; as General Omar Bradley remarked in 1950, "A small bit of sovereignty is relinquished. But when I think that national pride and sovereignty are often paid for with the life and blood of soldiers, I feel that we must accept the more difficult alternative which comes with the joining of hands" (p. 150).

Dr. Vagts enthusiastically proclaims that it was the American military who, well in advance of civilian thinking, pointed out the necessity of bringing Germany into the Western alliance. It was General Eisenhower who, in 1951, provided the clearest statement of the need to take Germany into full partnership and to avoid treating Germans as barbarian auxiliaries. "Liberalism and Labor," Dr. Vagts contends, "seemed unable to bring forth the political ideology required for a re-understanding with Germany. . . . It was the soldiers who had to furnish not only the military advice but also the better part of the political-internationalist argument" (p. 161).

In the aftermath of two world wars, then, the soldiers evinced far more flexibility than is ordinarily credited to the military mind. The military were, in Dr. Vagts' opinion, often in advance of public opinion in many Western countries. And the break with their own tradition was particularly noteworthy. "For a century and a half," he concludes, "the military had been the embodiment and occasional spokesmen of extreme nationalism. Now it was they who had to set the civilians, notably the French politicians, and electorates straight. They provided not only the experts' purely military considerations for defense of the

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West but also the ideology and historical argument for Western unity" (p. 162).

(3) *Preventive war.* In the long history of disagreements between civil and military leaders, some of the most bitter disputes have arisen from the frequent tendency of soldiers and sailors to argue that war must be initiated by their own nation to forestall an enemy attack at some indefinite future date when the military situation would favor the enemy's interests. To be sure, as Dr. Vagts is careful to point out, most preventive wars have been unfought wars; despite the urging of the military men, civilian leaders have held back either because of moral scruples or because they believed that their military advisers exaggerated only one aspect of a highly complicated situation. The idea of preventive war, as Bismarck once observed, "seems indeed to break eggs out of which very dangerous chickens might emerge" (p. 290).

The United States, despite the promptings of occasional military men in recent years, has remained "faithful in temptation." In the early stages of the Cold War, some military men—and militarized civilians as well—argued the necessity of preventive war against the Soviet Union and rested their case on the grounds that the United States must act while she still possessed atomic supremacy, as well as on the generally accepted proposition that preventive action in the mid-1930's would have averted the war against Hitler. Dr. Vagts, indeed, believes that the Truman administration permitted public declarations of this nature in the clear hope of intimidating the Russians. If so, the expectations were wrong, for such declarations had the harmful effect of providing grist for the Soviet "peace" propaganda mill and convincing many fearful Europeans that the United States would initiate a third world conflict. But, according to Dr. Vagts, there was never much likelihood that the United States would falter; the built-in restrictions of the American democracy preclude any acceptance of the idea of preventive war. Moreover, as a practical matter, membership in NATO operates as an effective deterrent. Throughout history, coalitions have proved to be deterrents rather than stimulants to preventive war. Such conflicts have usually been waged by autocratic powers acting alone or as the completely dominant members of a coalition. In any event, "the restless idea of preventive war" seemed to have reached a new way-station with Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement that the aim of American policy was not to be so strong as to be tempted into aggressive action, yet not so weak as to invite attack. It is kept under control, Vagts argues, "for the moment by the reins of adverse demo-

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cratic convictions and estimates of indeterminate though not vastly differing ratios of military strength" (p. 335).

(4) *Mobilization and diplomacy.* In a century of total wars the relationship between mobilization plans and diplomacy is, or at least should be, a close one. The intricate details of the mobilization plans drawn up by the European staffs before World War I were such that they could not have been changed overnight to meet any sudden alterations in a country's foreign policy. Conversely, as the example of Germany in 1914 showed, foreign policy could not be freed from the restrictions imposed by the mobilization plans drawn up by the military professionals. Indeed, one of the theoretical justifications offered for Hitler's dictatorial power was that centralized control would achieve a better coordination of these vital matters than previous German arrangements.

But since 1945 the purpose of mobilization has changed, at least so far as the Western powers are concerned. It has been undertaken as much for the purpose of avoiding or averting war as for the sake of waging any conflict that should develop. But Dr. Vagts doubts that the partial mobilization of the Western powers in recent years has been successful in checking Russian moves and feels that, at best, it has been only a minor deterrent to the Soviets. In his opinion the Russian leaders consciously chose a policy which would force the West into partial mobilization. Both historical precedents and Communist doctrine led the Soviet Union to anticipate political gains from the mobilization of its enemies. Such mobilization, the Russians reasoned, with its ruinous economic pressures, would lead to the collapse of the capitalistic system and would create a situation through which Russia could attain her foreign policy goals without the necessity of fighting. Undermining the capitalistic economy through forced mobilization is, in Vagts' opinion, "the latest stroke in the grand strategy of international class warfare."

(5) *The promise of victory.* When international conflict occurs, the most important advice which the military can give to the civilian government concerns the nation's readiness for war and the chances of ultimate victory. That the advice given on such occasions has been a fruitful source of civil-military discord has been proved on numerous occasions; one has only to remember the bitter consequences of Marshal Le Boeuf's remarks in 1870 about the readiness of the French army down to the last gaiter button.

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In considering the contemporary aspects of this problem Dr. Vagts is unwilling to speculate about American experience, but he is willing to hazard a few guesses about the Russians. His underlying assumption is that the Soviet rulers convinced themselves that the United States would never employ its atomic weapons against them and that, therefore, it would be safe to undertake their own imperialistic drive. But who convinced whom? Did the Soviet military leaders assure the Politburo that it was safe to proceed? Or did the commanders of the Russian army simply accede to the argument of the political leadership that the West would be provoked into a ruinous rearmament that would bring about the internal collapse of the capitalistic powers? There are, he admits, no clear answers, but he remains convinced, as indicated previously, that the Russians deliberately chose a strategy of exhaustion rather than one which aimed at the annihilation of their enemies—hoping thereby to destroy those enemies from within.

From this argument it follows that one of General MacArthur's basic failures was his inability to understand the fundamental nature of the Russian threat. As an "old-style" commander who thought only in terms of military victories won on battlefields, he simply did not realize that the Russian strategy was one of exhaustion. MacArthur thought in terms of and promised victory without understanding that the "strategy of exhaustion has always been closer to diplomacy and its methods and aims than the strategy of annihilation" (p. 371). Worse still, when he could not in fact deliver the promised victory, he had to be removed by an administration with a wider view of the issues at stake.

(6) *General staffs and foreign offices in time of war.* The nineteenth-century division of labor between the civilian and the military agencies of government produced an almost inevitable schism between general staffs and foreign offices in time of war. The military have traditionally been tempted to follow Moltke's dictum that, once war has started, politics must not be allowed to interfere with operations, while civilians echo the contention of Clausewitz that "the subordination of political viewpoints to the military is preposterous, for it is policy that has produced the war" (p. 438). Dr. Vagts is, on the whole, content to observe that such differences are not foreign to American experience and that the general decline of the position and importance of the Department of State began during World War II. Moreover, in the United States as elsewhere, the diplomats have never quite regained their once dominant position. But to Vagts the near-eclipse of diplomacy is an in-

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evitable by-product of Cold War tensions and emotions. An age in which the world picture is viewed in strategic terms frequently creates an atmosphere in which diplomacy becomes the servant of the strategist. Yet it is not the complete servant. For, as a bewildered MacArthur was to discover, the importance of politics was still sufficient to thwart the purpose of a single-minded follower of the dictum of Moltke. In the face of the broader vision and unity of the State Department and the Joint Chiefs, he was left to complain bitterly that he was compelled to wage an "impossible" war in which politically inspired demands forced him to restrict his efforts.

(7) *Strategy and diplomacy*. To differentiate between strategy and diplomacy has always been easier in theory than in practice. It is relatively easy to accept Moltke's contention that "strategy is the practical application of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object in view" (p. 453), but the problem of the definition of the "object in view" remains to be settled. Yet at the same time few would quarrel with the proposition that the strategist and the diplomatist must eventually reach at least a minimum agreement. The foreign minister, certainly, must take care that he does not pursue policies which would be militarily indefensible; conversely, the generals and admirals must be prepared to fight the wars into which their countries might be led by the policies of the foreign office.

Americans, according to Dr. Vagts, have rarely understood the vital necessity of reconciling diplomatic and military strategies. Indeed, since the beginning of the twentieth century the United States has been prone to adopt Far Eastern policies which the military simply could not defend. The controversy over American policy in China and Korea since 1945 is simply the inevitable outcome of an American failure of a half-century to reconcile the demands of military strategy with those of foreign policy.

(8) *Organization for unity*. It follows, then, that the lesson of history—the "axiom of statecraft"—is the need for unity of policy and strategy. And not only within governments, but also between nations. Coalitions, for example, have historically been regarded as weak because they suffered the ills of divided policies and divided strategies. The greatest significance of NATO perhaps lies in the fact that it marks a determination to iron out policies and establish unity prior to the outbreak of war.

The practical problem of government, as vital today as a century ago, is that of creating unity between the military and the civilian agencies

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of government, between strategy and policy. Nineteenth-century states, by creating specialized bureaus and departments to handle civil and military affairs, may thereby have averted some of the traditional conflicts between soldiers and civilians. But at the same time this specialization and departmentalization furthered the tendency of military men to overvalue the importance of armed might, and of civilians to overestimate the possibilities of diplomacy. In our own day, moreover, the increasing complexity of government and the multiplication of offices and bureaus have made the problem of achieving unity even more acute. The traditional solution of handling all foreign business through a Foreign Office or Department of State has, for instance, clearly proved impossible in recent years. Thus, one returns again and again to the axiom of unity, and the fact that it is so often reiterated means simply that it is all too often forgotten or ignored.

The position of the President of the United States, to be sure, is such that, if so inclined, he can serve as unifier and coordinator. But, in Dr. Vagts' opinion, Roosevelt performed this task only indifferently during World War II, and events in the years immediately following the war revealed only bewildering shifts between the primacy of military considerations and the primacy of diplomatic factors. Final recognition of the American failure came with the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, for its passage marked the American realization "of the fundamental requirements of the post-war diplomatic-military situation—the complete and constant unity of policy, and coordination or integration of means and measures in preparation for total war and in the conduct of the 'cold war'" (p. 520).

Yet even the permanent establishment of such institutions as the National Security Council did not automatically create unity or end rivalries, as the differences between Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson were soon to demonstrate. Organization itself can never provide the complete solution; what Vagts' terms the "irrational residue" always remains. Moreover, so far as the United States is concerned, the achievement of unity is always hampered by the historically entrenched views of the individual services and departments, and the American tradition of limited government—believed by most Americans to be a necessary guarantee of personal freedom—will remain as a check against complete centralization and unification.

The subjects just discussed represent the major headings in *Defense and Diplomacy*. There are, to be sure, other chapters in this extensive

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volume. One, for example, considers the historic role of military missions sent to foreign countries and concludes that the nationalism of small and backward nations will continue to hamper the effectiveness of American missions just as it hindered the efforts of our European predecessors. Another section chronicles the role of the military in peace-making operations and the securing of armistices. Since World War II, the generals and admirals have become plenipotentiaries with only the most restricted of powers, and, as the Panmunjom negotiations indicated, military men seeking an armistice have operated under highly detailed instructions drawn up by governments increasingly aware of the strategic importance of political considerations. Likewise, with the post-1945 threat of nuclear destruction, the significance of the traditional armed demonstration—so often advocated by military men—has sharply declined. The Soviet Union, apparently convinced that the United States would never provoke outright war, has been, according to Dr. Vagts, singularly unimpressed by the movement of American troops or airplanes in recent years.

III

Evaluation of such a massive, disjointed study is difficult. The task is further complicated by the fact that most of its judgments are implicit, and its analyses are based on the Russia that existed before the death of Stalin. Nor, for that matter, is there anything in the way of a final summation. However, *Defense and Diplomacy* puts many contemporary issues in perspective; after reading it one wonders how, in the light of the past, Americans could have regarded the MacArthur affair as unique. It also shows how the role of the military has changed in many significant respects; after reading it one wonders why so many Americans failed to realize that the views of General MacArthur had no place in the atomic age.

But it is also clear that Alfred Vagts, whose earlier books had stressed the dangers of militarism, has shifted his ground. On the whole, he is now to be found on the side of the generals and the admirals. In his own defense, he would surely argue that he always meant to draw a sharp line of demarcation between sheer militarism and genuine military needs, and he would maintain that, since the objective conditions of the world situation have changed, an emphasis upon military considerations is now fundamental. But one wonders if the conversion has not been too extreme. Dr. Vagts accepts quite easily the familiar charge

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that President Roosevelt was blind to military reality in planning the peace; he claims that American military men deserve full credit not only for understanding the nature of the Russian threat but also for promoting the cause of Western unity by championing German rearmament; and he is prone to maintain that the Soviet threat can be interpreted in almost exclusively military terms. Indeed, in his view, the Russians deliberately brought about Western rearmament because Marxist theory taught that it would destroy the capitalistic economy.

Yet the lesson of the book, undoubtedly a familiar one, is the need for unity in policy-making—the necessity of bringing strategy and diplomacy together and of recognizing their mutual dependence. The dangers of overspecialization and departmentalization are made crystal clear, and while no Western nation can afford to create another totalitarianism to match the Soviet Union, neither can it forget to think of "the preservation of freedom as something no longer possible except by the timely generation and readying of power through the organized unity of foreign and military policy" (p. 522).

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THE APPEAL OF COMMUNISM IN ARAB COUNTRIES

By MARVER H. BERNSTEIN

Walter Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956, 362 pp. $6.50.

IN an appendix footnote to his tightly packed and ably constructed history of Communist parties in the Middle East, Walter Z. Laqueur quotes Karl Marx on the ignorance of Middle Eastern affairs prevailing in the West: ". . . the common notions floating about among the public were based more upon the *Arabian Nights Entertainment* than upon any historical facts. Official diplomatic functionaries, having been on the spot, boasted a more accurate knowledge, but this, too, amounted to nothing, as none of these officials ever troubled to learn the languages. . . . The business of these gentlemen was not with the people, the institutions, the social state of the country; it was exclusively with the court" (p. 348, n. 3).[1]

In the century since Marx wrote, the West has undoubtedly learned a great deal about the Middle East, and some of its diplomats have even learned the languages of the region. But vast areas of ignorance have remained. With impressive scholarship, Mr. Laqueur fills many gaps in our knowledge of the origin and growth of Communist and other extremist movements in the Middle East. Manifesting an extraordinary linguistic facility,[2] he threads his way through the labyrinthian intricacies of Communist Party politics in Middle Eastern countries without losing the reader along this previously uncharted path.

The complex details of this study suggest that it is intended primarily for specialists in Middle Eastern affairs. Nevertheless, it will prove stimulating and valuable to the informed layman and to those interested in American policy in the Middle East, the economic growth of underdeveloped countries, and the impact of Asian-African affairs upon the West. About two-thirds of the text traces the tumultuous course of Communist Party activities in Egypt (including the Sudan), Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. Two chapters analyze the

[1] Quoted from *New York Tribune*, April 19, 1853.

[2] The author has used materials in nine languages: Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Yiddish, English, French, German, and Russian.

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interconnection of Communist parties with minority groups and right-wing extremist organizations. One chapter treats the Soviet entry into the region. Finally, in three appendices, Mr. Laqueur collects and analyzes the obiter dicta of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on the Middle East, describes the splits in the Communist Party of Palestine between 1938 and 1949, and summarizes his sources in a bibliographic note. Forty pages of notes are followed by an index that unfortunately manages to be quite useless.

Particularly since 1947, it has been known that Communist groups in the Middle East have developed close working alliances with right-wing nationalist movements, but the sources of the affinity between the extreme right and the extreme left have not been well understood. Charles Malik, speaking as the Foreign Minister of Lebanon, recently described the way in which Communists have infiltrated the Middle East: "They did it . . . through the Communist Party primarily and through Communist dupes and through an alliance, which they have very carefully worked out between themselves and radical nationalism throughout the area; and the latent anti-Westernism, which has always existed there; and the anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, which is largely justified throughout the area; and a certain species of religious fanaticism which is still active among certain types of mind. And they are most clever in working out alliances and associations and working arrangements with all these anti-Western elements in the area." To illustrate the growing importance and influence of Communist groups, the Foreign Minister stated: "For instance, in some countries, the press never prints anything that is critical of the Communist world. In particular—in one instance, at least—not a word was published in the press of some countries in the Middle East about the recent events in Hungary. Those events could just as well have happened in Mars or Betelgeuse as on the third planet from the sun. . . . ."[3]

Perhaps Laqueur's most important contributions are his analysis of the interpenetration of Communist and extreme nationalist movements in Middle Eastern countries, especially since 1945-1946, and his explanation of how extreme right-wing and fanatical religious groups became the political allies of Communist parties throughout the area. In treating the forces shaping Arab nationalism today, he accepts and fortifies the conclusions of other scholars. His original achievement lies

[3] Interview with Charles Malik, Foreign Minister of Lebanon, "How to Beat Communism in the Middle East," *U.S. News and World Report*, March 29, 1957, p. 88.

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in demonstrating the common political background of nationalism and communism in the Arab countries.

The author's anatomy of Arab nationalism may be summarized briefly. First, a considerable part of the intelligentsia and the urban population are no longer adherents of Islam. "What is decisive is that Islam has gradually ceased to be a serious competitor of Communism in the struggle for the soul of the present and potential *elites* in the countries of the Middle East" (p. 6).[4] Furthermore, the decay of traditional religion has encouraged the spread of communism, which offers a new creed to people in urgent need of a universal or total interpretation of life.

Secondly, Arab nationalism, unlike European nationalism, lacks the seasoning of humanitarian and liberal values, and Arab tradition has not been able to supply them. ". . . this has been the main reason why nationalism there, to this very day, has taken so much more frequently the form of chauvinism, of emotional aggression, and of opposition to everything foreign rather than of genuine patriotism" (p. 7). The teachings of Fascism and Nazism, along with Soviet theory, have had more influence than Western liberal nationalism. Arab nationalism today finds its ideological expression in totalitarianism, and its leaders, like the Communists, are authoritarian and anti-democratic.

Third, the totalitarian tendencies of Arab nationalism are strengthened by the unwillingness of the ruling oligarchies to solve the appalling social problems of the region. Instead they pursue military and political objectives with an emphasis on the acquisition of sovereignty and independence. Their goal is self-assertion and the elimination of all traces of foreign rule and influence. But their preoccupation with national aspirations is not linked to domestic reform. They are incapable of dealing with problems of land reform, elimination of disease, or improvement of living standards. There is an immense disproportion between nationalist pretensions and the capacity to govern.

Fourth, domestic discontent is channeled into chauvinistic outlets. The street mobs are diverted not by development schemes but by inflammatory speeches on foreign policy. "This nationalism is distinguished by the over-estimation of one's own nation and the denigration of others, the lack of the spirit of self-criticism and responsibility, an ambiva-

[4] Cf. Malik's comment: "I don't believe at all that Islam is a bulwark against Communism, any more than Greek Orthodoxy was in Russia. I don't believe it at all . . . the religious factor is incompetent by itself to withstand the Communist onslaught" (*ibid.*, p. 89).

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lent appraisal of the destiny of one's nation based on a feeling of inferiority, and a general tendency to attribute anything wrong with one's nation to the evil-doing of others . . ." (p. 8).

Lastly, centuries of misrule and oppression have had a profound impact on the Arab peoples. The willingness of religious authorities to accept foreign rule and the passive attitudes of rural populations have been extremely irritating to the intellectuals. As leaders of the urban masses, they have taught that ". . . everything that is wrong in their country is the result of imperialist oppression and exploitation: economic and cultural backwardness, disease, illiteracy, low living standards, the absence of a highly developed industry, political instability, corruption, and so on" (p. 11). The Western powers provide an ample supply of scapegoats to redeem the loss of Arab self-esteem. Like other scholars, Laqueur finds in the Arabs today a powerful sense of grievance and profound dissatisfaction with life, coupled, however, with a feeling of impotence and an "inability to sustain a constructive effort on the domestic scene" (p. 12).

Given these characteristics, Arab nationalism has paved the way for communism in the Middle East and has collaborated with it. The two movements are united by a common opposition to the West and a hatred of liberalism. In one Arab country after another, Communist leaders have been recruited from the ranks of the intelligentsia, and the party itself is pre-eminently a party of intellectuals organizing a middle-class revolt against feudal rule. In fact—and wholly unintentionally, it must be emphasized—many party leaders have been trained by Western-sponsored schools, notably the American University of Beirut.

The sources of Communist strength are apparent. As Laqueur indicates, "The decay of Islamic society and its values, together with the absence of liberal and democratic-socialist forces (for which there was little room in the specific conditions of the Middle East), made Communist success easier than it was in Europe, where it had to face political and spiritual competition. Resistance to Communism was confined to retrograde forces, vested interests, and certain religious dignitaries, but there was no opposition to Communism among the intelligentsia. Such opposition could have been based only on the defence of freedom and the liberty of the individual, but freedom and liberty were lacking in the Middle East, and where they had existed they were not so highly valued" (p. 272).

Why has communism appealed so strongly to the intelligentsia of

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the Arab countries? According to Dr. Malik, it has done so because "the intelligentsia have nothing else to believe; because they can't live in an intellectual and spiritual vacuum; because their old systems of thought and life and of feeling and of hope have crumbled, and because their contact with the western world during the last 50 to 80 years —and education through books, through magazines, through all that sort of thing—has not filled their souls. Into this vacuum comes Communism!" But with what should the vacuum be filled? Malik characterizes the Arabs' need as "Something to live for, some idea to serve, some cause to be dedicated to. . . . In the case of many of them, the vacuum is something far above mere personal need. It's a matter of convictions for some of them, because they knew nothing better. Now, this is a very serious point and the West must, as it were, fall on its knees and seek why it has proven itself inadequate in the case of many of these intellectuals in meeting their deep intellectual and spiritual needs, and why Communism has beaten it at the game."[5]

What is it about communism that appeals to the Arab intellectuals? According to Malik, "Its social vision, its total character, its total interpretation of life—its messianic idea, namely, that it is the wave of the future. Also, the promises it holds—that it will solve all these economic and social injustices."[6] Democracy, on the other hand, has not been a militant creed. In the words of Laqueur, it "did not provide the answers to many specifically Asiatic questions. Democracy could not inspire the masses, and it did not give firm spiritual support to the *elite*" (p. 275). It has been communism, not democracy, that promised to overcome academic unemployment. Under communism, the intellectuals would stand to gain heavily in prestige and status, as the Soviet example indicated. Laqueur agrees with Morris Watnick's observation: "A programme of seizing political power followed by prolonged industrialization, economic planning, recasting of the social structure, realignment of a country's international situation in favour of the U.S.S.R.—these are considerations of the type which can attract intellectuals only" (p. 274).[7]

Before World War II, about half of the leading members of Communist elites in the Arab countries belonged to ethnic and religious minorities. Since the end of the war, however, minority elements have become much less significant in the movement. In the main, the leaders

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 90. [6] *Ibid.*

[7] Quoted from Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Underdeveloped Peoples," in Bert F. Hoselitz, ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Countries*, Chicago, 1952.

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today are lawyers and students, about half or more of whom are drawn from upper- and middle-class groups, and the rest from lower middle-class society. Laqueur describes them as immature, rootless, volatile, and frustrated.

Thus, many factors account for the success of the Communist parties in gaining adherents and popular support in the Middle East. In addition to the profound appeal of Communist totalitarian doctrine to intellectuals, mention must be made of the weakness of other political parties, the inability of the middle class to produce effective democratic leaders, and the prevalence of corrupt, inefficient, and unstable governments. Malik in particular emphasized the superior organizing skill of the Communists: "You have nothing comparable to the dedication, to the hard work, to the international support, which the Communist Party everywhere receives. . . ."[8] And he reiterated: ". . . it takes one man in a country—one Communist or one extreme nationalist—to dominate the whole country."[9] Communist support has been further strengthened by the example of the Soviet Union, which has demonstrated that a backward and underdeveloped country could transform itself within a single generation into a world power of great industrial strength.

The Middle East offers ample evidence that there is no facile connection between economic and political progress and that economic development does not necessarily lead to democracy. For example, Lebanon is the most highly Westernized Arab country, but it also has one of the strongest Communist parties. Iraq has substantial wealth in the form of arable land and oil; yet the Iraqi peasant is as wretched as any in Asia, and dissension is rife in the country itself. Development projects have made more progress in Iraq than in other Arab countries, but democratic trends have not been nurtured. Despite ruthless suppression of the Iraqi Communist Party by the ruling oligarchy, it has many sympathizers. The Iraqi Communists have failed to mobilize their influence effectively chiefly because their party has been as inefficient as other Iraqi parties.

While the West has offered technical aid and loans to the Arab countries, the Soviet Union has offered a creed. Laqueur emphasizes the limitations of foreign economic assistance: "The fact that the Levant states, and Lebanon in particular, are more advanced in many respects than the other Arab countries serves as a reminder that economic progress, higher living standards, or the establishment of more hospitals

[8] Malik, *op.cit.*, p. 88.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

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and schools do not automatically expedite the spread of Western ideas of human freedom and democracy. What these states need now more than anything else is good government by rulers who are not discredited by recurrent scandals involving corruption and nepotism. The West can supply material help, but it cannot provide these countries with a new *elite* that would be willing and able to give its homeland real and honest leadership" (p. 167).

Dr. Malik agrees: ". . . I don't believe that if you improve the material lot of people you necessarily make them good . . . goodness is fairly independent—not altogether, but fairly independent—of what you call the 'standard of living'. . . . It's very well for you here to say you want to raise the standard of living of those countries so that they can afford all sorts of material things, but I remember that the Germans had these things and they fought you, and the Russians today have them and they fight you."[10]

The history of Communist parties in the Middle East confirms the growing realization that economic aid is a necessary but insufficient condition for the peaceful development of backward countries outside the orbit of Soviet domination or influence. As Laqueur demonstrates, the Arab countries are in desperate need of a competent native elite with a high degree of political maturity. The growth of Communist influence in the region demonstrates, above all, the "utter inability of the ruling classes to give their countries moderately efficient governments, to promote social and economic progress (however slow), and to create a minimal atmosphere of hopefulness instead of the present climate of despair" (p. 280).

Communist influence in the Middle East will become stronger unless the people of the Arab states are offered a viable alternative to their present ruling oligarchies. Only a political reorientation sustained by the values and ideology of democracy and liberalism is capable of bringing the Arab peoples back to reality, willing to begin the long journey toward freedom and economic progress.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

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Announcing the Publication in the Fall of 1957 of the

Biographical Directory of the USSR

by the

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR

A unique biographical work compiled by the research staff of the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany. Should be invaluable for researchers, students, journalists, radio and television commentators. Will be especially valuable for data on lesser-known Soviet figures who often come unexpectedly to the top through frequent changes and shifts. The work will include over two thousand biographies of the Soviet elite.

The gathering of data has been made possible by the use of a research staff of former Soviet scholars who have at their disposal a library of 25,000 volumes of Soviet books and 5,000 volumes of Soviet journals and newspapers, including rare complete editions of *Pravda*, which were scanned especially for biographical data. Other sources were biographies accompanying Stalin and other awards, reports of the Soviet Academy of Science elections, minutes of Communist Party congresses and conventions, encyclopedias, and an Institute fact file of 60,000 cards. The cut-off date for biographical data is June 30, 1957.

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